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This research follows the “timber wars” in the Sierras of northern California from 1984 
through 1996, including the formation of the controversial Quincy Library Group.  Using 
a case study approach, the research explores the longstanding divisions between 
environmentalists, loggers, and the U.S. Forest Service and the role that social identity 
and social context play in perpetuating an intractable conflict and then helping to 
transform the local conflict as the social, economic, political and ecological context 
surrounding protagonists changed.  Social identity theorists argue that individuals possess 
multiple social identities that become salient in different contexts or as context changes.  
Such identities exacerbate differences and can, when threatened, lead to intractable 
conflict and to common pool resource dilemmas characterized by “tragedy of the 
commons” situations.  The research explores the use of identity and characterization 
frames by disputants in the context of the local timber and the way frames change, 
leading to the transformation of the conflict and the emergence of a new conflict at the 
regional and national level.  Using a process theory framework, the research findings 
support the argument that external directional forces created conditions necessary for the 
recognition of a common fate, common identity, and positive interdependence between 
loggers and environmentalists, and for cooperation and collaboration to transcend 
hostility and conflict. Transformation of the longstanding conflict resulted from a 
probabilistic process between adopted leaders on both sides of the conflict in which a 
common identity and superordinate goal were framed by one side and, over time, 
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accepted by the other.  The research has relevancy for identity-based environmental and 
natural resource conflicts and public policy processes in which multiple users are 







“Hey, Mr. Cunningham… Hey, Mr. Cunningham… How’s your entailment 
gettin’ along?  Don’t you remember me, Mr. Cunningham? I’m Jean Louise 
Finch.  You brought us some hickory nuts one time, remember? I go to school 
with Walter.  He’s your boy, ain’t he? Ain’t he, sir? He’s in my grade, and he 
does right well.  He’s a good boy, a real nice boy.  We brought him home for 
dinner one time.  Maybe he told you about me, I beat him up one time but he was 
real nice about it.  Tell him hey for me, won’t you?”  
 
In Harper Lee’s classic story To Kill a Mockingbird (Lee 1960), Atticus Finch’s 
young daughter Scout admonishes Mr. Cunningham to remember her, while innocently 
empathizing with his impoverished situation.  The scene occurs in front of the County jail 
where Atticus is standing watch over the jail’s occupant, Tom Robinson, a black 
farmhand accused of raping a local white woman.  A somber mob has assembled to take 
Tom from the jail and lynch him before he goes to trial.  Mr. Cunningham, whom Atticus 
is helping through his entailments, is among the mob.  Scout, her older brother Jem, and 
their friend Dill, have located Atticus sitting in front of the jail next to a lamp that he 
brought from home.  As a standoff develops, Scout, Jem, and Dill push through the 
crowd and run up onto the porch.  Angry at disobeying his orders, Atticus implores the 
three to go home.  While Jem is standing his ground, Scout surveys the crowd for a 
familiar face.  She notices a discomforted Mr. Cunningham, who is avoiding her gaze.  
Reluctantly, he acknowledges her: “I’ll tell him you said hey, little lady… Let’s clear out.  
Let’s get going, boys.”  
Scout’s words diffused the tension and altered the dynamics of the conflict, at 
least for the time being.  But what actually changed? What prompted Mr. Cunningham to 
acknowledge Scout and disperse the mob? Why did the men follow? I argue that a 
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change occurred when the crowd’s collective identity was forced to shift from angry 
white mob to neighbors and community members who share a common fate.  Scout’s 
words did not so much reframe the conflict itself but reframed mob members’ identities, 
reminding them that in spite of racial divisions, they were bound together, aligned if you 
will, in common suffering and dignity, defined by their place in society, their place in 
time, and their location.  The story unfolds in a small southern town in the 1930s, a time 
and place of not only abject poverty but of stark racial distinctions.  As Lee (1960, p. 5) 
writes, “A day was twenty-four hours long but seemed longer.  There was no hurry, for 
there was nowhere to go, nothing to buy and no money to buy it with, nothing to see 
outside the boundaries of Maycomb County.”  
Harper Lee’s powerful story illustrates my research and provides a departure from 
conventional wisdom.  If identities can substantively shift, defusing tensions and altering 
the dynamics of conflict, then it might be wise to study this phenomenon in more detail, 
and in actual settings.  The settings with which I am primarily concerned involve 
environmental and natural resource conflicts at local and regional levels, and those 
having “common pool resource” characteristics (Ostrom 1990).  Common pool resources 
include a wide range of resources that may be used in common by more than one person, 
thus comprising a “common pool from which individuals might draw products or 
benefits” (Stein and Edwards 1999, p. 539).  Common pool resources can be governed 
under four basic management regimes: 1) open access, where rules and regulations are 
absent, 2) public property, where public access is controlled by the state, 3) private 
property, where rights are owned by the individual, and 4) common property, where a set 
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of rules and a system of organized collective action is present to govern access to, 
allocation of, and control over the resource (Stein and Edwards 1999).  
Common pool resource conflicts are of particular interest because they are 
characterized by “tragedy of the commons” dilemmas (Hardin 1968) in which multiple 
resource users, acting rationally and independently, collectively deplete a resource.  
Common pool resource dilemmas occur as users weigh the benefits of extracting one 
more unit of value from the resource against the costs of doing so, which are spread 
among all resource users.  The result, according to the theory, is inevitable resource 
depletion since common pool resource dilemmas share the key feature of the 
‘‘subtractability’’ of benefits as access to the resource increases (Becker and Ostrom 
1995; Dolsak and Ostrom 2003; Kollock 1998).  
In Hardin’s view (1968), resource depletion was inevitable unless resource users 
discovered appropriate mediating structures.  Hardin argued that public resources, like 
public grazing lands, are more susceptible to tragedy of the commons problems because 
multiple resource users have little incentive to voluntarily restrict their use. In fact, if they 
do they simply leave more for others to exploit.  And, since there is often relative 
anonymity among users, exploiters may go unchecked (Kollock 1998). Common pool 
resource dilemmas are among the most complex and difficult problems facing resource 
managers today and in the future. Yet they are not devoid of hope. 
Since Hardin first drew attention to the tragedy of the commons, policy makers, 
natural resource managers, and environmental activists have been trying to prevent its 
occurrence.  Interestingly, while most interpreters of the theory advocate either increased 
government regulation or increased privatization of resources (Bish, 1977), Hardin 
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himself (1968, p. 1247) called for “social arrangements of responsibility” wherein users 
collectively accept what he termed “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon,” adding that 
he was not talking about “arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats” but 
mutual coercion “by the majority of the people affected.”  The often overlooked 
component of his idea is that mediating structures are created through a process of 
deliberation and agreement that renders them binding and mutually enforceable (Bryan 
2004).  Ostrom (1990) makes this point in her discussion of alternatives to Leviathan 
control on the one hand and free-market privatization on the other. Instead, Ostrom 
advocates a consensual, binding contract among resource users that commits them to “a 
cooperative strategy that they themselves will work out” (p. 15).  
In a similar vein, Johnson (2003) asserts that since tragedy of the commons 
problems are derived from resource users acting independently, one’s individual decision 
to voluntarily restrict his or her own use to sustainable levels, regardless of what others 
do, will “typically have no reasonable chance of achieving their objective” (p. 272). This 
is because common pool resource dilemmas require collective action. Unilateral action 
may temporarily reduce access to or consumption of the resource, however,  
…where one’s life or livelihood is derived from use of the commons, personal 
sacrifice to preserve the commons tends to be self-eliminating, as the scrupulous 
users lose their livelihood to the ignorant, the unscrupulous, or to those who 
reasonably doubt that all will voluntarily reduce their use (p. 274). 
  
Johnson adds that individual use of the resource is not the problem:  
This is not a problem in which every individual act is harmful and the total of all 
of these harmful acts is dreadful. Rather, individual acts are harmless in 




Johnson concludes, appropriately, that from an ethical perspective, one’s moral 
obligation in the face of a common pool resource dilemma is to “work for a collective 
agreement that could avert a potential tragedy of the commons” (p. 283). 
Since Hardin’s publication, researchers have discovered various situations where 
the tragedy has been successfully averted (Acheson 1988; 2003; Ostrom 1990) and have 
expanded on his thesis.  These findings hold relevance for this research, primarily with 
respect to the convergence of social identity theory, social dilemma research, and the 
application of collaborative and negotiated approaches to resolving environmental 
disputes.  Such approaches, because of their potential to influence social identity, may be 
the most promising avenue for achieving the social arrangements that Hardin described, 
thus averting the tragedy and moving society towards a more sustainable relationship 
with the natural world. 
While common pool resource conflicts offer a particular challenge, they are part 
of a growing number of environmental and natural resource conflicts in our society today.  
Environmental and natural resource conflicts are thought to be deeply rooted in 
competing values – the protection of natural resources on one hand and the pursuit of 
economic and social goals on the other (Ostrom, 1990; Susskind and Weinstein, 1980).  
As Susskind and Weinstein (1980, p. 311) note,  
Almost every effort to protect or enhance environmental quality is perceived as a 
challenge, at least at the outset, by groups or individuals whose economic self-
interest – or political beliefs – are threatened.  Similarly, almost every attempt to 
promote economic development or technological innovation is viewed as a 
potential insult to the quality of the natural environment or a threat to the delicate 
‘ecological balance’ upon which we all depend. 
 
Considerable resources have been devoted to environmental conflict in the last quarter 
century, yet many of these disputes remain largely unresolved (Bacow and Wheeler, 
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1984; Bingham, 1986; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).  Kriesberg (1993), Coleman 
(2000), Caton Cambell (2003), and Burgess and Burgess (1996) refer to these kinds of 
persistent conflicts as “intractable” because they appear to defy resolution, even though 
they recognize them as dynamic and potentially resolvable.   
Conventional wisdom holds that intractable conflicts are characterized by 
substantive differences over the distribution of resources (Hammond and Grassia, 1985; 
Lewicki et al., 1997), incompatible goals (Klar et al., 1987) and/or conflicting interests 
and positions (Fisher and Ury, 1981) that persistently thwart agreement.  However, more 
recent research suggests that intractability may result from identity-based differences 
(Brewer, 2001; Coleman, 2000; Northrup, 1989; Rothman, 1997), which manifest 
themselves in such things as group affiliations, ideologies, power differences, and 
organizational structures.  As Lederach (1997) contends, roughly two-thirds of the 
intense armed conflicts in the world today result from identity-based differences, 
primarily of religious, ethnic, and political origin.  Hunter (1989) draws similar 
conclusions about environmental and natural resource conflicts.  
Unfortunately, the nature of environmental and natural resource conflicts and the 
conventional procedures we currently use to address them – protracted litigation and 
administrative appeals of regulated activities – seldom lead to their resolution (Bacow 
and Wheeler, 1984; Bingham, 1986; Susskind and Weinstein, 1980).  Moreover, while 
these approaches have helped level the playing field in most situations, by creating and 
strengthening laws that provide checks and balances on the free-market system and its 
externalities, it is unclear the extent to which such procedures have either resulted in 
greater protection for natural ecosystems and at-risk populations or solved complex 
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problems (Susskind and Weinstein, 1980; Tenbrunsel et al., 1997).  Some even argue that 
our reliance on strict standards and command-and-control procedures have resulted in the 
opposite effect (DeLong, 2002; Holling and Meffe, 1996; Huber, 1999).  Take, for 
instance, the following reflection from a former oil worker regarding the proposal to drill 
for oil in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge:  “Rightly or wrongly, regulation tends to 
cause adversarialism—a feeling I know all too well. It leads to circumvention if not 
outright corruption” (Masiel 2004, 89).  
Ironically, increased use of litigation and administrative appeals, and the relative 
success of such procedures in upholding environmental laws and policies, has spawned a 
new interest in alternative forms of resolving environmental conflicts (Bacow and 
Wheeler, 1984; Bingham, 1986; Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987).  Due in part to 
concerns that litigation and administrative appeals were resulting in win-lose outcomes 
that seldom solved the problem, and in part to perceptions that such procedures were both 
inefficient and costly, a handful of individuals began experimenting with what is now 
widely known as environmental dispute resolution, mediation, and negotiation (Bacow 
and Wheeler 1984; Bingham 1986; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).   
Environmental dispute resolution (EDR) – the process of voluntary negotiation 
among disputing parties – contained the possibility for actually resolving conflict, 
resulting in legitimate joint solutions and avoiding costly and protracted legal battles.  
However, while the practice of EDR has grown considerably over the last two decades, 
adversarial and confrontational approaches to managing environmental and natural 
resource conflicts are still the norm.  Nevertheless, EDR continues to show great promise 
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for resolving some intractable conflicts (Bacow and Wheeler 1984; Bingham, 1986; 
Talbot, 1983; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000).   
Moreover, environmental dispute resolution appears to be part of a larger social 
movement directed towards greater participation among diverse stakeholders bounded by 
a common physical and social environment (Cortner and Moote, 1999; Wondolleck and 
Yaffee, 2000).  Under the guise of such concepts as strong democracy (Barber, 1984), 
communitarianism (Etzioni, 1993), civic engagement (Putnam, 2000), and civil society 
(Bell, 1989), citizens are increasingly stepping across ideological, social, and political 
boundaries to engage in place-based problem solving.  In the environmental and natural 
resource arena, Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) describe how various forms of 
“collaboration” among diverse stakeholders are overcoming barriers, resolving conflict, 
and addressing pressing environmental and ecological problems.   
The differences between EDR and collaboration appear to be subtle, albeit 
important.  While both employ a process of interest-based negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 
1981; Gray, 1991), EDR is generally a reactive response to existing and heated conflict 
while collaboration is a more proactive response to anticipated conflict.  Moreover, EDR 
tends to be a short-lived process designed to address a pressing dispute while 
collaboration is more often an ongoing relational process designed to manage multiple 
issues (Gray, 1991; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000). 
Along these lines, one of the more dynamic if less studied phenomena that has 
spontaneously emerged over the last decade is community-based collaborative natural 
resource management (Bernard and Young, 1997; Cortner and Moote, 1999; Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, 2000; Yaffee et al., 1996).  Combining alternative dispute resolution and 
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collaborative principles with democratic, communitarian, and civic ideals, numerous ad-
hoc collaborative groups have overcome significant local conflicts in an effort to move 
their communities towards a more economically, socially, and ecologically sustainable 
future (Bernard and Young, 1997).  Familiar community-based groups such as the 
Quincy Library Group (CA), the Applegate Partnership (OR) and the Malpai Borderlands 
Group (NM) have evolved in part to address long-standing and bitter natural resource 
conflicts at the local level (Brick et al. 2001).  Moreover, citizens have initiated such 
groups out of a growing frustration with centralized “one size fits all” policies of federal 
land management agencies, and from an emerging perception that community-based 
solutions can best integrate economic, social, and ecological concerns (Bernard and 
Young, 1997; Brick et al. 2001).   
Community-based groups, however, are not without controversy, which stems in 
part from the fact that most of the communities that have initiated them are surrounded 
by public lands that are managed by federal agencies pursuant to acts of Congress.  As 
such, community-based groups, even when their composition reflects national interests, 
represent only one element in multiple-use public land policy and administration.  
Federal laws and policies such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) have well-established procedures for 
involving the broad public in agency decision-making (Vig and Craft, 2000; Wondolleck, 
1988).  Community-based groups, critics argue, are simply attempts to circumvent these 
procedures (Coggins, 1996; 2001; McCloskey, 1997).  Such groups counter that they are 
not intent on circumventing environmental laws and policies but are simply better 
informed and equipped to deal with complex land management issues, are in a better 
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position to monitor and steward land management activities, and have more at stake in 
the outcome of public lands decisions (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000).   
The controversy raises significant questions about how natural resource 
management decisions are to be made; the role of local communities, industry, and 
environmentalists in decision-making; and what “hat” professional resource managers 
should wear in decision-making processes (McCloskey, 1997; Wondolleck and Ryan, 
1999).  The controversy also raises important questions concerning the ability of national 
and regional interest groups, particularly environmental organizations, to participate 
effectively at the local level; the capability of resource-dependent communities to balance 
environmental protection with economic prosperity; and the ability of group members to 
overcome significant ideological barriers.  The controversy has even rekindled 
fundamental Jeffersonian and Madisonian debates over the ability of “the people” to self-
govern (Kemmis, 1990).  Nevertheless, the former and current federal administrations 
have extensively touted collaborative approaches to decision-making affecting natural 
resources and the environment.   
Studies are emerging that address the breadth of community-based collaborative 
resource management groups (Cestero, 1999; Coughlin et al., 1999; Duane, 1997; 
Wondolleck and Yaffee, 1994; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Yaffee et al.  1996). Most 
of these studies compare such groups across certain relevant and observable variables.  
While these studies shed light on similarities and differences among operating groups, 
there has been no empirical research to date designed to gain an understanding of the 
underlying dynamics that enabled group members to overcome significant ideological 
and social conflict and agree to collaborative action.  This research attempts to fill that 
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gap by exploring one controversial community-based collaborative group and its deep-
seated conflict in great depth and over a long period, including the dynamic context 
within which the conflict unfolds. 
The research argues that dramatic and complex changes in the context 
surrounding the conflict may create conditions that enable social identities among key 
protagonists in the conflict to “align” in such a way that intergroup conflict is 
transformed into cooperation and collaboration as common identities among protagonists 
become salient.  Further, such alignment is facilitated by the salience of a common fate as 
the community and the surrounding landscape emerge as a socializing construct, which 
results from the changing context.  The research draws heavily from social psychological 
research on social identity and social categorization theory as well as research on social 
identity and conflict and the role of identity in common pool resource dilemmas.  
The research applies social identity theory to a complex and dynamic natural 
situation, rather than the more common experimental setting.  Further, the research builds 
on social identity and self-categorization theory by more fully exploring the role of 
context in social identity salience, and how contextual dynamics can influence social 
identity salience, resulting in new interpretations of the conflict and novel forms of 
organizing.  More specifically, while previous experimental research has focused on a 
shift in identity salience resulting from a new context, this research explores how the 
surrounding context, when studied longitudinally, can shift around disputants, causing 
salient social identities to align in ways that allow cooperation to transcend confrontation. 
In addition, the research more fully explores the role that leaders play in transforming 
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conflicts by framing a common identity and common goals, and by creating a common 
space for adversaries to step into when they cross identity-based boundaries.  
The research is particularly relevant to the fields of environmental dispute 
resolution, natural resource policy and planning, and common pool resource dilemmas 
where tragedy of the commons problems are likely to occur.  In each of these arenas, as 
Susskind and Weinstein (1980) argue above, conflict among people with competing 
motives and values commonly prevents them from working together to solve complex 
social, economic, and ecological problems, often resulting in protracted litigation and 
gridlock.  In contrast, we know from following EDR and collaborative resource 
management case studies that voluntary and negotiated processes can lead to mutually 
acceptable solutions to such problems.  From these case studies, we now know many of 
the guiding principles and processes that facilitate collaborative outcomes (Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, 2000).  However, we are still at a loss as to how disputants are able to 
transform seemingly intractable environmental and natural resource conflicts.  What 
changes occur among disputants that facilitate transformation? What changes occur 
within the context surrounding the conflict and how do protagonists interpret and act on 
those changes?  This research addresses these questions head on.   
I began the research by posing the open-ended question, “What changes when 
difficult environmental conflicts are transformed?”  As I began my research in this 
grounded way, I had few specific ideas or hypotheses about what I would discover.  My 
thoughts ran from changes in power that alter disputants’ choices and alternatives, to 
changes in disputants’ underlying interests, to changing perceptions of the problem or of 
each other.  The conflict I chose as a case study can be explored from these perspectives 
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and others.  However, as I waded through newspaper articles describing the local conflict 
and its profound transformation, I began to observe that the way disputants used “we” 
and “they” in their narrations of the conflict changed significantly. 
Further research into this previously intractable conflict began to reveal that 
social identities of the key protagonists in the local dispute appeared to change as the 
conflict transformed, and that changing identities appeared to be a factor not only in the 
transformation of the localized conflict, but also in the creation of a new conflict at a 
regional and national scale.  This was most notable when comparing the early stages of 
the conflict with the most recent stages, almost 15 years apart.  While there were other 
changes, this one in particular was intriguing because it appeared so unlikely given the 
contentious history of the conflict.  How could such acrimonious behavior be 
“transformed” into voluntary cooperation and collaboration?  Many observers were 
equally puzzled and astounded by this dramatic turn of events. Working from this initial 
observation, I began to notice that disputants’ identities appeared to be connected in some 
way with the conflict and its resolution.  It also appeared that common identities with 
community and place seemed to supersede identities associated with ideology and 
interest.  As a result, I arrived at the following research question: “What role does social 
identity play in the transformation of a community-based environmental conflict?” 
Every journey requires a road map and this journey is no different.  Chapter II 
explores the theoretical grounding for a social identity approach to understanding 
conflict, cooperation, and common pool resource dilemmas. Social identity theory 
provides a lens through which the case study can be understood as a set of complex 
cognitive processes operating at the level of the social group. When conflicts are played 
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out between groups, a social identity lens can help us understand the cognitive processes 
and how these processes contribute to the perpetuation and resolution of difficult 
conflicts. Chapter III describes the methodology used in the research, including the use of 
disputant “frames” to observe and track changes in social identity over time, the analysis 
of frames using a “document analysis” approach, and the use of “process theory” to 
explain behavioral change that does not follow a causal relationship.  Disputant frames 
were selected due to the wealth of documented data wherein disputants framed social 
identities in playing out the conflict. Document analysis was used to categorize frames so 
as to document changing patterns. Process theory was selected to account for situations 
where conditions exist that are necessary for behavioral change to occur, as well as the 
probabilistic processes that may lead to their occurrence.   
Chapter IV provides a case study of the controversial Quincy Library Group 
(QLG), including a history of the local “timber wars,” their transformation, and the 
emergence of a new conflict at the national level.  The QLG case is the often-told story of 
the conflict and its resolution from a “rationalist” perspective.  The story will be retold 
from a social identity perspective in a later chapter. Chapters V and VI offer a descriptive 
analysis of the data, focusing on identity and characterization frames during two phases 
of the conflict respectively. Chapters V and VI rely on document analysis techniques to 
determine base line identity and characterization frames during the first phase of the 
conflict and to demonstrate emergent patterns of change in the second phase.  
Chapter VII describes the dramatically changing context surrounding the QLG 
case and the external directional forces acting upon it. Context is a critical component of 
social identity theory and provides a basis for understanding the self-selection of social 
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identities and their ability to change, with changing context.  Chapter VIII uses a process 
theory framework to make sense of and explain the frame changes that are observed in 
the analysis. Process theory focuses on the conditions necessary for behavioral change to 
occur, the external directional forces that align the conditions and actors, and the 
probabilistic processes that trigger behavioral change.  Chapter VIII provides a retelling 
of the QLG story from a social identity perspective. Finally, Chapter IX returns to the 
research question, explores the relevancy of the findings for environmental conflict 
management and public policy; the contribution of the research to the fields of social 
identity theory conflict management theory, and common pool resource dilemmas; and 
the limitations of the research.  
This research takes a decidedly specific approach to looking at one deep-seated 
environmental conflict and its transformation at the local level. It was decided early in the 
study to select and follow a specific theoretical framework. Preliminary research on the 
QLG case led to the selection of social identity theory as a framework because of the way 
disputants’ collective identities appeared to change as the conflict was transformed. As 
the study demonstrates, social identity theory provides an important lens through which 
we can make sense of this and similar conflicts, especially where collective or group 
identities are salient in the discourse, and where identities may prevent parties from even 
coming to the table. Where “we” and “they” are implicit or explicit lines of demarcation 
regarding resource allocation or access, social identity theory provides an important and 
critical lens for understanding. Unfortunately, public policy makers, conflict managers, 
and participants tend to focus on the substantive dimensions of such conflicts, and the 
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seemingly rational choices of disputants, and tend to overlook the identity-based nature 









Social Identity: Conflict, Cooperation, 
and Common Pool Resource Dilemmas 
 
In this chapter I develop a theoretical foundation for the research question, as well 
as an argument for a social identity approach to environmental and natural resource 
conflict.  I also explore the role that social identity plays in particularly tricky challenges 
that characterize many natural resource conflicts – common-pool resource dilemmas.   
Social Identity  
To begin, I am drawing a theoretical distinction between identity and social 
identity theories, and am following the latter theoretical perspective that recognizes social 
identity in the context of group memberships or social categorizations that individuals 
choose for themselves and in which others concur (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).  Tajfel 
(1972) first introduced the concept of social identity and defined it as “the individual’s 
knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and 
value significance to him of this group membership” (p. 31).  Brewer (1991) defines 
social identity as “categorizations of the self into more inclusive social units that 
depersonalize the self-concept, where I becomes we” (p. 476).  According to Abrams 
(1992), an individual’s social identity can be made up of simultaneous identifications 
with many different groups.  A group or social unit in this sense is “a collection of 
individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share 
some emotional involvement in this common definition, and achieve some degree of 
social consensus about evaluation of their group and of their membership in it” (Tajfel  
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and Turner, 1986, p. 15).  By this definition, a group is not limited by size or proximity.   
Turner (1991) contends that the social group, and not the individual, is the basic 
unit of society and thus explains the conformity to group norms and roles as conditions of 
membership.  Accordingly, individuals define themselves in terms of their social group 
memberships and affiliations and then “enact roles as part of their acceptance of the 
normative expectations of in-group members” (Turner et al., 1994, p. 460).  An 
individual’s role is thus subsumed within the concept of the group, rather than the other 
way around.  Turner et al. (1994) argue that shared social identity “gives rise to the 
emergent, psychologically distinctive processes of group life” and provides an 
explanation for “how human individuals are able to act as other than and more than just 
individual persons” (p. 460).  Further, and particularly relevant to this research, Turner 
(1987) contends that “the general process underlying mutually co-operative intensions 
and expectations is the extent to which players come to see themselves as a collective or 
joint unit, to feel a sense of ‘we-ness’, of being together in the same situation facing the 
same problems” (p. 34). Shared social identity makes it possible for group members to 
produce shared knowledge and shared understanding about ways of thinking and acting 
that are situationally appropriate (Turner 1991). 
In her optimal distinctiveness theory, Brewer (1991) suggests that social identity 
derives from a “fundamental tension” between human needs for validation and similarity 
on the one hand and contrasting needs for uniqueness and individuality on the other.  
Group membership balances this tension by enabling humans to be “the same and 
different at the same time” (Brewer 1991, p. 477).  Similarly, Brewer and Gardner (1996) 
suggest that individuals need to define themselves not only internally, in terms of a 
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unique self-concept, but as an “extended” sense of self, which is developed through 
“immersion in relationships with others and with larger collectives” (p. 83).  The authors 
make a further distinction between relational identities, which are based on personalized 
bonds of attachment, and collective identities, which are based on impersonal bonds 
derived from identification with a symbolic group or social category.   
A definition of social identity also requires some form of social comparison 
between one’s own group and other relevant groups such that “any behavior displayed by 
one or more actors toward one or more others… is based on the actors’ identification of 
themselves and others as belonging to different social categories” (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986, p.15).  Similarly, Turner (1999) refers to social identities as self-categorizations 
that define the individual in terms of “shared similarities with members of certain social 
categories in contrast to other social categories” (p. 12).  Brewer (2000) contends that 
group identity arises from “categorical distinctions between those who share some 
attribute, experience or label and those who do not” (p. 119).  Moreover, once individuals 
establish social identities, they almost immediately began to perceive themselves as 
different from members of other groups, often evaluating their group more positively.  
Tajfel (1972) referred to this phenomenon as the minimal group paradigm 
because it was observed under conditions absent of substantive intergroup difference or 
conflict.  Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm occurs when mere group membership and 
identification creates perceived similarities among in-group members and differences 
between in-groups and out-groups, which in turn can lead to corresponding stereotyping, 
discrimination, and prejudice (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), as well as conflict (Brewer, 
2001; Kelman, 1997; 2004; Rothman, 1997; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).  The consequences 
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of social categorization and comparison, according to Hogg and Abrams (1988), is the 
accentuation of both the perceived similarities among in-group members and the 
perceived differences between in-group and out-group members.  These similarities and 
differences fall out along the lines of attitudes, beliefs, values, behavioral norms and 
other characteristics that are relevant to the category (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).  
Further, Foddy and Hogg (1999) argue that the process of self-categorization 
actually generates group behavior. Through it, the self is “assimilated to the contextually 
salient in-group prototype which both describes and prescribes cognition, affect, and 
behavior” (p. 312). It also sets up the process of social comparison. The authors use an 
example similar to the current research to make this point: “categorization of self as a 
conservationist, particularly in contrast to loggers, would make salient beliefs about 
environmentally sensitive behaviors, and influence evaluations of both the ingroup and 
the outgroup” (p. 312).  They further argue: 
Self-categorization is thus responsible for self-definition as a group member, and 
is seen to be the basis for normative behavior, conformity, differential intergroup 
behavior, ethnocentrism, ingroup bias and stereotyping. Because groups furnish 
social identity… they not only tell us who we are and how we should think, feel, 
and act; but prescribe our worth in relation to other people and other groups (p. 
312-313). 
 
As alluded to above, social identity theory is further distinguished by the role that 
social context plays in self-categorization (Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; 
Turner et al., 1994).  Social context provides the frame of reference, social reality, or 
domain that informs or activates a particular social categorization (Brewer, 1991).  
Turner (1987) contends that there is a functional relationship between self-categorization 
and context and suggests that the salience of a given social category will depend on its 
“fit” with an environmental reality.  It follows that individuals hold distinct and 
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contextually responsive social identities within a relevant social context (Hogg et al., 
1995).  Turner et al. (1994) further suggest that social identity is always context 
dependent; the individual, they argue, “gains identity from being placed in context” (p. 
458).  Context may also include the larger and more complex environment in which the 
individual functions.  For example, Ethier and Deaux (1994) explored the effects on 
social identity from a change of environment, where social identities among newly 
enrolled Hispanic students in a predominantly Anglo university changed as a function of 
their new environment and thus, “no longer exist as the person has known them” (p. 244).   
Further, social identities are not fixed and absolute properties of individuals but 
are “relative, varying, context-dependent properties” (Turner et al., 1994, p. 456).  Turner 
and his colleagues define four such properties: the salient level of self-categorization, 
from the individual to the increasingly inclusive group; the distinction among relevant 
categories, determining which social identities are salient; the meaning of a category, 
how people perceive or judge a social identity and its “content dimensions” in 
comparison to relevant others; and the relative prototypicality of group members within a 
category, or the typical or representative group member in a given context.  All vary, 
often dramatically, with context.   
Turner et al. (1994) further argue that variability in self-categorization is not 
arbitrary but is closely related to variation in social context.  Self-categorizations are 
“social representations of the individual-in-context in that they change with the context, 
not just with attributes of the individual” (p. 458).  Social identity varies in order to better 
represent the individual’s changing relationship to reality.  The self, they argue, “is not a 
relatively fixed mental structure but the expression of a dynamic process of social 
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judgment.  The particular self-categories that emerge in different contexts are variable 
products of this judgmental process” (p. 458).  Similarly, Brewer (1991) argues that 
social identity is expandable and contractible across different domains, resulting in 
transformations in the definition of self.  “When the definition of self changes, the 
meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also changes accordingly” (p. 476).  
Consistent with the idea of contextual responsiveness is the notion that social 
identities are both stable and fluid.  On one hand, Deaux (1993) suggests that social 
identities are “reasonably stable categories of membership to which a person claims to 
belong, together with sets of personal meanings and experiences linked to the identities” 
(p. 6).  Deaux recognized that each category contains a context or domain in which “its 
influence is most likely to be evident” (p. 9).  For example, Deaux (1991) found that 
adults commonly claimed approximately seven social identities, which remained 
relatively stable over the life of her study – approximately one year.  As social realities 
shifted, respondents were able to move from one salient social identity to another.  
“Equipped with a set of stable identities,” Deaux (1991) concluded, “individuals have 
some latitude as to what identity will come to the forefront.  At any given time, in any 
given interaction, one identity may be more prominent than others, guiding behavior and 
influencing the sequence of events” (p. 84).   
Deaux (1991) argues that both internal forces, such as the number of interactions 
one has that are “defined in terms of that identity,” and external forces, such as “strong 
situational demands,” as well as more subtle actions and cues, influence what social 
identities are likely to emerge (p. 85).  Moreover, individuals do not simply cast about in 
a sea of influences but, instead, “approach situations with particular goals in mind and 
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then consciously choose which identity or aspect of self to depict” (p. 86).  Harre (1979) 
adds that people are neither wholly autonomous nor wholly dependent on social context, 
but instead have “relative autonomy” with respect to their response to a given set of 
circumstances.  On a more strategic level, research on self-verification theory (Swann, 
1983) suggests that individuals may also select a context or social reality that supports a 
particularly important social identity. 
On the other hand, despite forces for stability, there are countervailing forces for 
fluidity.  Deaux (1991) recognizes three ways in which social identities can change or 
shift in response to changing context – in the meaning of the identity, in its relative 
importance, or as an entirely new or abandoned identity.  In the first, Deaux argues that 
an individual may reassess the meaning associated with a particular social identity rather 
than change the category itself.  In the second, Deaux suggests that an individual may 
reassess the importance or salience a particular identity holds relative to other choices.  In 
the third, Deaux contends that the individual may actually change the category, either by 
forming a new identity or by abandoning an existing identity.   
Social identity theorists have made attempts to categorize the range of social 
identities claimed by research participants and are beginning to focus on the study of 
particular social categories.  Using cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling, for 
example, Deaux and colleagues (Deaux, et al., 1995) identified five broad categories that 
captured representative social identities among survey of respondents – relationships, 
vocations and avocations, political affiliations, stigmatized groups, and ethnic and 
religious affiliations.  Also relevant to this research is the work of Hogg and Terry (2000) 
and others on social identification in an organizational context.  Hogg and Terry define 
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organizational identity as “units or divisions within organizations, professions or 
sociodemographic categories that are distributed across organizations,” along with the 
organizations themselves (p. 122).  
In addition, in an earlier study Deaux (1993) described situations in which a 
geographical or environmental context provided the basis for social identity and 
recognized the work of Proshansky and others (Proshansky, 1978; Proshansky et al., 
1983) in defining “place identity.”  Particularly relevant to this research, place identity is 
also consistent with Mathews (1983) research on common social identities among 
neighbors and community members, and is linked to the relationship between a group of 
individuals and a place, region, or physical environment (Lalli 1992; Wulfhorst 2000). 
Rural sociologists Lee et al. (1990), for example, discuss three definitions of community 
including a) “a human settlement with a fixed and bounded local territory,” b) “a local 
social system involving interrelationships among people living in the same geographic 
area,” and c) “a type of relationship, especially a sense of shared identity [that] does not 
require a geographic basis for social interaction” and “may be widely dispersed, as in the 
‘environmental community,’ ‘forestry community,’ or ‘loggers’ world” (p. 6-7). Lee and 
colleagues’ definitions b and c are consistent with Kusel’s definitions of “communities of 
place” and “communities of interest” respectively (Kusel et al. 1996).  
Finally, a few social identity theorists have explored collective identity at a 
regional level. Bernd et al. (1995), for example, studied regional identity among male 
inhabitants of the Saarland region of Germany using a social identity lens. Bernd and 
colleagues began with the premise that “given the appropriate social context or frame of 
reference, people identify even with highly inclusive groups such as nations or even 
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continents (e.g. in times of war)” (p. 326).  Bernd and colleagues defend the idea of a 
regional identity arguing that “because a region is typically defined by convergent 
boundaries in terms of geography, common history and culture, its population often 
constitutes a group at a level of inclusiveness that is conducive to the perception of 
[Brewer’s] ‘optimal distinctiveness’” (p. 326).  Their research findings provide evidence 
that social identification with the Saarlands region, when salient, constitutes a distinct 
social identity. In addition, the study was unique in that it revealed that research subjects 
were capable of making distinctions between different levels of inclusiveness – the 
Saarlands region and the nation – rather than simply in-/out-group distinctions.  
Contrasting Identity and Social Identity Theories 
In contrast to social identity theory described above, identity theory is a micro-
social theory of human interaction that helps explain action-oriented and self-verifying 
roles among individuals (Stets and Burke, 2000; Stryker and Burke, 2000).  Identity 
theory is focused on individual role-related behaviors and categories that are determined 
by the “reciprocal relationships between self and society” (Hogg et al., 1995, p. 256).  
From an identity theory perspective, a role is “a set of expectations prescribing behavior 
that is considered appropriate by others” (Simon, 1992).  The core of one’s identity, 
according to Stets and Burke (2000), is the “categorization of the self as an occupant of 
that role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations associated 
with that role and its performance” (p. 225).   
According to Stryker and Burke (2000), roles are mediated through interactions 
between the individual and society.  The successful enactment of the role by the 
individual not only validates his or her identity but also enhances self-esteem and the 
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self-concept.  Role identities, according to the authors, are arranged more or less 
hierarchically in how they inform the self-concept, with those at the top more self-
defining and salient than those near the bottom.  Identity salience, according to Hogg et 
al. (1995) is the likelihood that the identity will be invoked in various contexts. 
While identity and social identity theories are similar, identity theorists are more 
attuned to self-defining roles that people occupy in society, or within a group, while 
social identity theorists focus on social categories that people ascribe to themselves and 
others (Hogg et al., 1995).  This distinction, while subtle, can be made clearer, perhaps, 
by contrasting the identity basis of “environmentalist” through both identity and social 
identity lenses.  Applying identity theory, the role of environmentalist carries with it 
societal expectations and standards that define the norms and behaviors by which the 
individual must abide in order to achieve a positive self-evaluation in that role.  Applying 
social identity theory, the individual associates herself with the social category of 
environmentalist, to which she belongs and in which others see her.  In the first, she is 
accepting a role for which a segment of society sets and maintains standards – what it 
means to be an environmentalist (Stets and Burke, 2000).  In the second, she is choosing 
an affiliation with a distinct group or category that is recognized both by its members and 
non-members (Hogg et al., 1995). 
Social Identity and Social Conflict 
 
Early theories of social behavior assumed that intergroup differentiation led to 
hostility and subsequent conflict.  Sumner’s (1906) theory of ethnocentrism, for example, 
held that out-group hostility is a natural condition of differentiation.  “The insiders in a 
we-group,” Sumner argued, “are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and 
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industry, to each other.  Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and 
plunder” (p. 12).  However while Tajfel’s (1972) research confirmed that intergroup 
comparisons led to positive assessments of in-groups over out-groups, it provided no 
evidence supporting corresponding in-group hostility towards out-groups.  According to 
Brewer (2001), in-group identification precedes out-group hostility but is not by itself a 
sufficient explanation for intergroup conflict.  The explanation is far more complex.   
Brewer (2001) contends that social categorization accomplishes two fundamental 
purposes – it partitions humans into discrete subsets and it highlights intergroup 
similarities and differences.  In addition, since social categorization is a “self-reflecting 
phenomenon,” Brewer argues, it also engages additional processes that encourage further 
social differentiation by means of in-group attachment.  Positive valuations resulting 
from in-group attachment in turn facilitate the development of trust and cooperation 
among in-group members, which perpetuates a “benign cycle” of positive attitude and 
behavior within the group. Positive feelings and behavior towards in-group members, 
however, is limited to those sharing a common membership in the group.  The extension 
of positive behavior towards others, “stops at the boundary between in-group and out-
groups; attitudes towards those outside the boundary are, at best, characterized by 
indifference” (Brewer 2001, p. 22).  The consequence of such indifference in many 
intergroup situations is the perception of discrimination since goodwill and cooperation 
are extended to individuals on the basis of category membership.  However, as Brewer 
(2001) notes, discrimination occurs, “not because outgroups are hated, but because 
positive affects such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved for the ingroup and 
withheld from outgroups” (p. 23).   
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Hostility is also perceived when a group engages in differentiation that is 
triggered by a salient need to address an uncertainty about the group’s performance or 
standing.  Most often that need is met by comparing the in-group to similar out-groups on 
relevant variables.  Some such comparisons, however, lead to “better than” or “worse 
than” evaluations and to what Turner (1975) terms “social competition” for positive 
identity.  While the goal of social competition is to seek relative gain for the in-group, it 
is normally not intended to cause direct harm to the out-group as an end in itself (Brewer, 
2001).  As such, Brewer (2001) and Struch and Schwartz (1989) make a distinction 
between intergroup differentiation and discrimination derived from competition for social 
status, and aggression driven by the desire to inflict harm. 
Brewer (2001) suggests that social identity theory provides an adequate 
framework for explaining intergroup discrimination that arises from social competition.  
However, as Brewer suggests, “the story becomes more complicated when one tries to 
use the same framework to account for more virulent outgroup hate and intergroup 
hostility” (p. 27).  To justify aggression against out-groups, the in-group must perceive 
“the very existence” of the out-group or its goals and values as a threat to the survival or 
maintenance of the in-group (p. 27).  To fully understand this threat, it is important to 
understand how the interests of both groups come to be perceived as in conflict.  One 
explanation is that the groups are engaged in substantive competition over finite or scarce 
resources.  In such situations, the connection between in-group survival and intergroup 
antagonism appears obvious.  However, Brewer contends that analyses of warfare and 
intergroup violence do not objectively correlate with resource scarcity or competition.  
To the contrary, she argues, “threat is often subjective and symbolic” (p. 28).   
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Brewer (2001) offers another explanation that begins with the recognition that 
group living constitutes “the fundamental survival strategy” that defines all humans (p. 
28).  In order to survive in a broad range of physical environments, humans abandoned 
features and characteristics necessary for survival as isolated individuals and adopted 
characteristics required for cooperation.  In other words, nature selected for “cooperation 
rather than strength and social learning rather than instinct” (p. 28).  Brewer (1997) and 
Caporael (1997) define this characteristic as obligatory interdependence, a requirement 
on the part of the individual to share resources and provide assistance in order to receive 
assistance and resources from others.  The decision to cooperate, however, creates a 
“dilemma of trust” for the individual since the benefits of cooperation depend on others 
reciprocating.  Social categorization provides the means for addressing this dilemma – by 
limiting assistance to “mutually acknowledged” in-group members, the risks of non-
cooperation can be minimized.  Brewer (2001) defines in-groups in this context as 
“bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual 
interdependence and cooperation” (p. 29).   
While social categorization helps address the dilemma, it presents a new problem 
– at the same time that groups demonstrate trust and cooperation within, they constrain it 
in intergroup relations, reasoning that out-groups cannot be entrusted to protect the in-
group’s welfare.  Even in the absence of substantive conflict, this difference in behavior 
creates a self-fulfilling “cycle of competitiveness,” leading groups to compete in order to 
protect themselves from anticipated domination.  Brewer describes this phenomenon as a 
“misattribution process whereby universal ethnocentric behavior (intragroup trust and 
lack of trust in intergroup encounters) is used to infer malevolent intent on the part of 
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outgroups” (p. 32).  Brewer adds that misattribution processes may also be involved in 
interpreting intergroup differences more generally, causing discomfort and unease to be 
attributed to differences in attitudes, values, and cultural practices.  Intergroup anxiety is 
thus transformed into fear, disgust, or hatred (Stephan and Stephan 2000).   
Another component of intergroup aggression, and one that is relevant to this 
research, is the role that threatened identity plays in exacerbating conflict.  Brewer’s 
(1991) optimal distinctiveness theory provides parallel clues to this behavior.  The theory, 
described above, suggests that strong group identification derives from meeting 
simultaneous needs for inclusion and differentiation.  From this perspective, there are two 
fundamental sources of threat to one’s social identity.  One is a threat to inclusiveness, 
which derives from fears of marginalization from the in-group brought about by 
challenges to one’s commitment to, or compatibility with, the group.  Threats to inclusion 
result in feelings of contempt and disgust towards offending out-groups.  The response, 
according to Brewer, is avoidance.  The second is a threat to group distinctiveness, which 
derives from fear of the loss, destruction, or domination of the group itself.  According to 
Brewer, changes that increase contact or integration with, or influence from the out-group 
trigger threats to group distinctiveness, which are accompanied by “feelings of invasion” 
(p. 33).  The emotions resulting from this dual threat, “provide the potent ingredients that 
are sufficient to kindle hatred, expulsion, and even ethnic cleansing” (p. 33).   
Ironically, the potential for intergroup cooperation may exacerbate conflict if 
cooperation poses a threat to in-group distinctiveness.  Even when groups discover 
common goals or common challenges that are in their interest to address collectively, 
they often do not (Brewer, 2000; 2001).  This view conflicts with well-known research by 
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Sherif et al. (1961), which suggests that disparate groups may overcome contentious 
intergroup conflict when the groups discover a superordinate goal or common threat that 
can only be addressed through mutual cooperation.  Brewer generally supports this 
conclusion when “loosely knit groups” are mobilized to work cooperatively.  However, 
she differs with Sherif’s conclusion when dealing with highly differentiated yet 
interdependent social groups (such as those in the present study).  In such contexts, 
Brewer (2001) argues, “perceived interdependence and the need for cooperative 
interaction make salient the absence of mutual trust” (p. 33), which poses a threat to 
group distinctiveness.  “Without the mechanism of… trust based on common identity,” 
she argues, “the risk of exploited cooperation looms large and distrust dominates over 
trust in the decision structure” (p. 33).  In such situations, the anticipation of cooperative 
behavior brought on by perceptions of common goals or threats may actually promote 
intergroup conflict.  This is particularly true for individuals who are highly invested in a 
single social identity.   
Other factors that have the potential to exacerbate conflict, and which are also 
relevant to this research, include political power, culture, and social complexity (Brewer 
2001).  All provide a context that creates added tensions between the in-group and 
various out-groups.  As conditions are exacerbated, Brewer observes, “a line is crossed 
between the absence of trust and the presence of active distrust, or between 
noncooperation and overt conflict” (p. 33).  In the political arena, for example, social 
comparison processes can be strategically manipulated to exaggerate group distinctions 
for the purpose of gaining or maintaining political power.  Thus, social category 
differentiation provides the “fault lines” that are exploited for political gain (p. 34).  The 
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result is that political attacks from the out-group increase group cohesion and loyalty 
among in-group members and elevate the legitimacy of in-group interests and goals over 
the individual’s.  Moreover, social and cultural factors that intensify in-group attachment 
and loyalty may further exaggerate intergroup distinctions.  When the salience and 
strength of social identities are increased, the importance of maintaining social 
boundaries is also increased.   
Finally, Brewer (2001) predicts that in-group/out-group antagonisms will be 
exacerbated in “highly segmented” societies that are differentiated along a dominant 
cleavage, such as ethnicity or religion (p. 34).  Differences would be especially dramatic, 
she contends, when the categorization is “dichotomous,” resulting in two distinct 
subgroups (p. 34).  By contrast, Brewer would predict that complex societies 
differentiated along multiple and overlapping dimensions that are “not perfectly 
correlated” would be less likely to fall prey to dichotomous antagonisms.  Complex 
societies, she contends, give rise to “cross-cutting” category distinctions that reduce the 
individual’s dependence on any particular in-group for meeting his or her needs for 
inclusion, thereby lowering the potential for polarization along a single dimension 
(Brewer 2001; Brewer and Gaertner 2004).  
Social Identity and Cooperation 
Brewer (2000) argues that three conditions must be met for intergroup 
cooperation to emerge from hostility and conflict – common fate, common identity, and 
positive interdependence. The first condition, common fate, is defined by Brewer as a 
“coincidence of outcomes among two or more persons that arises because they have been 
subjected to the same external forces or decision rules” (p. 118). Residents living in the 
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path of an oncoming hurricane, for example, share a common fate in the potential impact 
of the hurricane on their lives.  Their common fate, however, does not necessarily 
translate into cooperation.  They could still act independently of each other, even if it 
were rational to work together.  If, however, they actively coordinate their efforts, then a 
degree of what Brewer refers to as positive interdependence has been introduced.  
Positive interdependence occurs when “goals are compatible such that behaviors that 
benefit Person A also improve outcomes for Person B” (p. 119).  In situations of positive 
interdependence, Brewer contends, “joint rewards may be the product of cumulative 
behaviors of independent actors or the product of coordinated interaction in pursuit of 
common goals” (p. 119).  
From Brewer’s perspective, the disparate boys’ groups in Sherif et al.’s (1961) 
well known Robbers Cave experiment experienced a common fate in the crises 
introduced by the researchers as well as positive interdependence in the form of a 
superordinate goal that required their cooperation.  However, Brewer (2000) argues that a 
common identity necessarily preceded the recognition of positive interdependence and 
arose from the research subjects’ recognition of their common fate.  As Brewer notes, 
“common fate provides one potentially powerful basis for common identity; being 
subject to the effects of the same event or discriminatory policy creates a social category 
boundary that distinguishes those who are affected from those who are not” (p. 119).   
The impact of common fate on shared identity, Brewer (2000) notes, will depend 
on the relative saliency of that which is producing the fate. However, while common fate 
often gives rise to shared identity, the relationship between interdependence and social 
identity, Brewer contends, is “much more tenuous” (p. 120).  In situations of “negative 
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interdependence,” for example, competing or conflicting goals (i.e. zero-sum games) will 
reduce the potential for common identity to emerge and, instead, increase the salience of 
in-group/out-group distinctions.  According to Brewer, even in situations where a 
common fate produces opportunities for positive interdependence, parties may still be 
compelled to take advantage of each other (i.e. let others do the work).  Cooperation, 
therefore, requires the parties to trust each other or have a means for verifying the other 
party’s trustworthiness. A superordinate goal or the recognition of positive 
interdependence do not alone engender trust and may not be sufficient to resolve the 
dilemma of trust that is created, particularly in the face of competition or conflict (Brewer 
2000; 2001). A common identity provides the means for resolving this dilemma and 
serves as the link between common fate and positive interdependence. Turner (1985) 
reinforces this point in his critique of interdependence theory: 
…whereas interdependence theory states that positive interdependence leads to 
cooperation, which in turn leads to the formation of a psychological group, the 
evidence implies that psychological group formation may be the necessary 
intervening process before objective interdependence can be transformed into 
cooperative activity (p. 88).   
 
Smyth (1994) makes a similar comparison regarding the resolution of intractable 
conflicts involving ethnic, religious, linguistic, and territorial dimensions. Smyth notes 
that, “Deals can indeed be done in such intractable conflicts but, in my view, only after 
issues relating to the identity of these groups have first been addressed” (p. 314). Smyth 
contends that agreement on institutional arrangements to govern public decision making 
is challenged by identity salience. “Where people are sharply focused on their group 
identity, negotiating new institutions that will regulate control is very difficult; in fact, 
 
 35
existing institutions may come under great pressure, to the point where ordinary goals 
such as economic and political progress lose their motivating power” (p. 314).  
While it appears that a common identity may be tied to the recognition of a 
common fate, organizational identity research suggests that common identity may also 
arise from strategic interventions aimed at “re-categorization.” Re-categorization is a 
process in which a third-party intervention is initiated between subgroups to prime, or 
reframe, a salient common identity (Brickson and Brewer 2001; Gaertner et al. 1996; 
Gaertner et al. 2000). Re-categorization is defined by Gaertner et al. (1996) as a strategy 
which “transform[s] [group] members’ cognitive representations from ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
into a more inclusive ‘we’” (p. 232) and has been used to induce cooperative behavior 
between two or more sub-groups with histories of out-group bias and competition.  
It may be unrealistic, however, to expect re-categorization to occur in situations of 
“mortal group conflict” (Gaertner et al. 2000, p. 147).  While their experimental 
interventions with multi-ethnic students in a racially tense high school produced positive 
results, they were temporary.  The authors suggest that in the absence of a stabilizing 
force, re-categorization “may be unstable and perhaps fleeting among groups in conflict 
or with strong separate identities” (p. 147). Gaertner and colleagues add that in 
circumstances of intense conflict, “the introduction of a common enemy can redirect bias 
and improve relations… at least temporarily, presumably in part through the process of 
recategorization” (p. 147). Nevertheless, they argue that even a “transient” superordinate 
identity can have reciprocal effects that cross intergroup boundaries.  
In his critique of the common ingroup identity model, Haslam (2004) argues 
against the use of re-categorization in the context of negotiation between sub-groups with 
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conflicting interests.  Haslam contends that single identity intervention models “advocate 
strategies of conflict management that do violence to the social reality that negotiation is 
designed to address,” particularly with regard to the sub-group that is negated as the 
superordinate group takes shape (p. 125-126). He contends that,  
Where individuals feel aggrieved as a result of their membership in a particular 
group, attempts to address that grievance need to allow them to define themselves 
and act in terms of that group membership (p. 126). 
 
Haslam adds that, “because social identification of this form is an essential ingredient of 
all social conflict, it must be recognized and allowed expression at some stage in any 
remedial process” (p. 127).  An intervention must begin, therefore, by recognizing the 
legitimacy of each group’s salient social identity. Once the legitimacy of intergroup 
identities are recognized, group members may be willing to move to a more inclusive 
level of saliency, where integrative problem-solving is attainable.  
Viewed in the way, Haslam (2004) asserts that “the process of intergroup 
negotiation – like conflict itself – can be seen to revolve around counterposed social 
identities defined at subgroup and superordinate levels” (p. 127). This suggests that “the 
key to satisfactory conflict resolution lies not in increasing the salience of [superordinate] 
social identity at the expense of subgroup identity (that is, re-categorization…) but in 
acknowledging and allowing expression of both superordinate and subgroup identities” 
(p. 127).  A “dual identity model” of conflict resolution (Gaertner et al. 1996) is based on 
the premise that social identity salience “need not suppress individuality or sub-group 
specialization – it can simply harness these things towards a common goal” (Haslam 
2004, p. 127-128).  
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In fact, Haslam argues that the success of intergroup negotiation depends on both 
the saliency of subgroup and superordinate identities. The saliency of the sub-group 
identity, he argues, “is necessary to ensure that the basis of conflict is actually 
addressed.” The salience of the superordinate identity is necessary for the parties to 
“share a common motivation to do the creative intellectual work that is needed for social 
differences to be reconstructed as sources of strength rather than bones of contention” (p. 
129). Applying Gaertner’s (1996) dual identity model, and borrowing Haslam’s graphic 
representation, we see in Figure 2.1 how disputants in an intergroup conflict may define a 
superordinate identity that encompasses and yet retains their subgroup identities.  
To further illustrate the dual identity model, Haslam (2004) recast the “dual- 
  
concern” model of Rubin et al. (1994) that aligns “concern about own outcome” and 
“concern about other’s outcome” on separate x and y axes. Concern for both, research 
shows, leads to a problem-solving orientation as opposed to contending, concession 
making, or inaction orientations. In the dual identity model illustrated in Figure 2.2, 
Haslam aligns “salience of subgroup identity” and “salience of superordinate identity” on 
separate x and y axes and suggests that in resolving intergroup conflict, disputants move  
Figure 2.1 
Subgroups accommodated in a Superordinate Identity 





sequentially from a “contending” quadrant where divergent subgroup identities are salient 
but not accommodated within a superordinate identity, to an “integrative problem 
solving” quadrant where divergent subgroup identities are “reconciled” with a salient 
superordinate identity (p. 129).  
Haslam (2004) adds that if negotiation is to proceed successfully, “then this will 
necessarily involve problem-solving activity as lower-level social identities remain 
salient but parties now endeavor to reconcile them with a salient superordinate identity” 
(p. 130). It is this “synthesizing process,” he concludes, “that mobilizes the intellectual 
resources that help unlock any integrative potential in the negotiation situation” (p. 130).  
This is not to suggest that intergroup conflicts cannot be settled by working on them in 
other quadrants. Similar to Rubin’s dual concern model (Rubin et al. 1994), Haslam is 
merely suggesting that contention, concession-making, and inaction in an intergroup 

































b) concede too much in the interest of appeasing the larger group, or c) avoid raising 
genuine intergroup conflict.  
Social Identity and Common Pool Resource Dilemmas 
An emerging area of social identity theory is in the realm of social and common 
pool resource dilemmas. Chase (1992) defines social dilemmas as conflicts of interest 
between individual and collective outcomes that are both “inter- and intra-individual: that 
is, between self-interest and other’s interest and between self-interest as individual and 
self-interest as a member of a collective” (p. 104).  Kollock (1998) argues that, “many of 
the most challenging problems we face, from the interpersonal to the international, are at 
their core social dilemmas” (p. 183). Common pool resource dilemmas, a particular kind 
of social dilemma, arise when a population’s aggregate consumption of a common pool 
resource exceeds the available supply or the rate at which the resource can replenish 
itself.  When those conditions are met, continued unchecked consumption of the resource, 
or lack of restraint, threatens the welfare of the entire population (Chase 1992; Kramer 
and Goldman 1995).  
Two broad strategies have been suggested to manage social and common pool 
resource dilemmas. Messick and Brewer (1983) and Van Vugt (2001) make distinctions 
between structural approaches, which include privatizing or regulating the commons in 
some fashion so as to restrict and monitor access or consumption, and psychological 
approaches, which consist primarily of educational interventions designed to alter the 
way individuals value and behave with regard to the resource. A more recent social 
psychological approach involves interventions that rely on social connections and 
interdependencies among resource users (Messick and Brewer 1983; Morrison 1999; Van 
 
 40
Vugt 2001).  Such connections have the potential to foster self-restraining norms and 
behaviors that increase collective responsibility for the long-term sustainability of the 
resource. Uphoff and Langholz (1998) refer to this dimension as the socio-cultural, 
which they argue “underscores that individual decisions are embedded in community and 
local contexts” (p. 251). 
Early experimental research on the social-psychological dimensions of common 
pool resource dilemmas suggests that choices among research subjects to first hoard and 
then share a limited resource were affected by the activation of collective identities. 
Researchers found that subjects, when empowered to freely and anonymously harvest 
from an abundant resource, took as much as they needed as long as the resource was 
replenished. When the experimenters allowed the resource to slowly deplete, however, 
subjects began hoarding the remaining contents, resulting in a more rapidly depleted 
supply. But when the researchers introduced a common identity as resource-dependent 
users, subjects voluntarily limited their consumption in order to accommodate other 
users. What grew from a common identity, it appears, was a self-imposed willingness—
an unspoken social contract—to leave some of the resource in place (Kramer and Brewer 
1984; 1986). More recent experimental and field research has confirmed the importance 
of common identity in enhancing cooperative behavior in common-pool resource 
dilemmas (Kramer and Goldman 1995; Morrison 1999; Tyler and Degoey 1995; Van 
Vugt 2001; Wit and Kerr 2002). 
Chase (1992) suggests that when the individual perceives a commonality of 
interest with other individuals, the individual may consider other persons’ outcomes in 
relation to his or her own actions. “Rather than simply maximizing one’s own outcome,” 
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he suggests, “one may trade off benefits to self and other so as to give both (all) some 
satisfaction. This would lead to greater cooperativeness in social dilemmas as the benefit 
to the others in the interaction is given more weight” (p. 110).  In reviewing early 
experimental studies of social dilemmas, Chase (1992) concludes that the studies 
generally support the hypothesis that “social identities have an important role in 
determining behavior in a social dilemma” (p. 117). Chase concludes that “the likelihood 
of cooperative participation in collective action is greater the greater the sense of shared 
identity with others involved in the action…” (p. 117).  
According to Foddy and Hogg (1999), social identity theory “has direct relevance 
to an analysis of social dilemmas” (p. 313). The central idea, they argue, is that,  
…as a collection of people increasingly define themselves as members of a 
common social group, the welfare of the collective should increasingly prevail 
over self-interest, and their behavior should become more cooperative. If the crux 
of the conflict in resource dilemmas resides with the level at which identification 
occurs, then the resolution will rely on finding methods for instilling compatible 
levels of social identity (p. 313). 
 
In other words, how resource users treat a common resource, the authors contend, “may 
depend critically upon whether those people identify themselves and relate to one another 
as individuals, a single inclusive group, or two or more subgroups” (p. 313). A 
superordinate group orientation, they argue, “removes the conflict, because it aligns 
individual interests with those of all people accessing the pool” (p. 314). Further, when 
the welfare of the collective “is aligned with the preservation of a common resource, 
collective orientation may promote resource conservation.”  However, Foddy and Hogg 
contend that it is often difficult to establish such a superordinate orientation, particularly 
in very large groups. “The problem is that people generally have a large repertoire of 
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identities they can use to define themselves…, and it can be very difficult to arrange 
circumstances that enduringly maintain a superordinate identity” (p. 314).  
Chase (1992) perceives a similar problem with the application of collective 
identities in dealing with common pool resource dilemmas – what he terms “dilemmas of 
identity” (p. 119).  Research findings suggest that competition is more intense between 
groups than it is between individuals in situations involving commons dilemmas. As 
such, in many of the most challenging common pool resource situations, such as global 
climate change, Chase warns that “the superordinate group identity would need to be so 
all-inclusive as to be very hard to maintain. Such a group identity may be liable to 
fracture and fragment into various subordinate identities” (p. 119). The breakdown of the 
superordinate group and the formation of subgroups would likely intensify competition 
for scarce resources, thus exacerbating the problem. Kramer and Brewer (1984) agree. “If 
subordinate boundaries or distinctions that differentiate members of a commons into 
identifiable subgroups are made salient,” they argue, “processes of in-group bias and 
intergroup competition may undermine collective interests” (p. 1045). In common pool 
resource situations, this is often a problem of defining the appropriate scale and 
boundaries (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003).  
What is compelling about social identity theory as it relates to common pool 
research is that it draws attention to the resource itself as a socializing construct (Kramer 
and Brewer 1984; Morrison 1999; Tyler and Degoey 1995; Van Vugt 2001; Wit and Kerr 
2002).  Kramer and Brewer (1984), for example, suggest that “the potential benefits of 
group identification for solving collective-choice dilemmas require that the salient group 
boundary correspond fairly closely to access to the common resource. The shared 
 
 43
resource, and associated interdependence, must, in effect, form the basis for a 
superordinate group identity, which encompasses all of the individuals in the commons” 
(p. 1045). Kramer and Brewer, therefore, set the stage for the recognition of a common 
resource- or place-based identity. For example, in an experiment to test the hypothesis 
that Santa Barbara (CA) residents would restrain themselves from depleting a common 
pool resource when primed with a “salient community identity,” researchers told subjects 
that they were interested in “how the behavior of residents of a small community like 
Santa Barbara would compare to residents of other areas” (p. 1048). The researchers 
found that when a community identity became salient, mean individual consumption 
reached or fell below the optimal level required to sustain the resource. By contrast, in 
each of their trials, when subordinate identities were salient, consumption exceeded the 
capacity of the resource to sustain itself.  
Similarly, in a field study of motives for conserving domestic water during a 
water shortage, Van Vugt (2001) compared the strength of subjects’ “identity with the 
community” with their water consumption habits, as determined by their water meter 
readings over a nine-month period. The study found that, in general, “high community 
identifiers” consumed less water than “low community identifiers,” especially during the 
summer.  Van Vugt surmises that greater differences in water conservation between high 
and low community identifiers in summer months may be due to variations in outdoor 
water use, which constitutes a “public behavior” since it is readily observable by one’s 
neighbors. This may explain why high community identifiers were more willing to show 
restraint. “For them,” Van Vugt observed, “it is important to be a respected member of 
the community: therefore they cannot afford to be deviant” (p. 1448).  
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In assessing the mechanisms through which community identity might increase 
the willingness to conserve water, Van Vugt suggests three possibilities. First, 
community identification might “transform the definition of self-interest to an 
overarching community interest, thus blurring the boundaries between the private and 
collective interest.”  Second, greater community identification could “promote restraint 
by increasing trust in other people’s willingness to exercise restraint.”  Third, community 
identification may “raise feelings of pride and respect in the community, which may 
further promote restraint during a shortage” (p. 1442). Van Vugt concludes that in 
“extrapolating these findings to natural resource management in society, it seems that in 
situations with the potential risk of a resource shortage, when needs are high yet supplies 
are relatively short, communities must rely either on adequate incentive systems or on the 
strength of people’s community ties to save valuable resources” (p. 1447). Van Vugt 
warns, however, that “community identification processes will only kick in when there is 
a direct threat to the community and there is no personal incentive for cooperation” (p. 
1447). He suggests that it is “probably more appropriate to think of social identification 
as a buffer, which elicits cooperation only when it is collectively needed, such as a 
shortage” (p. 1447). 
Miller (1992) makes a similar argument for community-based identity in his 
analysis of the rationality of collective action. According to Miller, rational choice 
theorists take a too-narrow approach in understanding the affects of rationality on 
collective action. Drawing on Habermas, Miller suggests that humans possess a 
“lifeworld” within which “cultural traditions, social integration, and normative 
structures… are reproduced through an ongoing interpretative process of communicative 
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action” (p. 26). Communicative action, Miller argues, is focused on “common 
understandings arrived at consensually that provide the basis for a morally valued way of 
life and the construction of identities that transcend the individual. These moral bonds 
and collective identities can form bases for collective action” (p. 29). However, Miller 
(1992) argues that rational choice theorists have ignored the social context in which 
communicative action occurs. The social context with which Miller is referring is the 
community, which he interprets along communitarian and feminist lines as “a collection 
of people who interact with each other in a common territory” (p. 30). Collective 
identities are formed, through “the common occupancy of space” (p. 32).  Community, in 
Miller’s words, “implies collective identity…” (p. 32).  
While community identity is relevant to this research, individuals construct 
resource- and place-based identities at larger scales, which may also serve to address 
common pool resource dilemmas. In an experimental field study involving 135 Papua 
New Guinea residents, for example, Morrison (1999) examined intra- and intergroup 
cooperation at increasingly inclusive geographical levels of identity salience, from 
provincial (19), to regional (4), to national (1). Morrison’s study tested the hypothesis 
that “level of cooperation is the product of a salient social identity and that the emergence 
of a psychological group transcends the objective interdependence structure that defines 
the social dilemma” (p. 302). Her experimental dilemma was based on a structured 
conflict of interest between individuals’ desires to spend a holiday period with their 
families or voluntarily participating in a project to help an environmental organization 
protect the rainforest from an insect invasion.  
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Morrison (1999) was able to manipulate the definition of the geographical area to 
be protected so as to create an intra- and intergroup “frame of reference” for participants 
at each level of identity salience – provincial, regional, and national. Morrison’s findings 
confirmed her hypothesis that participants were more willing to volunteer their time in 
the intra-group frame of reference regardless of the geographic level of identity salience. 
Morrison concludes that “the psychological level of identification has a significant 
impact on cooperative behavior in a social dilemma” (p. 307). Not only were participants 
able to conceptualize identities at a larger geographic scale, they were also able to make 
commitments towards resolving the dilemma. Intergroup cooperation at the provincial 
level, for example, was significantly lower than in-group cooperation at the regional 
level. Likewise, intergroup cooperation at the regional level was significantly lower than 
in-group cooperation at the national level. Important to the present research, Morrison 
adds that “the frame of reference in which a social dilemma is perceived contributes to 
the pattern of behavior that emerges” (p. 307).  
Wit and Kerr (2002) drew similar conclusions in their studies of categorization 
and cooperation in “nested social dilemmas.” Wit and Kerr found that “increasing the 
saliency of categorization of any level of the hierarchy (i.e. individual, subgroup, or 
collective) through the subtle and temporary linking of fates of members at that level 
tends to increase group members’ willingness to allocate resources to that level of 
interest” (p. 632). They also found that group members’ willingness to contribute to the 
collective interest was lowest when fate was shared at the subgroup [competitive] level 
and highest when fate was shared at the collective [cooperative] level. “Thus, concern for 
the collective interest is undermined most by an ‘us versus them,’ two opposing groups 
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scheme and is nurtured most by a ‘we are all in this together,’ superordinate-collective 
scheme” (p. 632).  While subgroups showed the lowest level of concern for the collective 
interest, they showed the highest concern for both the subgroup and the individual, thus 
setting up conditions for a greater level of in-group/out-group tension. Finally, Wit and 
Kerr suggest that a low concern for the collective interest can be remedied by the 
introduction of a common fate with members of the opposing subgroup.  
 More to the point, the boundaries of the resource in question must be such that a 
salient resource-based identity is achievable. One significant dimension of this equation, 
according to Brewer (2000), is the ability among resource users to trust and/or monitor 
other users.  Taking an evolutionary perspective, Brewer (2000) argues that “the most 
important and universal consequence of ingroup-outgroup differentiation will be the 
capacity for trust” (p. 123).  
If ingroup-outgroup categorization inherently places boundaries on the capacity to 
trust, then intergroup attitudes and perceptions are fundamentally incompatible 
with cooperative interdependence. Some redefinition of relevant and salient 
category boundaries – self categorization at a different level of inclusiveness – 
must come prior to any benefits of cooperation or else interdependence will 
increase rather than decrease intergroup hostility (p. 123).  
 
Brewer concludes that: 
It is not sufficient to reduce the salience of the preexisting ingroup-outgroup 
category boundary; this boundary must be superseded by another category 
identity that is more inclusive but still maintains the properties of a bounded 
ingroup – defining exclusion as well as inclusion (p. 123). 
 
The Role of Leadership 
Using a social identity framework, organizational psychologists Haslam and 
Platow (2001, p. 218) argue that social identity salience, “can be seen to provide the 
psychological footing for a range of key organizational phenomena including information 
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exchange, consensus seeking, cooperation, trust, empowerment, group productivity, and 
collective action.” A leader’s success, therefore, “hinges upon an ability to turn ‘me’ and 
‘you’ into ‘us’ and to define a social project that gives that sense of ‘us-ness’ meaning 
and purpose.” In this regard, it is the role of the leader to define and maintain identity 
salience at the organizational level. Haslam and colleagues contend that organizational 
leaders are therefore “entrepreneurs of identity” (Haslam 2004; Reicher et al. 2001) and 
they collaborate with followers in the transformation of social reality and social identity 
(Reicher et al. 2005).  
In related studies of leadership in social movements, Reicher et al. (2001) suggest 
that, “If crowd members are seeking to determine how they should behave as category 
members, then the issue comes down to the process of how categories are defined and 
how proposals come to be construed as either consonant or dissonant with such 
definitions.” Equally, they argue, “the issue of leadership comes down to the question of 
how individuals come to be seen as defining these matters of category identity” (p. 184). 
Reicher and his colleagues conclude that, “those who wish to mobilise people to different 
ends will seek to provide different categories through which people should see their 
world, themselves and their actions in the world” (p. 186).  
A re-interpretation of the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif et al. 1961) helps 
illustrate these points. In the experiment, the research team controlled events that led to 
the boys’ discovery of a superordinate goal. However, the research team was instructed to 
avoid providing leadership to the boys or in directing them in any way. According to the 
research protocol: 
No staff member is to be a leader to the boys during any stage of the study in any 
of the various activities… You may have to give advice when asked and institute 
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controls when necessary to maintain order, but please refrain from giving 
direction and initiating action in relation to problem situations (p. 57). 
  
In Sherif’s interpretation of the experimental situation involving the breakdown of the 
supply truck, the boys tried to push the truck but quickly realized that is was facing 
uphill. They then discovered a superordinate goal in the form of a tug-of-war rope that 
could be used to pull and jump-start the truck. In a departure from Sherif’s conclusion, 
however, it appears that the Rattlers’ (R) leader Mills, and other Rattlers’ team members 
framed both a superordinate identity and a superordinate goal. The following passage is 
taken directly from the study (Sherif et al. 1961) and reinforces the role that leaders play 
in the framing process:  
Several Rattlers suggested, “Let’s push it,” but they abandoned the idea because 
the truck was parked facing up-hill. The tug-of-war rope was in plain sight to both 
groups. Mills (R) said, “Let’s get ‘our’ tug-of-war rope and have a tug-of-war 
against the truck. Someone said, “Yeah, we can’t push it.” Swift (R) said, “20 of 
us can.” Several boys agreed loudly with this, Mills adding, “20 of us can pull it 
for sure.”  
 
Similarly, as entrepreneurs of identity, Reicher and colleagues (2001) contend that 
leaders must accomplish three fundamental and interrelated tasks in order to successfully 
mobilize people to appropriate action. First, they must “define the boundaries of the 
relevant identity such that it includes all those whose support is sought.” Second, they 
must “define those for whom support is sought (the individual, the organisation) such that 
they are undoubtedly part of the group.” And third, they must “define the content of the 
relevant identity and the nature of one’s proposals such that the two are consonant” (p. 
186). In other words, leaders will be more likely to succeed to the extent that they can 
successfully “frame” for their followers, a) the salient identity category and boundary of 
inclusion (and exclusion), b) the distinct characteristics and values of in-group members, 
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including the leader, and c) the congruency between the group’s (superordinate) identity 
and the leader’s proposed (superordinate) goals. “Above all,” Reicher concludes, “it is 
necessary to work on these various constructive dimensions… such that they form a 
coherent and seamless whole” (p. 186). 
Social identity theory provides a framework that can be used to explore many 
aspects of group life that are not readily explainable from other perspectives. The purpose 
here is not to compete with other theoretical frameworks or explanatory concepts, or to 
mix and match theories to make sense of a situation, but to follow one framework and its 
application in a dynamic and complex field setting. The present research provides an 
opportunity to view the conflict through a particular lens and to see if that lens exposes 









Methodology: The Use of Frames and Framing 
 
The selection of social identity theory as a lens through which to view and better 
understand the transformation of community-based environmental conflict requires a 
slight reformulation of the research question. Therefore a reformulated question is posed: 
"How does a focus on social identity inform our understanding of the transformation of 
community-based environmental conflict?"  To get at the answer to the question, I chose 
a case study approach of one controversial and deep-seated natural resource conflict that 
was transformed at the local level, and in which social identity appeared to play an 
important role.  The approach differs from similar research on natural resource conflicts 
that employ cross-case comparisons focused on readily observable variables among 
categorically distinct groups (for example: Coughlin et al., 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 
2000; Yaffee et al., 1996).  By contrast, this study is designed to gather detailed data on 
one controversial and high profile group, the Quincy Library Group, located in the Sierra 
Nevada of northern California.  QLG was selected primarily because of the richness of 
narrative and archival data associated with the conflict.  It is also a unique or “extreme” 
example of community-based conflict and presents an opportunity to study constructs 
that are presented more vividly.  Case study researchers often recommend extreme or 
polar cases over typical cases because the constructs of interest to the researcher are 
usually more transparent and observable (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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Moreover, a case study approach was selected because the research question led 
in that direction.  According to Yin (1994, p. 1) “case studies are the preferred strategy 
when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control 
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.”  Yin adds that, “the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to 
understand complex social phenomena” (p. 3).  This desire is what separates the present 
research on the transformation of community-based natural resource conflict from past 
cross-case research and is what drives this study.   
Unit of Analysis – the Frame 
A growing body of research suggests that the way parties “frame” conflicts has 
implications for how they interpret the conflict and the parties involved, how they 
anticipate the conflict unfolding, and whether and how they see the conflict being 
resolved (Gray, 1997; 2003; Putnam and Holmer, 1991).  The basic unit of analysis in my 
research is the frame, which emerges through the active process of “framing” various 
aspects of the conflict. For the purpose of this research, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between frames and the process of framing.  From a cognitive perspective 
(Johnston, 1995, p. 217), frames are “problem-solving schemata, stored in memory, for 
the interpretive task of making sense of presenting situations,” and are based on past 
experiences and “cultural templates” of appropriate behavior.  Similarly, Gray (1997, p. 
171) defines frames as “cognitive structures held in memory and used to guide 
interpretation of new experiences.”  Goffman (1974, p. 10) uses frames to describe a 
situational perspective that an individual takes with reference to an event and suggests 
that the question “what is really going on?” can be defined differently depending on the 
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frame one is using to make sense of the situation.  In situations involving conflict, frames 
are thought to help parties develop interpretations of what is at stake (Bateson, 1972; 
Gray, 1997). 
While frames are, in a sense, cognitive lenses that help people make sense of the 
world around them, framing provides an ongoing means of “constructing a world, of 
characterizing its flow, of segmenting events within that world,” and is thought to be a 
particularly social process designed for building and sharing meaning within a particular 
culture (Bruner, 1990, p. 56).  According to Gray (2003, p. 12) framing is the active 
process of “constructing and representing our interpretations of the world around us.”  
We construct frames, “by sorting and categorizing our experience – weighing new 
information against our previous interpretations.”   
Social movement theorists contend that social activists employ framing to locate 
the individual in relation to an issue or action, including defining a social problem, 
imputing blame or causality, and taking a stance (Taylor, 2000).  According to Buechler 
(2000, p. 41), in the process of framing, social activists focus attention on an event, issue, 
or individual with the purpose of conveying “meaning and significance to elements 
within the frame and setting them apart from what is outside the frame.” In conflict 
management theory, parties frame disputes in language that reveals differences in values, 
beliefs, goals, and expectations (Gray 1997; 2003; Putnam and Holmer 1991; Vaughan 
and Siefert 1992).  Similar to social movement theory, disputants’ perceptions of conflict 
thus emerge through the construction of frames in which issues are defined, positions are 
justified, actions take shape, and allies are recruited and mobilized (Gray, 2003).   
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It follows that the framing of a conflict, and the perpetuation of frames over time, 
may contribute as much to a conflict’s intractability as the inability of the parties to 
equitability distribute finite resources (Klar, et al., 1987; Gray, 1997; 2003).  Conversely, 
reframing a conflict, or an important dimension of it, may be necessary for conflicts to be 
successfully resolved (Gray 1997; 2003; Putnam and Holmer 1991; Shon and Rein 1994; 
Smith and Berg 1997).  Mary Parker Follett (1942) metaphorically defines reframing as 
“getting the desires of each side into one field of vision” (p. 39).  Indeed, mediators often 
help parties reframe conflicts so that they can see them in new and integrative ways, thus 
breaking the old frame that held them in the conflict (Moore 2003). Similarly, Smith and 
Berg (1997) argue that groups often get stuck in the paradoxical tensions characteristic of 
intergroup conflict and must discover “the link between two apparently contradictory 
opposites.”  This discovery provides a reframing of the relationship between the opposite 
parts and “brings with it new ways of ‘looking’ at the conflicts” (p. 218). 
In an expanded assessment of frames and framing, Gray and others (Lewicki et 
al., 2003) identified eight distinct frames that are commonly employed by disputants in 
environmental conflicts and that are believed to contribute to the intractability of such 
conflicts.  These are identity, characterization, conflict management, social control, 
whole story, power, risk, and loss/gain.  Identity and characterization framing, the focus 
of this research, builds on the work of social identity theorists such as Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) and Brewer (2001) who suggest that conflict derives in part from social group 
comparisons in which in-groups portray themselves (identity) more positively and out-
groups (characterization) more negatively. It is also consistent with research on the 
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framing of social identity in situations of conflict, such as the work of Cook-Huffman 
(2000) who contends that social identity serves as a frame,  
“…when it implicitly or explicitly invokes the norms, rules, expectations, 
feelings, beliefs, or actions associated with a particular social identity or its 
symbolic representation. Social identities as frames act as boundaries that 
delineate and characterize the issues and/or the individuals or groups in the 
conflict. They focus perspectives, which color images and interpretations of both 
in-group and out-group members” (p. 118).  
 
Among the frames studied by Gray and others (2003), identity and 
characterization appear to be the most relevant to environmental and natural resource 
conflicts.  Gray (2003, p. 21) contends that groups experiencing such conflict inherently 
“develop reflective frames that depict the way disputants feel about themselves and 
projective identity frames that carry disputants’ characterizations of others in the 
conflict” (emphasis added). Consistent with this view, Brewer and Gardner (1996, p. 91) 
argue that when collective identities are salient, “in-group/out-group categorizations 
become the most important basis for evaluating others.”  Moreover, the use of language 
to distinguish in-groups from out-groups can have a powerful effect on perceptions.  As 
Perdue et al. (1990) argue, “Because of their ability to imply the in-group or out-group 
status of people, collective pronouns such as we, us and ours or they, them, and theirs are 
likely to be especially powerful influences in social cognition and perception” (p. 475).  
Identity and characterization frames thus provide a key to this understanding.  
This research follows primarily along the lines of Cook-Huffman (2000), Gray 
(2003), and Brewer and Gardner (1996) above. However, it is also cognizant of the subtle 
use of collective pronouns in common language that is not intended to convey or invoke 
meaning, and which is consistent with methodological conventions in social identity 
research (Perdue et al. 1990).  It is important to note here that I am not studying the act of 
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framing per se. There is considerable valuable research dedicated to the way actors 
employ frames and framing in their discourse, some of which is discussed above.  The 
present research uses the frame as a tool of analysis, not the subject of the research. 
Because of these distinctions, I am adopting a more flexible approach to the identification 
of a suitable frame.   
Data Sources  
I began the study with the collection and temporal cataloging of all available 
documentation that described local forest management issues from 1982 through 2004, 
and which provided opportunities for disputants to state opinions and/or respond to the 
actions of others – the activity of framing.  Documents included, a) newspaper articles 
and public interest news stories; b) local, regional and national editorials and letters to the 
editor; c) activist and trade association newsletters and action alerts; d) written and 
electronic correspondence; e) public testimony; f) meeting minutes; and g) technical 
reports.  Documentation included both third-person accounts of forest management issues 
at the local and regional level, in which disputants are quoted, as well as first-person 
accounts from a range of individual perspectives.   
Because of the public attention created by the conflict, media coverage of events 
surrounding the conflict is extensive.  Coverage is also rich in public dialogue since the 
conflict itself unfolds in local and national public arenas, including public hearings, 
public meetings, editorials and letters to the editor, public correspondence, legislative 
testimony, and congressional debates (including a C-SPAN U.S. House of 
Representatives floor debate). Media coverage was solicited to both track the events as 
they unfolded and document how disputants framed the conflicts associated with 
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particular events.  Early local newspaper coverage came primarily from the Feather River 
Bulletin, published weekly in Quincy, California.  Early regional news coverage came 
from the daily Sacramento Bee and Chico News & Review.  A single local news reporter, 
Jane Braxton Little, covered most of the stories for local and regional publications.  Later 
newspaper coverage came not only from local and regional news sources but also from 
national sources including the San Francisco Chronicle, Los Angles Times, New York 
Times, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post and others.  Approximately 500 
documents were gathered from web searches, news-clipping services, local library and 
historical society collections, interest group archives, a U.S. Forest Service clipping file, 
and the personal file of local reporter Jane Braxton Little. 
I also conducted open-ended interviews with approximately 40 individuals 
directly or indirectly involved in the local conflict to obtain a detailed account and 
retrospective of the conflict.  Interviews were 1.5 to 5.0 hours in length and were 
recorded and transcribed into roughly 1000 pages of text.  Interviews were conducted to 
gain disputants’ perspectives on the conflict, learn more about the conflict than could be 
assessed from archival information, and identify contextual dimensions that disputants   
felt were relevant to and might explain their actions and the actions of others. 
Interviewees included QLG members (loggers, environmentalists, public officials and 
community members); local, regional and national environmentalists; U.S. Forest Service 
administrators and professional resource managers; Congressional and administrative 
aides; a local journalist; and a local logger and Maidu tribal member.  Data was collected 
during a series of trips to the region of the conflict – between 1998 and 2004 – as well as 
to places where disputants currently reside.  In addition, from March 2001 to April 2002, 
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with the assistance of a Ford Foundation Community Forestry Research Fellowship, I 
lived in the community of Quincy, California, the focal point of the conflict, where I 
conducted field research.  
Frame Analysis – Documenting Identity and Identity Change 
To analyze identity and characterization frames, the research followed a modified 
version of content analysis that is more accurately defined as document analysis 
(Altheide 1996).  Content analysis is defined broadly as a “multipurpose research method 
developed specifically for investigating a broad spectrum of problems in which the 
content of communication serves as the basis for inference” (Holsti 1968, p. 597).  More 
specifically, content analysis is a quantitative technique for “making inferences by 
systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 
1968, p. 601).  The technique is generally thought of as a quantitative research method 
that follows a set of pre-determined rules to objectively determine the frequency of a 
characteristic within a message, and can also be used to detect patterns within messages 
as well as the presence or absence of characteristics. Content analysis is especially useful 
when the volume of material being analyzed is such that it requires the researcher to, 1) 
sample a portion of the total data set and/or 2) use a team of trained coders to process the 
data set (Holsti 1968). While the data in the present research met some of the 
requirements for content analysis, the volume of data being analyzed was not large 
enough to warrant sampling or the use of trained coders.  
Instead, this research follows an approach described as document analysis, which 
Altheide (1996, p. 14) characterizes as “ethnographic content analysis” or more 
descriptively as the “reflexive analysis of documents.”  The principal difference between 
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content analysis and document analysis is that content analysis adheres to pre-determined 
rules and protocols that allow a number of investigators to code data in precisely the 
same way, while document analysis follows similar rules and protocols but also allows 
categories to emerge from the data itself, thus rendering it a qualitative methodology. The 
goal of content analysis, according to Altheide, is to “verify or confirm hypothesized 
relationships rather than discover new or emergent patterns” and enables the coding 
process to be carried out by “novices quickly trained to find, record, and count the 
‘mentions’ for each unit of analysis” (p. 16).  Content analysis uses inter-coder reliability 
to produce validity. Document analysis follows a similar process in that it starts with a set 
of hypothesized rules and protocols. “The aim is to be systematic and analytic but not 
rigid. Categories and variables initially guide the study, but others are allowed and 
expected to emerge…” (p. 16).  Document analysis does not rely on inter-coder reliability 
but, instead, produces validity through the “reflexive and highly interactive nature of the 
investigator, concepts, data collection and analysis” (p.16).   
Because of the relatively small volume of data, and due to the need to allow 
categories to emerge from the data, a document analysis approach was selected. 
Moreover, the nature of the research question and the desire to understand complex social 
phenomena consistent with a case study, pointed to a reflexive and interactive approach 
to data analysis. Finally, two common criticisms of content analysis helped inform the 
selection.  The first is the argument that content analysis tends to be overly focused on 
the frequency of a characteristic, which does not necessarily translate into the 
significance or importance of the characteristic (Altheide, 1996; Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
Second, content analysis generally follows a set of rules that pre-determine the categories 
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used to code data, and which may bias the research direction by overlooking emergent 
categories that are not contained in the coding protocol (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  These 
criticisms were noted by Bryan and Wondolleck (2003) in a previous framing analysis. 
Exploring emerging and changing patterns, they found, provided a deeper understanding 
of how the conflict was transformed and did not preclude an assessment of a frame’s 
frequency, which was necessary to verify changing patterns.  
Identify and Characterization Frames 
To begin the analysis, approximately 500 documents tracking local forest 
management issues were transferred verbatim into a chronological Word file using 
document scanning and voice recognition software.  From a chronological stream of 
documents, I conducted key-word searches for statements and quotations containing first-
person-plural (identity) and third-person-plural (characterization) pronouns, as well as 
specific collective references such as environmentalist, logger, timber industry, Forest 
Service, Quincy Library Group, community, and other collective affiliations that emerged 
from reading the documents.  First-person (we, us, our) and third-person (they, them, 
their) collective pronouns were then assigned salient group affiliations based on their 
intended meaning within the context of the document.  If the intended meaning could not 
be determined or was a more generalized use of the collective pronoun, the quotations 
were discarded. I then “packaged” each quote with enough of the adjoining text to 
capture a sense of the surrounding immediate context.  Similar to Gray (2003a), I refer to 
these packages as identity and characterization frames. 
For illustration, the following (Frame #1) is both an identity and characterization 
frame containing first person plural (we) and third person plural (they) pronouns as well 
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as the assignment of collective affiliations (Forest Service and logger).  The context in 
which identities are salient is a public hearing concerning the Forest Service’s 
clearcutting policy and is expressed by a member of the local logging community: 
Frame #1:  
I blame everything on the Forest Service.  They [FS] sit on the middle of the 
fence.  Whoever it looks like is going to win, they drop down on that side of the 
fence,” McElroy said.  “It looks like loggers [we] are to blame, but it's the Forest 
Service.  We are not responsible for their clearcutting policies. [120] 
 
The above frame is typical of the frames found throughout the study, and can be 
categorized as both an identity and a characterization frame that is designed to convey a 
message about the situation faced by the in-group (in this case loggers) and the role of the 
out-group (in this case the Forest Service) in affecting the situation.   
Following Altheide (1996) and Lincoln and Guba (1985), the first step in the 
frame analysis was the categorization of frames based only on emergent social identities.  
Categorization of identity frames enabled me to identify salient social identities and 
document baseline patterns as well as track changes over time.  Categorization of identity 
frames confirmed preliminary observations that salient social identities referenced by 
disputants fell into four dominant categories:  
 Logger (including timber industry supporters) 
 Environmentalist 
 U.S. Forest Service 
 Quincy Library Group 
 
I also discovered an affiliation with “community” as a salient social identity.  
Community identity, however, did not emerge as a dominant category but appeared to 
either support one of the dominant categories listed above or bridge a dominant identity 
boundary.  Community identity frames were evoked by loggers, environmentalists, and 
QLG, but not by the Forest Service.  Although community identity was not a dominant 
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identity in the larger dispute, in terms of its frequency, it does appear to play a 
meaningful role in how disputants framed their own identities and how the conflict was 
ultimately transformed. Community identity is therefore included in the analysis.  
From the initial patterning of social identity frames I was able to distinguish three 
phases of the forest management conflict, punctuated by two relatively distinct “turning 
points.”  My research is focused on the first two phases of the conflict and I use the point 
at which the third phase emerged to bracket the study.  The first two phases are of 
particular interest because they delineate the transformation of the conflict at the local 
level, where it had festered for more than 15 years.  Data from the first two phases of the 
conflict, a subset of the entire database, is comprised of 258 documents (Appendix A) 
containing 372 identity frames and 158 characterization frames.  
In the spirit of full disclosure, a predominance of identity frames originate from 
disputants who are serving as leaders of the groups identified above.  For example, of the 
55 environmentalist identity frames found in phase 1 of the conflict, 20 are associated 
with the group’s primary leader, Michael Jackson.  This pattern is repeated within each of 
the groups.  As a counter to the possible bias introduced by too few respondents, I 
revisited interview transcripts of more than 50 individuals involved in the dispute to 
determine whether they may have framed the conflict differently than either their 
principal leaders or other in-group members.  Almost without variation, they did not.  
Moreover, disputants did not disparage leaders or other in-group members, at least in the 
phases studied.  These factors provide a level of confidence that spokespersons’ framing 
of the conflict are representative of the larger group.  
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The second step in the frame analysis was to categorize frames based on 
disputants’ characterizations of each other within the two phases.  Characterization 
frames contain third-person plural (they-them-their) references and affiliations that make 
a distinction between the group evoking the frame (in-group) and the group or groups 
(out-group) that are being characterized.  In the framing example above (from Phase 1 of 
the conflict), a prominent member of the logging community is criticizing the Forest 
Service for perceived political maneuvering over its clearcutting policy.  In the example 
below (from Phase 2), a QLG member is criticizing the Forest Service for perceived 
resistance to a forest plan developed by the group.   
Frame #2: 
“We can’t get (officials of) the Plumas National Forest to do anything but talk,” 
said Michael B. Jackson, a Quincy environmental attorney and a founding 
member of the group (QLG).  “They (FS) tell us they like our program but they 
can’t do anything about it.  They ought to change their name to the U.S. Lip 
Service.” [190] 
 
Similar to the categorization of identity frames, this step followed a mostly 
emergent process, although preliminary research and observation suggested noticeable 
patterns.  Initial frame analysis revealed distinct categories of characterization frames 
depending on the in-group evoking the frame and the out-group being targeted.  In phase 
1 of the conflict, six categories emerged and are listed below:  
 Characterizations by loggers towards environmentalists 
 Characterizations by loggers towards Forest Service  
 Characterizations by environmentalists towards loggers 
 Characterizations by environmentalists towards Forest Service 
 Characterizations by the Forest Service towards environmentalists 
 Characterizations by the Forest Service towards loggers 
 
In phase 2, six additional categories emerged:  
 Characterizations by loggers towards QLG 
 Characterizations by environmentalists towards QLG 
 
 64
 Characterizations by the Forest Service towards QLG 
 Characterizations by QLG towards loggers 
 Characterizations by QLG towards environmentalists 
 Characterizations by QLG towards the Forest Service 
 
The number of characterization frames in each category were then counted and compared 
between phases to determine whether a pattern of change would begin to emerge.  
The third step in the frame analysis was to categorize characterization frames 
based on their perceived intent.  This was an emergent process that began to reveal 
important inter-group dynamics.  Quite noticeably, characterization frames fell into either 
negative and critical (divisive) or positive and favorable (inclusive) categories.  
Characterization frames were thus assigned a “charge” – either negative (-) or positive 
(+) – based on their intent.  Frames #1 and #2 above are examples of divisive frames 
(negatively charged) in which the groups evoking the frames are critical of Forest Service 
policies.  The example below (Frame #3), from phase 1 of the conflict, is both negatively 
and positively charged, depending on the target of the characterization.   
Frame #3: 
What do environmentalists believe we have in common with the Yellow Ribbon 
Committee?  We believe that we are all honest people who want to continue our 
way of life.  We believe that we all love the area in which we live.  We believe 
that we all enjoy beautiful views, hunting and fishing, and living in a rural area.  
We believe that we are being misled by the Forest Service and by large timber, 
which controls the Forest Service, into believing that we are enemies when we are 
not. [71] 
 
In this example, environmentalists are favorable to and therefore inclusive of local 
loggers (the Yellow Ribbon Committee) and, at the same time, are critical of and 
therefore divisive towards the Forest Service and “large timber” (the timber companies 
that seasonally employ local loggers).   
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While the majority of characterization frames are divisive, reinforcing the 
intractable nature of the conflict, the proportion that are inclusive provide clues to 
strategies pursued by some disputants to alter the dynamics.  Taken together, the analysis 
of identity and characterization frames provides an image of the dominant groups 
participating in various phases of the forest management conflict, how salient group 
affiliations changed over time, how in-groups characterized various out-groups 
throughout the conflict, and how these characteristics affected the overall dynamics of the 
conflict.  The frame analysis was designed to determine whether social identities 
markedly changed during the life of the forest management conflict, how they changed, 
and to systematically document that change.  Further, the analysis may suggest that 
changing social identities are in some way related to the transformation of the conflict at 
the local level. 
Contextual Analysis – External Directional Forces 
 
While the frame analysis is mostly descriptive, there is also a need for an 
explanatory aspect to the research.  If social identities did in fact change during the life of 
the forest management conflict, as indicated by changes in both identity and 
characterization frames, does the research offer a plausible explanation for the change?  
One explanation may lie in a changing context.  Social identity theorists (Deaux, 1991; 
1993; Turner et al., 1994) argue that social identity is context dependent and changes as 
individuals move from one context to another.  A plausible explanation explored in this 
research is whether the changing context surrounding the dispute could produce the same 
effect.  If so, an explanation for frame changes observed in the forest management 
 
 66
conflict should be observable in one or more dimensions of a changing context 
surrounding the conflict.   
The fourth step in the analysis was to identify and explore contextual dimensions 
drawn from the frame analysis, and from retrospective interviews with disputants, that go 
beyond a description of how social identities changed and offer clues as to why identities 
changed.  If frame analysis effectively demonstrates that salient social identities among 
key disputants changed, the explanation, consistent with social identity theory, should 
point to a changing context.  The question that arises, then, is whether the context 
significantly shifted and, if so, whether it created conditions that fostered the emergence 
of an inclusive social identity.  
In the following identity frame, for example, the 1988 release of Forest Service’s 
Plumas Forest Plan provided a context for identity and characterization framing: 
“As a county, we asked for 315 million board feet of timber a year.  We got 265.5 
million.  We and all the counties in northeastern California opposed set-aside 
lands for the spotted owl.  We got more than 100,000 acres.  The Regional 
Forester has ignored our requests and I think we ought to take a hard look at an 
appeal ourselves,” Coates told other County supervisors September 6.  [45] 
 
In the quote, the immediate dispute over the content of the forest plan provided a 
immediate “micro” context for identity and characterization framing.  In the larger 
“macro” context, the forest plan, and the spotted owl issue, are embedded in a conflict 
over shifting policies affecting the Forest Service that are driven by changing national 
priorities, greater scientific understanding of forest ecosystems, political pressure, and a 
growing fear of catastrophic wildfire.  In addition, the economic and social dimensions of 
the community and the ecological conditions of the surrounding forest are subject to 
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dynamic fluctuations that influence the framing process.  These are all potentially valid 
dimensions of the surrounding context and can be divided into the following categories: 
 Changes in the community 
 Changes in the environmental movement 
 Changes in forest conditions  
 Changes in the Forest Service 
 
These categories emerged primarily from the rationale disputants offered in the 
interviews to justify their actions in the dispute.  For example, disputants often defended 
their actions as necessary to protect the community from impending doom.  Concerns for 
the community were used by loggers and timber industry supporters to justify their 
actions to increase timber harvests, and by environmentalists to assure long-term 
community economic stability. All of this was occurring while community demographics 
were slowly shifting from a predominantly logging economy and social structure to a 
more diverse and less timber-dependent economy and structure.  
Disputants also spoke about the environmental movement and its evolution.  In the 
initial phase of the conflict, for example, environmentalists had little ability to influence 
forest policy and resorted to appeals of local timber sales to gain traction.  As the 
environmental movement gained momentum, however, environmentalists began 
influencing policy decisions on a grand scale. As well, environmentalists increasingly 
turned to the courts to halt what they considered damaging and misguided logging 
practices. Many local environmentalists, however, were growing uncomfortable simply 
advocating a halt to timber production and began exploring alternative forms of timber 
management and “new forestry” paradigms.  
Disputants also spoke of changes in the physical environment.  As timber harvests 
increased throughout the 1980s, it became clear to many that there were limits to the 
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amount of timber that could be harvested under conventional logging practices.  At the 
same time, environmentalists were busy documenting the remaining old growth forest.  
Communities were also increasingly aware of the growing danger of catastrophic wildfire 
as surrounding forests became more dense, increasingly infested with insects, and 
weakened by drought.  Finally, the California spotted owl was in steep decline, putting it 
on a trajectory similar to the Northern spotted owl, which dramatically altered the Pacific 
Northwest timber economy.  
Finally, changes in the Forest Service took on several dimensions including both 
changes in the agency itself and changes that affected the agency.  The early period of the 
conflict saw massive downsizing and consolidation of the agency’s field offices, while 
workloads were increasing and diversifying.  At the same time, the agency’s timber 
management paradigm began to shift as more emphasis was placed on endangered 
species, old growth protection, fire management, and recreation.  The agency also began 
to explore new forestry paradigms including ecosystem management. 
 Process Theory Orientation 
Thus far I have focused on social identity and characterization frames and their 
changes from phase 1 to phase 2 of the conflict. I have also focused on the context 
surrounding the conflict as well as changes in the context, which provide the conditions 
necessary for changes in identity and identity salience (Brewer 1991; Deux, 1993; Turner 
et al. 1994). However, while we may accept that social identities are context dependent, 
we also know from other research (Bernard and Young, 1997; Cestero, 1999; Coughlin et 
al., 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Yaffee et al. 1996) that similar contextual 
changes occurred in other communities and yet collaborative efforts did not emerge.  This 
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observation suggests that there may be a need for an explanatory framework that enables 
the researcher to identify the conditions necessary for change to occur, without the 
requirement for change to actually occur.  
Mohr’s (1982) process theory provides an explanatory approach that accounts for 
such situations.  Process theory looks at the “necessary” conditions for organizational 
behavior to occur without the requirement of “sufficiency” that would produce a cause 
and effect relationship and a predictable outcome. This approach relies on a “process and 
necessary ingredients” rather than discrete variables to explain an organizational 
outcome.  Mohr argues that behavioral phenomena often occur without a strict causal 
relationship among dependent and independent variables.  Mohr uses the analogy of 
contracting malaria to make this point.  The necessary conditions for the contraction of 
malaria are the malarial parasite, persons already harboring the parasite, climatic 
conditions, and the Anopheles mosquito.  In the presence of these conditions one could 
contract malaria.  But if he or she does not, even though the conditions exist, then 
causality does not hold.  Mohr (1982) uses the metaphor of “ingredients plus the recipe 
that strings them together in such a way as to tell the story of how Y occurs whenever it 
does occur” (p. 37).  The recipe provides a story of how the ingredients fit together in a 
particular way to create – or in retrospect to explain – an outcome.  Process theory, 
according to Mohr, “eschews efficient causality as explanation and depends instead on 
rearrangement – that is, on the joining or separation of two or more elements rather than 
on a change in the magnitude of some element” (p. 45).   
Moreover, process theory deals with a discrete “series of occurrences of events” 
rather than the relationship among variables.  The events are linked together in a unique 
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pattern such that one event tends to pick up where the other left off, making the events, 
their sequence, and their connections important to the outcome.  Mohr adds that, “the 
ingredients alone do not convey a sense of explanation (for example, victims, 
mosquitoes, parasites; so what?). There must also be some instruction for mixing them – 
a recipe” (p. 60).  While process theory tells a story about how something comes about, 
the manner of storytelling, according to Mohr’s definition, must conform to narrow 
specifications and focuses on three elements: “1) necessary conditions, 2) necessary 
probabilistic processes, which together form the core of the theory, and 3) external, 
directional forces that function to move the focal unit and conditions about in a 
characteristic way, often herding them into mutual proximity” (p. 45).   
Mohr’s theory provides a useful framework for the present research. In the 
present research, the outcome is the willingness among disputants in the local timber 
wars to cooperate, which led to the unexpected formation of QLG and a resolution of the 
local forest management conflict. The framework for explaining the outcome is Mohr’s 
(1982) process theory, which allows the researcher to explain why an outcome occurs 
when it does occur.  The substance of the explanation is drawn from social identity 
theory, which explores identity saliency within a dynamic context.  
 Research methods employed in the study were selected because of their fit with 
the research question, which arose from preliminary observations of identity change. The 
initial question suggested a case study approach, the need to document identity change, 
and the need to explore the changing context surrounding the conflict. There was also a 
need, based on the rarity of similar events given similar contexts, to find a framework for 









Case Study: The Quincy Library Group 
 
The Quincy Library Group (QLG) formed in the fall of 1992 out of the efforts of 
an unlikely trio: Plumas County Supervisor Bill Coates, a Republican and strong 
advocate of the timber industry; Tom Nelson, a forester with Sierra Pacific Industries 
(SPI), California’s largest timber company; and Michael Jackson, a local environmental 
attorney and founding member of the Friends of Plumas Wilderness (FPW), an 
environmental organization based in Quincy, California.  All were concerned about 
effects on the local economy from sharp declines in timber harvests on the Plumas 
National Forest, which virtually surrounds the town of Quincy.  QLG emerged when 
logging community leaders Coates and Nelson approached Jackson, the principal leader 
of the local environmental community, with a proposal to resurrect an unusual forest 
management plan that FPW and regional environmental organizations had crafted in the 
mid-1980s (Friends of Plumas Wilderness et al. 1986).   
The environmentalists’ plan was designed to demonstrate that timber harvesting 
on the Plumas National Forest, if done appropriately, could accommodate old-growth, 
endangered species, and riparian habitat protection, and could still produce enough 
timber to sustain the local mills.  But the plan was met with severe hostility when it was 
introduced, as were its architects. Six years later, however, the plan had begun to look 
like the only hope for saving the local economy.  As reporter Jane Braxton Little wrote in 
the Chico News & Review in October of 1993: 
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When the environmentalists released their plan in 1986, the Plumas County 
establishment greeted it with scorn, anger and a spate of anonymous death threats.  
But by early 1993, when Plumas Forest officials were scrambling to keep a 
minimal timber program alive, the environmental alternative suddenly looked 
bounteous. [179] 
 
Coates, Nelson, and Jackson assembled a group of their peers that included, 
among others, representatives from local timber and business interests, environmental 
activists, county supervisors, and local citizens.  Jackson also invited his activist friends 
in Sacramento and San Francisco.  Some had worked on the environmentalists’ 1986 
proposal.  But Sacramento was an arduous three-hour drive from Quincy and San 
Francisco was five.  Attending regular meetings to further develop the plan would be 
difficult.  Moreover, it was questionable whether the plan was a priority compared with 
other environmental battles.   
The beginning was difficult, but as Nelson noted, he, Jackson and Coates could 
agree on a lot of things, among them that they all wanted community stability and all 
were convinced that the Forest Service could not provide it.  As trust grew, they were 
able to agree to a “Community Stability Proposal” (QLG 1993) that reflected the 
environmentalists’ original plan and called for old-growth forest protection, selective 
logging, fuel management, and riparian protection, while restoring traditional harvest 
levels on the Plumas, Lassen and a portion of the Tahoe National Forest through selective 
logging instead of clearcutting.   
In the context of the QLG study, the timber wars, as they were called, can be 
divided into three phases, which are distinguished by the ways in which disputants’ 
identity and characterization frames changed in response to shifting contextual patterns.  
The phases are: 1) the Forest Planning Process (1984-92), 2) the Emergence of QLG 
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(1992-96), and 3) Legislating National Forest Management (1996-present). Following is 
the story, with emphasis on the first two phases. A timeline for phases 1 and 2 is included 
in Appendix A.   
Phase 1 – The Forest Planning Process – (1984-92) 
 
The QLG emerged within a larger political, social and economic context that 
influenced livelihoods, social status, and political power within natural resource 
dependent communities in the Northwest.  The original conflict escalated in the 1980s 
under the Reagan Administration, whose policies dramatically increased timber harvests 
throughout the Northwest (Hirt 1994).  At the same time, many rural communities in the 
Northwest were experiencing an in-migration of urban professionals and retirees whose 
livelihoods were not dependent on the timber economy (Duane 1998).  While this trend 
would begin to tip the balance of power, during most of the 1980s extractive users held 
far greater influence.  Michael Jackson was in the thick of the efforts to slow the harvest.  
“The environmental community wasn’t going to be intimidated,” recalled Jackson, “so 
we were filing appeals on every sale” (Marston 1997, p. 9).  
The main battlefield for the conflict was the Forest Service’s planning process.  
The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) required each national forest to 
develop a comprehensive plan to guide decision-making.  After considerable anticipation, 
in January 1986 the Forest Service released a draft plan for the Plumas National Forest.  
The agency touted the plan as a careful balance between timber and environmental 
interests and announced an annual target of 265 million board feet of timber (the average 
at the time was 185.5 million board feet), to be harvested primarily through clearcutting.   
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Pursuant to a citizen initiative provision under NFMA, a timber industry coalition, 
Plumas County, and FPW each submitted alternatives to the Forest Service plan.  The 
timber industry and Plumas County alternatives sought dramatically increased harvest 
levels, in the range of 315 million board feet per year.  The FPW “conservationist 
alternative” proposed a lower annual harvest – 245 million board feet per year – less than 
the agency’s proposed plan but still considerably more than average harvests.  In 
addition, the FPW alternative set aside significant old-growth, roadless and riparian areas, 
and banned the controversial practice of clearcutting.  The group’s goal was to return the 
forest to pre-European settlement conditions by removing understory trees that had 
accumulated during a century of fire suppression. In FPW’s estimate, the work required 
to restore and maintain the forest could keep the timber industry active for decades.  Said 
Michael Yost: 
None of us is opposed to logging.  If done carefully, a great deal of this forest can 
provide timber for the economic benefit of these communities that depend on the 
forest. [10]  
  
But timber interests were skeptical of the FPW proposal and the group’s motives.  They 
were also distrustful of the Forest Service, which faced the new challenge of balancing 
competing values.   
Fearing a dramatic change in forest policy, a coalition of conservative citizens 
from Plumas and neighboring Sierra County strongly opposed the Forest Service and 
FPW plans on the grounds that they over-emphasized non-timber values.  To gather input 
on its proposed plan, the Forest Service held public meetings throughout the region.  
According to a Sacramento Bee account of a 1986 meeting in the town of Quincy, the 
logging community came out in force: 
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The timber industry amassed logging trucks, backhoes and forest workers on the 
streets of this mountain town Tuesday in a show of force to support maximum 
harvests on the Plumas National Forest.  Speakers wearing wide suspenders and 
hard hats dominated the hearing, attended by more than 300 people.  [14]  
 
As news of the Forest Service plan spread throughout the region, negative reaction only 
escalated.  No one, it appeared, was happy with the agency’s apparent compromise.  In a 
newspaper article, Supervisor Coates warned of a pending appeal by Plumas County: 
As a county we asked for 315 million board feet of timber a year.  We got 265.5 
million.  We and all the counties in northeastern California opposed set-aside 
lands for the spotted owl.  We got more than 100,000 acres.  The regional forester 
has ignored our requests and I think we ought to take a hard look at an appeal 
ourselves. [45] 
 
Not surprising, the Forest Service selected its own alternative.  But the agency 
acknowledged the FPW plan as the “environmentally preferred alternative” and touted it 
for providing “community stability” better than the other options, including its own.  The 
agency rejected the FPW plan however, claiming that its selective logging practices were 
less efficient than clearcutting, the agency’s preferred method of harvest.  Unhappy with 
the Forest Service’s so-called compromise, FPW and 12 other groups, including Plumas 
County, formally appealed the Plumas Forest plan.  While the appeals joined dozens of 
other national forest plans in a cumbersome national review process, the Forest Service 
initiated timber harvesting under its preferred plan.   
Even as it did, however, it was clear that change was on the horizon.  In 1989, the 
northern spotted owl, a cousin of the California spotted owl, was proposed for listing as a 
federally threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (it was officially listed in 
June 1990 after more than five years of intense public debate) (Yaffee 1994).  This event 
accelerated the decline of the timber industry in the Pacific Northwest and, while the 
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northern spotted owl would not affect the Plumas, it suggested that declines in California 
owl populations would eventually threaten local timber production.   
 Fearing a similar action, in February 1989, local loggers formed the Yellow 
Ribbon Coalition, a grassroots effort to protest Forest Service policies they claimed were 
causing timber shortages.  Yellow ribbons, flying from supporters’ vehicles and property, 
symbolized their solidarity with the timber industry.  A local newspaper ad passionately 
described the campaign under the headline “Why We Fly Yellow Ribbons:” 
The Yellow Ribbon is silent, but it radiates a power for change, a power to save 
our Timber Industry, our communities and our natural-resources lifestyle.  A 
lifestyle that embodies all of the values that have made our Nation the greatest 
Nation on Earth.  When we pass a car or truck that is also flying Yellow Ribbons, 
a bond is formed that cannot be severed by words or deeds of preservationist 
adversaries.  Our Timber Industry, our homes, our families and our communities 
are at risk.  We are united. [75] 
  
In the ad, coalition organizer Donna McElroy listed more than 70 individuals and local 
businesses that supported the campaign. Soon yellow ribbons were flying from vehicles 
and posted in storefront windows across the region, and in conservative enclaves 
throughout California and the West.  Beginning in 1989, the coalition staged an annual 
Labor Day rally and logging truck convoy through northern California.  Rally attendees 
charged the Forest Service with threatening the fundamental rights of local workers.  
“This rally is about the spotted owl and my rights – peoples’ rights to work. If we don’t 
stop the spotted owl deal,” a convoy member told a local reporter, “you’re not even going 
to be working.” [66]  
In response to the Yellow Ribbon campaign, an anonymous environmental faction 
circulated a well-publicized flyer taking a cynical jab at the campaign and using a 
fictitious Earth Day 1990 picnic as the medium:   
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In recognition of Earth Day and all our renewable natural resources – a 
Community Picnic – April 21, 1990 – Shady Glen area – Plumas County 
Fairgrounds. Free trees to plant for the future! Free chain saws to prevent 
unwanted old-growth! Brought to you by: The Nature Consumptioncy, The 
Wilderness Prevention Society, Ducks ‘R’ Ours, Multiple Use First!, True 
Conservationists, Real Environmentalists for Jobs, Sierra Stumper, Friends of the 
DeForest Service, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Red Emmerson. [78] 
 
The flyer also cleverly listed the picnic’s fictitious supporters:  
 
Kinder & Gentler Logging, Inc.; California Department of Forest Prevention, Inc.; 
Pacific Gouge & Erosion, Inc.; 4x4s for 2x4s, Inc.; The Hedduppis Rectumus 
“Hug a Tree” Project, Inc.; Bob’s Biomass Burgers, Inc.; Company Town 
Realtors, Inc.; Feather River Erosion Aggregate, Inc.; Tie a Yellow Ribbon 
Around an Old-growth Tree Coalition, Inc.; Plumas Unified School District 
Kindergartners for Logging, Inc.; Mean Street Project, Inc.; Sierra Chainsaw 
Artists Guild; Sierra Pacific Monopolies, Inc.; Bill’s Tire & Kick-back Company, 
Inc. [78] 
 
Because the flyer and others like it were anonymous, it was not possible to know whether 
they were circulated by members of Friends of Plumas Wilderness or by more radical 
agitators with a different agenda. Michael Jackson and other local environmentalists were 
careful to distance themselves from vandalism towards the timber industry however it 
was nevertheless difficult for those in the logging community to make that distinction.  
In their Yellow Ribbon campaign travels, loggers were becoming aware of 
growing public resistance to the practice of clearcutting.  To their chagrin, they also 
discovered that blame for the policy was falling directly on them.  Signs that distanced 
loggers from Forest Service clearcutting policies began to emerge.  “Clearcutting is as 
much of a problem for the logger as the spotted owl,” charged Mac McCutcheon, a 
Quincy logger.  “Most loggers are for selective cutting.  With proper selective cutting, 
we’ll always have a timber industry and we’ll always have our jobs.  With clearcutting 
we get erosion and brush fields.” [66] 
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Nevertheless, the practice of clearcutting continued, as did the growing tensions.  
The following year, Donna McElroy, a spokesperson for local loggers, stepped up her 
defense of the logging community and her attacks on the Forest Service: 
I’m tired of loggers getting blamed for what’s going on in the woods.  In every 
news report you see, the logger -- the working man -- takes the blame for 
clearcutting. [96] 
 
Despite common ground on clearcutting, loggers continued to use the annual rallies to 
hammer environmentalists, which they ultimately blamed for Forest Service policies:  
If these radical environmentalists have their way we are going to have the cleanest 
depression this world’s ever seen.  If we didn’t have the timber industry, there 
would be no town here, and that’s a fact. [96] 
 
A year later, however, McElroy reiterated a growing frustration with the agency. “I blame 
everything on the Forest Service. They sit on the middle of the fence.  Whoever it looks 
like is going to win, they drop down on that side of the fence. [121] 
Not surprising, environmentalists shared much of the logging community’s 
frustration with the Forest Service, albeit for different reasons.  Asked if 
environmentalists were satisfied with Forest Service changes, Michael Jackson told a 
reporter in August of 1991:  
If you ask me if there is any real change going on with the Forest Service, I will 
tell you that there is not.  I don’t think they are doing anything other than 
propaganda. [121] 
 
The agency’s attempts to balance competing values were satisfying no one, it seemed.  
The Forest Service was in flux.  While an extractive use philosophy pervaded the agency 
throughout the 1980s, at least parts of the agency were beginning to recognize that public 
values, and the agency’s mission, were changing.  Greg McClarren of the Deschutes 
National Forest in Central Oregon was aware of the dilemma as early as 1986: 
 
 79
Our values are slowly catching up with the public’s perception of multiple use.  
There are some fundamental changes coming in the way our forests are managed.  
We’re on the cutting edge, but we are leading from somewhere in the middle.  
Timber people say the Forest Service is too liberal; conservationists say our head 
is in the sand – and to some extent it is, because of our strong traditions in timber 
management. [10] 
 
 Public reaction to the agency’s confusion was extremely disruptive, however.  
Vandalism and threats of violence began to surface in July 1988 when a spiked board was 
found buried across a steep logging road.  In August 1988, a Quincy newspaper publisher 
received a bomb threat intended for a Sierra Pacific mill.  Threats to environmentalists 
occurred as well.  Michael Jackson reported receiving death threats, including a phone 
message tape-recorded on his answering machine.  He also discovered a well-placed 
bullet hole in his Main Street office window.   
In a 1989 letter appearing in the Feather River Bulletin, Jackson decried the 
vandalism and threats.  He also reached out to loggers, referring to a recent Bulletin letter 
from Yellow Ribbon Coalition organizer Donna McElroy in which she criticized Forest 
Service clearcutting policies.  Jackson wrote, “I was more encouraged by reading that 
letter than anything I have seen or heard in the last ten years in this county.” [71]  
Jackson empathized with loggers’ frustrations and reiterated that FPW’s alternative 
provided a common purpose.   
We know what is wrong with present Forest Service activities and we 
know how to fix it.  We know how to do that while preserving all of the 
local timber industry jobs and potentially increasing them.  We also know 
that the logging community has answers to some of our common problems 
which we may not have considered.  We know that for a complete solution 
to our common goals we need the wisdom of the people who have worked 





Jackson also suggested that environmentalists and loggers had a common love of the 
forest and a common foe in both the Forest Service and in large timber companies. 
Jackson’s letter attracted the attention of the Plumas County Board of 
Supervisors, who invited he and McElroy to a County Board meeting in which a 
Resolution condemning the violence was drafted.  The Resolution called upon “members 
of our community to cooperate and continue positive discussions on the future of the 
forest and the stability of our rural quality of life.” [70]  While Jackson’s letter and the 
County’s Resolution pointed towards a collaborative solution, it did little to change the 
dynamics of the conflict.  The Plumas Forest Plan was being appealed and the draft forest 
plan on neighboring Lassen National Forest had not yet been formally released.  
Moreover, for the time being the Plumas Forest was producing an abundance of timber.   
All of that was about to change.  In June 1991, the Sacramento Bee published a 
cutting five-part special report on the status of the Sierra Nevada Range titled “Majesty 
and Tragedy: The Sierra in Peril.” The series, which won a Pulitzer Prize for author Tom 
Knudson, stunned the Forest Service.   
Today, the Sierra is dominated by controversy.  From Camp Nelson to Quincy, 
Lone Pine to Nevada City, people are fighting over the future of this range.  At 
the center of the controversy stands the largest landowner in the Sierra, one that 
has cut vast stands of forests, caused massive soil erosion and destroyed many 
sparkling streams.  That landowner is the U.S. Forest Service. [103] 
 
The report laid blame for most of the Sierras perils directly in the lap of the 
agency and its mantra to “get out the cut.”  In its defense, the agency claimed that it was 
changing.  “We are really at a crossroads,” Regional Forester Ron Stewart told Knudson.  
“We’ve got a history.  And we see over the past couple of years, and the next couple, 
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rapid changes going on in the direction and aspects of our mission.” [103]  The agency’s 
challenge was obvious, even to most insiders, as a wildlife biologist told Knudson:   
We have been forced since World War II into being a company that provides a 
service to private industry and government coffers.  This may sound corny, but 
we should be the stewards of the land – not just a company that meets timber 
targets. [106]  
 
But even those inside the Forest Service had doubts about the agency’s sincerity.  “I hear 
a lot of good verbiage,” said Ron Medel, an agency biologist.  “But is it translating to 
change down on the land? No.” [103]   
In the face of growing pressure, in July of 1991 the Forest Service temporarily 
suspended all timber sales and harvests in California spotted owl habitat.  A Forest 
Service spokesperson described the suspension as part of a larger move towards a 
“landscape approach” to managing national forests.  In the interim, the agency would 
complete a study of the status of the California spotted owl and would recommend new 
management policies.  The logging community, however, feared that the Forest Service 
was caving in to a powerful environmental lobby.  Seeking to diminish their influence, 
the timber industry sought to portray environmentalists as radical special interests: 
Until John Q Public stands up and says what he wants, the Forest Service 
responds to that vocal minority – that 1 percent of the public that wants to 
lock everything up for owls and wandering minstrels. [119] 
 
In spite of opposition from the timber industry, production began a steep 
decline.  While an average of 185 million board feet was harvested on the Plumas 
Forest annually between 1988 and 1990, the harvest began a steep decline to an 
average of 75 million board feet between 1991 and 1993.  The Forest Service 
predicted steeper declines well into the future. Similar declines were projected on 
the Lassen National Forest.  An initial draft of the Lassen Forest plan predicted an 
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annual harvest of 154 million board feet (from a high of 178 million board feet in 
the mid-1980s), although the Forest Service’s own estimates suggested that the 
final plan would slowly decrease the harvest to 120 million in 1993.  The agency 
hinted that reductions would continue and that protection of spotted owl habitat 
would have to occur.  
By the time the Lassen plan was finally released in August 1992, however, 
the harvest target had dropped to 96 million board feet.  Livid, county officials 
took Lassen Forest officials to task for caving in to special interests.  Bill Coates 
told agency leaders: 
We sense that the Forest Service is losing its will to fight. We’re counting 
on you guys to start making a stand for these communities. They’re 
counting on you and we’re counting on you, and we expect you to fight! 
[124]   
 
In response, Lassen forest supervisor Leonard Atencio cited a shift in national 
priorities, which de-emphasized the agency’s traditional focus on timber 
production:  
Internally [the agency] is in a lot of chaos.  As a country we are not sure we want 
to continue with our way of life or start protecting our environment.  For the 
Forest Service it isn’t a choice.  Based on the laws we are required to follow, we 
are not given a choice of protecting animal species or communities. [124] 
 
In September 1992, Lassen County Supervisors held a special meeting to 
gather public input on the Lassen plan.  Susan Baremore, a forestry consultant 
from a third-generation logging family, reflected the desperation of the local 
logging community.  “This plan will effectively exterminate an entire culture of 
families like ours.  We’re not going to allow our families to be torn apart without 
a fight!” [147]  The meeting ended with a Resolution condemning the Forest 
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Service and demanding that it postpone adoption of the Lassen Forest plan until it 
could adequately review local economic and social impacts.   
Phase 2 – Emergence of the Quincy Library Group (1992-96)  
It was becoming apparent to both environmentalists and logging advocates that 
their administrative appeals to the Plumas Forest plan were going to fail.  FPW 
contemplated a court action to force the Forest Service to adopt its alternate plan, which 
the agency had already touted.  Coates and Nelson saw no reasonable legal recourse for 
their appeals.  So in the fall of 1992, several weeks before the election that ushered the 
Clinton administration into office, Coates and Nelson approached Jackson with the idea 
to dust off the FPW plan.  Jackson was eager to meet but did not mince words.  As he 
told a reporter (Little 1998), the timber industry was on its knees. “We let it up to do the 
right thing” said Jackson. “These people are our neighbors” (p. 13).  SPI’s philosophy 
made it easier to talk.  According to Nelson, SPI’s position has always been “go talk to 
your adversaries as long as you can keep your wits about you, because you may not be at 
odds on all points.” (personal comm., 3-4-99) 
 Coates, Nelson, and Jackson agreed that the concepts in the FPW plan were 
sound.  With initial agreement, they joined with other community members to develop a 
specific project they could take to the Forest Service.  Group members initially sought a 
pilot project on a single watershed – McClellan Creek.  The group also started meeting at 
the Plumas County Library, where it could accommodate a large group, demonstrate 
openness, and, some say, refrain from raising their voices.  In February 1993, the 
“Library Group” presented the Forest Service with a proposal entitled, “Joint Project 
Proposal by Friends of Plumas Wilderness and Sierra Pacific Industries.”  By all public 
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accounts, the proposal was greeted with cautious optimism by the Forest Service.  Plumas 
Forest Supervisor Wayne Thornton wrote to Jackson on March 4, 1993 expressing the 
agency’s cooperation: 
The presentation you made to develop a joint resource management proposal in 
the McClellan Creek area is exciting.  It is exactly this kind of approach to find 
common ground among diverse interests and get beyond ‘sacred semantics’ that 
will determine the best path for resource management in the Sierra Nevada’s.  
(letter dated 3-4-93) 
 
Thornton encouraged the group to develop a detailed proposal for agency review and to 
coordinate its efforts with agency personnel.  
As the group moved forward, however, it returned to a broader focus on interim 
management of the entire Plumas National Forest as represented in the FPW alternative.  
The group also expanded its scope to include the Lassen and a portion of the Tahoe 
National Forest.  Together these forests made up a productive and coherent eco-region at 
the northern tip of the Sierra Nevada.  The region included the California timber towns of 
Quincy, Susanville, Chester, Loyalton, and Greenville – all facing a similar fate.  In 
moving from an experimental watershed project to the management of a timber-
dependent region, the group placed itself directly in the path of the Forest Service’s 
timber management program.   
In July 1993, Coates and Jackson sought community support at a town meeting at 
the Quincy Theater Hall.  The Feather River Bulletin covered the meeting of about 150 
citizens and Forest Service employees.  The paper was surprised by the camaraderie: 
It was something we never thought we'd see in Plumas County but last weekend it 
happened.  Environmentalists, loggers, USFS personnel, mill workers, their union 
representatives and a bevy of concerned citizens met at a town hall meeting to 
discuss a plan for the future of the area's forests.  After two hours of discussion on 
the bipartisan proposal, a straw poll show of hands was called for.  Only four 
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people disapproved.  It could be the beginning of the end of a long struggle over 
forest use in the Sierra and a harbinger of the Sierras future. [161] 
 
Prophetically, the Bulletin also hinted at the challenges facing the group:  
Now it must be sold to the Forest Service and Congress for implementation.  
Fortunately, the grassroots forest plan is precisely the kind of thing President 
Clinton called for at the recent timber summit in Portland. [161]  
 
The Forest Service was among the first to respond:  “Something really unique and special 
has gone on here,” stated Forest Supervisor Thornton.  “All sides are applying equal 
pressure to the Forest Service, but they’re singing from the same song sheet, and that’s 
music to my ears.” [163] 
The Library Group’s purpose, according to a report released at the meeting, was 
“to develop a plan that would promote the objectives of forest health, ecological integrity, 
adequate timber supply, and local economic stability.” [162]  The report contained a list 
of basic points they could agree upon, general strategies for accomplishing their goals, 
and an image of a desired future condition: “an all-age, multi-storied, fire resistant forest 
approximating pre-white-man conditions.” [162] With broad community support, the 
Library Group pushed forward and soon developed a five-year “Community Stability 
Proposal” for the delineated forests, a total of 2.5 million acres of federal forestland. 
Encouraged by the group’s progress and overwhelming community support, 
Coates was optimistic: “None of us has ever done this before, and I’m sure we’ll make 
mistakes.  But the work we’ve done so far represents a four-letter word – hope.  We 
haven’t had a lot of that in the past.” [163]  
Jackson later stated his reasons for getting involved (Marston 1997): 
I’ve taken part in listing almost every salmon on the West Coast.  But I can’t fix 
the salmon problem with the law.  They’re in too much trouble.  I need the help of 
everyone.  It’s the same with logging.  I need my neighbors.  If the logger who 
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drives the Cat in the woods won’t help me, then the tractor will go through the 
stream, no matter how many rules there are. 
 
But Jackson had other important reasons as well.  “These are my neighbors,” he told a 
reporter.  “My heart doesn’t bleed for Sierra Pacific Industries, but bleeds for the folks 
getting $12 an hour who don’t have alternatives for work.” [163]  In a letter in a timber 
industry newsletter two months after their historic town meeting , Jackson elaborated: 
We sat down, and worked it out.  In doing so, we began rediscovering our sense 
of community.  The conversations, both formal and informal, that have occurred 
as a result of the efforts of the [QLG] have been very positive.  They have made 
us realize how dysfunctional a community we were before, always fighting each 
other, instead of trying to move forward on common goals. The social experiment 
of working together as neighbors is perhaps as important, or maybe more 
important, than the forestry experiment we are now proposing [170] 
 
 While the majority of FPW members joined QLG, not everyone affiliated with the 
group supported the plan.  The first to challenge it was local forest activist Neil Dion.  
Dion objected to the group’s interpretation of the California Spotted Owl Interim 
Guidelines (CASPO), a scientific report designed to provide interim protection for the 
owl while the Forest Service developed a long-term management plan.  Encouraged 
primarily by Dion, environmentalists outside the community grew wary of the emerging 
coalition.  They viewed the forests primarily as national assets and saw little connection 
with local economies, even though some had worked on the earlier FPW plan.  Nor did 
they trust SPI.  Moreover, while outside environmentalists were equally frustrated with 
the Forest Service, and welcomed forest reform, they believed QLG’s plan was overly 
ambitious and preferred a small-scale experiment somewhere on the Plumas forest. 
QLG also gained early attention and support from California political leaders 
including liberal Senator Barbara Boxer and conservative Congressman Wally Herger.  
Boxer had initial reservations about the group but attended a QLG-sponsored field trip to 
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tour neighboring Collins Almanor Forest, which served as a model for the group’s plan.  
At the end, however, Boxer concluded: “This is not easy.  And you did it.  It is a myth 
that we can’t be for a sound economy and also for a strong environment.” Boxer pledged 
her support for the plan and added, “Here’s what I want to leave you with.  I think it’s 
exciting.  I think it’s a model.” [179]  
Congressman Herger also praised the group but used his praise to subtly criticize 
Clinton Administration policies:  
Unwilling to sit idly by while distant forces decide the fate of our mountain 
communities, local leaders and activists from across the ideological and political 
spectrum have been quietly meeting together in a constructive effort to find 
common ground.  [169] 
 
In spite of their ideological differences, Boxer and Herger penned a letter to Secretary of 
Agriculture Mike Espy in February 1994.  The letter described the “remarkable progress” 
made between the local environmental community and the timber industry on a proposal 
aimed at achieving balance between economic and environmental interests.  Boxer and 
Herger hoped to encourage Espy to back funding for the proposal’s implementation.   
In the interim, QLG’s strategy at home was to advocate for the modification of 
proposed Forest Service timber sales that were inconsistent with its Community Stability 
Proposal.  Since the Forest Service had not formally adopted QLG’s proposal, the 
agency’s timber sales were often in conflict, especially among agency resource managers 
who objected to the group’s influence.  In a leaked and widely circulated internal memo, 
Lassen Forest Supervisor Leonard Atencio challenged QLG’s credibility, while stating 
his commitment to work with the group.  
I have heard the concerns and agree with everyone, this group is not going to be 
easy to work with.  I also agree that this group DOES NOT HAVE THE 
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ANSWERS EITHER, [and] does not have the expertise they claim. (memo dated 
1-9-94) 
   
Atencio’s memo was evidence that Forest Service managers were dragging their feet.  To 
ease growing tensions, Regional Forester Ron Stewart sent a memo to staff of the 
Plumas, Lassen, and Tahoe national forests encouraging cooperation and reminding them 
that QLG’s proposal had already amassed Congressional support.  Stewart wrote:  
We have wanted consensus for years.  This proposal is serious – it could break 
gridlock – we must be quick to work with it, and to make it a reality.  It is our best 
opportunity to gain the strong community support we need to practice sound 
resource management.  The Forest Service will be judged by how we are able to 
shift to a new way of doing business.  Let’s strive to make the judgment 
favorable.  (memo dated 1-21-94) 
 
Sympathetic elements within the agency offered encouragement.  Yet little 
changed.  Lacking specific commitment to their plan from local Forest Service officials, 
42 QLG members went to Washington, D.C. in March 1994 to lobby Congress and 
Administration officials.  While there, they visited Forest Service Chief Jack Ward 
Thomas and 110 members of Congress, whom they considered key funding votes 
(Brooks, 1994).  The group received glowing reports from Congress and the Clinton 
Administration.  In fact, some in the Administration began touting QLG, and similar 
groups, as the “natural resources movement of the 1990s” [188]. 
However, while its efforts with Congress blossomed, QLG found only pockets of 
cooperation within the Forest Service.  Exasperated, Jackson reminded Thomas of the 
President’s message of cooperation at the 1993 Northwest Forest Summit and the strong 
support the group received outside the agency.  True to his reputation, Jackson accused 
the agency of “advertising a defective product” for fraudulently claiming to reinvent 
itself, and chided Thomas for the agency’s inaction: 
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They tell us that the Washington office of the Forest Service and the United States 
Congress have so screwed up the system that even without opposition, they can’t 
sell timber.  Is it true? Is everything so hopeless? Does the Forest Service truly 
lack the ability to produce any goods or services? Or is it just the group of people 
we are dealing with? (letter dated 4-19-94) 
 
Thomas did not respond to the letter.  So Jackson, as predicted, turned to the media:  
We can’t get [officials of] the Plumas National Forest to do anything but talk.  
They ought to change their name to the U.S. Lip Service.  I’m hoping its only 
local ineptness.  But if it’s not, owls versus jobs was never the problem. [190]  
 
A Sacramento Bee news article put the problem into perspective: “Plumas County’s 
storybook tale of environmentalists and loggers working side-by-side to save their 
community now has a purported villain: the U.S. Forest Service.” [192]  An agency 
spokesperson called it an irony:  “The very things that led the Quincy Library Group to 
meet in the first place are the very things that are limiting our ability to respond.” [190] 
 Instead, the Forest Service responded directly to Congress with a briefing paper 
reaffirming its support for QLG.  Accompanying the paper was an internal memo 
describing what agency public affairs staff perceived to be the underlying tensions – 
worsened economic conditions, misleading statements from Chief Thomas and 
Undersecretary [James] Lyons, unmet timber harvest projections, and increased threat of 
catastrophic wildfire. (memo dated 4-25-94)  The memo also confirmed that amending 
the existing forest plans would provide the mandate needed to implement QLG’s plan.  
However, the memo stopped short of recommending plan amendments pending the 
scheduled environmental impact statement (EIS) on the CASPO interim guidelines.  
Rather than amend the forest plans to incorporate the QLG proposal, the agency decided 
that the CASPO EIS would serve as the vehicle for amending the forest plans.  For QLG 
this was a catch-22.  QLG’s plan sought to provide community stability during an interim 
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period while spotted owl guidelines were being reviewed.  However, the preparation and 
review of those guidelines blocked QLG’s interim plan from being implemented. 
 Frustrated with the administrative process, in May 1994 QLG members attended a 
Democratic fundraiser in Sacramento, where the California Congressional delegation had 
arranged for Michael Jackson to meet President Clinton.  According to the Feather River 
Bulletin, Jackson waited patiently while the President worked the room.  As Clinton 
approached Jackson, he was joined by Congressman Vic Fazio and Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, both strong proponents of QLG’s proposal.  According to the Bulletin: 
Jackson… began by telling the president “the community has sent me because we 
think we have a solution to the timber wars.”  He briefly explained the group's 
intent when Fazio broke in: “This is the most remarkable group I have ever seen."  
Feinstein added, "Yes, and we’re going to get the money for it." [193] 
 
The President took the group’s proposal and promised to review it.  According to the 
Bulletin, Clinton was enthusiastic about working on a bipartisan project and was 
encouraged by a letter of support from California Governor Pete Wilson.  Jackson told 
the Bulletin that Clinton’s response was more than the group had hoped for.  He also 
noted, “the ease with which we got to the top was amazing.  It indicates the level of 
interest in this plan.” [193]  
Once again it appeared that the planets were aligning.  QLG members soon 
learned, however, that California’s regional environmental community, anticipating 
Jackson’s meeting, had penned a pre-emptive letter to the President, Administration 
officials, and Democratic members of the California delegation.  The letter offered 
support for local efforts to address forest management issues but was critical of QLG’s 
proposal, arguing that it was inconsistent with federal laws, regulations, and policies, and 
that it excluded outside environmentalists. Although environmentalists agreed with the 
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technical aspects of the proposal, they reminded the President that, in his own words at 
the 1993 Northwest Forest Summit, any plan must be “scientifically sound, ecologically 
credible, and legally responsible.” “At this time,” they concluded, “the Quincy Library 
Group plan fails this test.” (letter dated 5-18-94) 
Blindsided by the letter, QLG environmentalists fired back a terse and angry 
response.  In their reply to QLG’s letter, regional environmentalists attempted to mend 
fences, apologizing for the tone of the letter and admitting some mistakes.  However, 
they also defended their actions as necessary to correct the impression that 
environmentalists were united in support of the QLG plan.  The reconciliation letter 
concluded: “We all share the same goal of healthy and sustainable Sierra Nevada forests, 
and we look forward to continuing to work with you toward that goal.”  
 Although strained, QLG environmentalists and their counterparts resumed a 
working relationship.  For the most part, their criticisms were substantive and not 
personal.  But tensions persisted.  Then, in the summer of 1994 a reporter asked Jackson 
and Coates why some environmentalists opposed the QLG plan.  Jackson reminded 
observers that the group had detractors on both sides.  Not one to miss an opportunity to 
poke his detractors, Jackson described one side as “right-wing people who believe this is 
a left-wing plot to weaken the moral fiber of loggers and who support the cutting of more 
trees.”  The other he described as a “small, left-wing environmental contingent that 
believes the plan is too kind to loggers.” [199]  Coates took a direct swipe at 
environmentalists, suggesting that they may be withholding support, “because their dues 
are derived from things not working.  If we can do something to make the environment 
better,” he suggested, “it threatens their ability to grow and thrive.” [199] 
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While QLG was busy lobbying Congress, and defending its proposal in the 
CASPO EIS review, a fire destroyed 40,000 acres of pristine forest the group had 
delimited as off-limits to future logging.  The following season, in response to a 
controversial “salvage” policy designed to streamline logging in burned-over forestlands, 
Lassen Forest officials initiated the Barkley Salvage Sale.  The pending timber sale 
threatened to splinter the group. While QLG declared the forest off limits to logging, it 
was now charred and, in the minds of many group members, had limited ecological 
value.  Why not harvest what remained?  Jackson recalled the “disputatious” meeting:  
The environmental side told our friends “we were with you when the Clinton 
Administration came in and the Congress was Democratic.  We stood with you 
then.  Now you guys have just had the ’94 election and you have a Republican 
Congress and you are insulated from the law.  We want you to know that you are 
not insulated from your word.  And you will stop it.”  They said, “We can’t stop 
it” and they tried and they couldn’t.  And the Forest Service went ahead with the 
sale.  (personal communication, 8-25-98) 
 
Since they could not stop the sale, QLG agreed to oppose it.  “That was not an 
easy thing,” reflected Tom Nelson of SPI.  “We got into this coalition to get more timber 
on the market.  But our deal is that the land is off the [logging] base.  We honored our 
commitment.” [231]  In fact, no logging companies bid on the sale and it was withdrawn.  
Congressman Herger, however, wanted the timber sold.  In a letter to the Forest Service, 
Herger strongly counseled the agency to re-bid the sale.  It did. Again, there were no bids.  
QLG member and forester Bill Howe told the Los Angles Times: 
We were under a lot of pressure to break with the group. Industry people were 
calling, saying, ‘Are you crazy, or what?’ But three years ago we decided to speak 




Suspicious of the timing and conditions of the sale, QLG members accused the Forest 
Service of trying to splinter the group. “I have no doubt the Forest Service’s sole goal is 
to divide us so it can get back to being in charge of a dying empire,” stated Jackson [231]. 
One week after the Forest Service withdrew the Barkley sale for the second time, 
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman announced $4.7 million in funding to implement 
parts of the QLG plan, approximately 1/3 of what the group requested.  Officially, the 
funds were granted to assist the Forest Service in implementing the group’s wildfire 
management strategy.  Glickman stated, “This is a California experiment to see if we can 
talk to each other about natural resources instead of kill each other.” [226]  
In spite of its efforts, or perhaps because of them, QLG could not get the Forest 
Service to fully implement its plan.  Without a specific charge from Congress or a funded 
mandate from the Clinton Administration, the agency lacked clear direction to amend its 
existing forest plans.  With encouragement from Congressman Herger, QLG began to 
view Congress as its only hope for action.  QLG biologist Linda Blum viewed legislation 
as a last resort to get the Forest Service to take the plan seriously.  “This is to get them off 
the dime – to do this work and do it right.” [253] 
Phase 3 – Legislating National Forest Management (1996-present) 
The legislative road was rocky at best.  In March 1996, Herger’s aides began 
meeting with SPI’s Tom Nelson to draft legislation.  Not surprising, Herger favored the 
logging components of the QLG proposal and, in a letter to Nelson, advocated 
“flexibility” in the legislation that would allow logging in protected areas “on an as 
needed basis.” (letter dated 3-31-96)  To his credit, Nelson shared the letter with QLG 
members.  Jackson suggested that the letter amounted to “blackmail.” (QLG meeting 
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notes dated 4-19-96)  Jackson also stated that while he preferred that Herger sponsor the 
bill, he distrusted the Congressman.  To counter Herger’s bias, Jackson requested that 
Senator Feinstein assign an aide to balance the bill.  
A draft bill was first circulated in June 1996 (draft legislation dated 6-13-96).  To 
QLG members’ frustration, however, the bill still reflected Herger’s pro-logging slant.  
As the bill passed through committee mark-up procedures, QLG environmentalists 
offered changes to reflect the QLG proposal.  A second draft was circulated in September 
of that year (draft legislation dated 9-4-96).  This time QLG environmentalists sought 
input from their colleagues in the regional environmental community.  While the draft 
bill was significantly improved, the coalition of regional environmentalists revealed 
several additional problems.  No friend of California’s environmental community, Herger 
ignored the coalition’s comments and formally introduced the bill in the House.  Since 
the bill was not expected to move in the House before the holiday recess, however, QLG 
environmentalists assured their regional counterparts that there was still time to respond.   
Fearing Herger would by-pass them again, however, regional environmentalists 
urged QLG to stall action until they could reach agreement, and recommended a time-
limited negotiation, “aimed at achieving bill language which allows a reasonable 
demonstration of the QLG approach.” The negotiation required QLG “not to seek to 
advance the bill until the time allocated for negotiations is up.” (Pace, letter date 9-21-96)  
While QLG welcomed the negotiations, it had little control over Herger, who was eager 
to advance the legislation.  Congress, however, recessed before the bill moved in the 
House, giving QLG environmentalists and their regional counterparts another chance to 
find common ground.   
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Deliberations continued early into 1997 when Herger issued a February 13 
deadline for completion of the draft.  On February 7, Linda Blum faxed the latest version 
of the bill (dated 2-7-97) to 15 environmentalists representing a coalition of groups 
involved in the negotiations.  The Sierra Nevada Alliance, the most moderate of the 
groups, agreed to support the latest draft.  The California Wilderness Coalition, also 
relatively moderate, suggested minor changes but stated that it would not actively oppose 
the bill.  Ryan Hansen, the organization’s director, added, “We agree with [QLG 
members] who point out that the land management framework authorized by the QLG 
bill is a marked improvement over current practices” (letter dated 2-12-97)   The Sierra 
Nevada Forest Protection Campaign, the most radical of the groups, threatened to oppose 
the bill and urged other environmentalists to reject it.  
Herger and Feinstein introduced the bill on February 27, 1997.  QLG 
environmentalists still hoped that opposing environmentalists would join their effort to 
improve the legislation.  Two days before the House Resources Subcommittee hearings 
on March 5, which arch-conservative Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth (R-ID) chaired, 
Blum attempted once more to get the remaining opposition on board:  
Finally, I fear that you may be walking right into Queen Helen [Chenoweth] and 
her loyal knights’ trap. They are looking to portray environmentalists as being 
unreasonable, hysterical, intransigent and never satisfied.  You are better than 
that.  (email message dated 3-3-97) 
 
The northern California environmental community, which had thus far held 
together despite tensions over the QLG proposal, was about to come apart.  Two days 
after the hearing, Natural Resource Defense Council’s David Edelson responded:   
Under the circumstances, are you really surprised by the amount of confusion, 
distrust, and concern that the bill has engendered in the environmental 
community? Speaking personally, I am very uncomfortable being in a position of 
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opposing you, Mike Yost, and Mike Jackson; I have worked with all of you for 
many years and have a great amount of respect for your work.  However, my 
greatest allegiance – like yours – is to the forest, and I simply do not agree with 
you that the QLG agreement is better than what we have, or are likely to have in 
the near future.  (email message dated 3-7-97) 
 
Despite attempts to hold the environmental community together, the contentious political 
process caused it to splinter, and elevated the conflict to the national level.  An improved 
version of the bill eventually passed the House by a vote of 429 to 1 (the lone dissenting 
vote was cast by Congressman Ron Paul, R-Texas).  Environmentalists lobbied Senator 
Boxer to withdraw her support and place a “courtesy hold” on the bill, preventing it from 
reaching the Senate floor.  In response, Senator Feinstein worked behind the scenes with 
the Clinton Administration to attach the bill to its 1998 Appropriations Bill, where it 









Frame Analysis and the Forest Planning Process 
 
Identity and characterization framing occurs within the context of the local 
Timber wars, which, as the QLG case reveals, can be divided onto three phases – the 
forest planning process, the emergence of the Quincy Library Group, and legislating 
national forest management.  As such, the frames being analyzed in this research were 
triggered by actions or events associated with forest management decisions and policies 
instituted by the U.S. Forest Service.  The actions and events provide opportunities for 
the disputants to “frame” an issue, position, or response, to which other disputants frame 
their own responses, and so on.  The present chapter (V) documents the intractability of 
the conflict from a framing perspective and provides a baseline from which to compare 
identity and characterization frames during the next phase of the conflict. The following 
chapter (VI) documents identity and characterization frames present as the conflict was 
transformed.  Taken together, chapters V and VI provide an objective assessment of 
frame changes as the conflict moved from intractability to local resolution.    
Dominant Identity Frames 
It was first observed that the Timber wars involved three dominant affiliations – 
logging interests, environmental interests, and the U.S. Forest Service.  While these 
distinctions are often taken for granted, for the purpose of this study they need to be 
verified so that they can serve as base-line information from which change may be 
tracked.  Baseline social identity categories and subsequent frames were determined by, 
 
 98
1) identifying disputants’ in-group affiliations from specific collective references, 2) 
interpreting the intended meaning of first-person plural references (we, us, our), and 3) 
recording collective labels attached by the media within the context of a news article. 
Following a document analysis approach (Altheide 1996; Lincoln and Guba 
1985), identity frames were grouped into common categories and named at the end of the 
grouping process.  Figure 5.1 provides a breakdown of the frequencies of dominant 
identity categories for the entire study period along with a further breakdown of 
categories in the two phases of the Timber wars. In addition to the dominant identity 
frames listed above, Figure 1 also includes the Quincy Library Group (QLG), which is 
absent in Phase 1 but is strongly represented in Phase 2.  
 
The following analysis is designed to provide the a sense of the dominant identity 
frames that emerged in Phase 1 of the conflict, as well as a sense of the context in which 
the identities were evoked by disputants.  Tables 1-3 below contain typical examples of 
logging, environmental, and Forest Service identity frames respectively.  Because they 
are infrequent, community identity frames are discussed individually and are not placed 
in a table.  
Identity Frames            Phase 1        Phase 2 













Frequency of Identity Frames 
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 Logging Identity:  During the forest planning process, common identities 
emerged among loggers, timber industry officials, businesses that serviced and/or 
profited from the industry, supportive county officials, and the local school district, 
which benefited from payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) on timber sale receipts.  I refer to 
this common affiliation as the “logging community” because it centers around a common 
position among affiliates to maximize timber harvesting on the national forests.  While 
loggers, timber industry representatives, and county officials spoke most often on behalf 
of the logging community, local business leaders and school district officials frequently 
weighed in on forest management issues.  This group was galvanized in part by declining 
timber harvests, increased unemployment, declining tax revenues and PILT payments, 
and federal cutbacks.  Identity frames commonly expressed during this period include 
affiliations with loggers, with the timber industry, and with “working people.”  
Table 5.1 is illustrative of the 97 identity frames expressed by members of the 
logging community throughout Phase 1.  While “we” is primarily the more narrowly 
defined association of timber workers and timber industry representatives, it is also 
inclusive of the broader set of interests that are connected to the industry through 
economic and social ties.  As the frames indicate, the wellbeing of this group is 
increasingly threatened by Forest Service actions expressed in the forest plans.   
Table 5.1: Logging Identity Frames 
  
“We've got jobs.  We [loggers] go to work five days a week, and we get paid for it.  I've seen things a lot worse,” said 
a local lumber mill worker.  [7] 
 
“Our homes, college funds, everything we [working people] have is derived from timber dollars,” said Gene DuPont, 
owner of DuPont Power Tool Company in Quincy.  “Without them, I might be the next closed business in town.” [15] 
 
 “As a county, we [county officials] asked for 315 million board feet of timber a year.  We got 265.5 million.  We and 
all the counties in northeastern California opposed set-aside lands for the spotted owl.  We got more than 100,000 
acres.  The Regional Forester has ignored our requests and I think we [county] ought to take a hard look at an appeal 
ourselves,” Coates told other County supervisor September 6. [45] 
 
“I’m a fourth-generation logger [we] in Plumas County and damn proud of it,” said a sign on the logging truck owned 
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by independent Quincy loggers Ian and Donna McElroy, organizers of the event.  [66] 
 
 “This plan will effectively exterminate an entire culture of families like ours [logging community],” said Susan 
Baremore, member of the third-generation logging family.  “We are not going to allow our families to be torn apart 
without a fight.” [147] 
  
 
Environmental Identity:  The forest planning process was the second major 
battle for Quincy-area environmentalists.  The first was the successful 1984 battle for 
federal designation of the 21,000-acre Bucks Lake Wilderness on the Plumas National 
Forest west of Quincy.  The Bucks Lake battle mobilized a group of Quincy-area citizens 
that founded the Friends of Plumas Wilderness.  As mentioned, the Friends also 
spearheaded the forest plan alternative for the Plumas National Forest that was touted as 
the “environmentally preferred alternative” by the Forest Service.  The Friends of Plumas 
Wilderness emerged as the organizing force behind local forest protection initiatives, and 
worked with a close-knit coalition of regional and national environmentalists on 
initiatives affecting California forests.  While local environmentalists identified with their 
local community, their most salient social identity during the forest planning process 
appears to be with the local and statewide environmental community.  Importantly, 
environmentalists often framed identity in the context of putting forth the Friends of 
Plumas Wilderness’ conservationist alternative. Table 5.2 is illustrative of the 55 identity 
frames expressed by members of the environmental community throughout Phase 1. 
Table 5.2: Environmental Identity Frames 
 
“None of us [enviros] is opposed to logging,” said Yost.  “If done carefully, a great deal of this forest can provide 
timber for the economic benefit of these communities that depend on the forest.” [10] 
 
“The time for public comment is over.  We've [enviros] already submitted our alternative for managing the Lassen 
Forest.  We’re waiting to see what will come out in the final plan.  If we’re unhappy, the proper way to deal with it is 
to appeal it based on what we see,” said Yost.  [37] 
 
The local environmental community is not about to be intimidated, nor does it desire a victory at the expense of our 
neighbors in the timber industry.  We are open to communication with any timber industry group.  There will be one 
more opportunity for the community to work together to insure our mutual future.  [71] 
 
Quincy attorney Michael Jackson suggested that if the supervisors chose not to remove the [yellow] ribbons from 
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county trucks, they also display Sierra Club bumper stickers. “That would indicate that the county is taking an even-
handed approach to its political activities,” Jackson said. [85] 
 
Friends of Plumas Wilderness recognizes that salvage sales usually cannot generate the funding to carry out the 
thinnings and fuels reduction work that needs to be done.  Earlier this year, we [FPW] offered to go hand-in-hand 
with local Forest officials and the timber industry to the higher levels of the Forest Service and to Congress to lobby 
for special appropriations to finance this important work.  Today, we renew that offer.  [144] 
 
 
Forest Service Identity:  The U.S. Forest Service has a strong hierarchical 
structure and culture.  As such, communication follows a fairly formal chain of 
command, making it difficult for agency resource managers to communicate directly with 
their communities or the media, except through prescribed public involvement and public 
relations protocols.  In addition, in the context of the forest planning process, agency 
spokespeople often found themselves in public forums wherein they were making formal 
presentations and responding to questions and comments that are bound by planning 
protocols.  They are seldom in a position to express their personal views.  The result, it 
appears, is that Forest Service spokespeople framed organizational issues, and 
organizational identity, in consistent ways and seldom strayed from the message. Forest 
Service identity frames generally bear this out.  The identity frames in Table 5.3 are 
illustrative of the 113 identity frames expressed by Forest Service spokespeople in the 
context of the forest planning process, which focused almost entirely on the agency and 
its intended actions.   
Table 5.3: Forest Service Identity Frames 
 
“We're [FS] here to manage these public lands for the benefit of the public which uses them.  People's ideas of what's 
best change from time to time, and we will adopt our management to suit the times,” said Britton.  [10] 
 
“When we [FS] went from the draft plan to the final, we didn’t do it in a void.  What we came out with is a 
compromise, but virtually every solution to a complex problem hurts some interest.  This is a plan for a lot of people, 
not for special interest groups,” Bennett said.  [40] 
 
“If we [FS] cut off part of the forest, we won't get as much output.  Congress is the one that has given us this mission.  
They said get out there and grow trees,” Crummer said.  [77] 
 
As for the process the plan is undergoing, Wickman told the board that “We [FS] will come out with a final draft, 
with a proposed 45-day public comment period.  At the end of that period of time we will analyze the comments we 




Atencio added that the Forest had faced some tough choices in addressing a wide variety of ways people value and 
use the Forest.  “We [FS] found we simply could not give everyone everything they wanted, so we had to develop the 
best balance we could, given the circumstances.  I think we have done that.” [135] 
 
 
Community Identity: While not dominant, disputants in the local Timber wars 
occasionally framed other identities. One identity that was framed by both 
environmentalists and loggers, although with different meaning, was an affiliation with 
“community.”  Community affiliation is mentioned here because it appears to be linked 
to a common or superordinate identity that emerged in Phase 2. Environmentalists, for 
their part, tended to frame community in three interrelated ways. First, environmentalists 
used community frames to refer to themselves and the local logging community as 
legitimate members of the larger Plumas County community, such as follows: 
What can Plumas County environmentalists offer the Plumas County logging 
community?  The Plumas County environmental community has been preparing 
for the forest planning process for over ten years.  We are well represented by 
national and statewide environmental groups and major law firms. We know what 
is wrong with present Forest Service activities and we know how to fix it.  We 
know how to do that while preserving all of the local timber industry jobs and 
potentially increasing them [71]. 
 
The use of community frames in this way makes in-group/out-group distinctions and 
implies that the groups are part of a larger interdependent whole. A common or 
superordinate identity is implied from the reference to Plumas County but is not 
explicitly stated, nor is it the most salient identity expressed. Second, environmentalists 
framed community in ways that drew attention to their common fate with local loggers, 
as well as their interdependence. The following frame recognizes in-group/out-group 
distinctions, and intergroup conflict, and more directly acknowledges a common 
community identity (a single community) as well as opportunities to work together “to 
insure our mutual future” (emphasis added).  
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The local environmental community is not about to be intimidated, nor does it 
desire a victory at the expense of our neighbors in the timber industry.  We are 
open to communication with any timber industry group.  There will be one more 
opportunity for the community to work together to insure our mutual future.  That 
will take place after the Forest Service responds to the various land management 
plan appeals which should happen next spring. [71] 
 
Third, environmentalists used decidedly inclusive frames in an attempt to make 
salient a common identity, fate and purpose with the local logging community. In the 
following frame, environmentalists refer to the Yellow Ribbon Committee, a coalition of 
loggers, businesses, and public officials who were united in support of increased logging 
on national forests in the Sierras.   
What do environmentalists believe we have in common with the Yellow Ribbon 
Committee?  We believe that we are all honest people who want to continue our 
way of life.  We believe that we all love the area in which we live.  We believe 
that we all enjoy beautiful views, hunting and fishing and living in a rural area.  
We believe that we are being misled by the Forest Service and by large timber, 
which controls the Forest Service, into believing that we are enemies when we are 
not. [71] 
 
This frame comes closest to a salient expression of a common or superordinate identity. 
Unfortunately, it does not directly reference “the community.” It does, however, 
reference a strong symbol of logging community solidarity – the yellow ribbon.  The 
yellow ribbon was widely distributed on vehicle antennae and in the windows of 
businesses, shops, restaurants, homes and local government offices throughout the county 
and came to symbolize membership in the logging community. 
It is also worth noting in this frame that environmentalists were attempting to 
draw new in-group/out-group boundaries that placed local loggers and environmentalists 
in the new in-group and the timber industry and Forest Service in an unholy alliance as 
the new out-group. Mainstream environmentalists gained some traction with this 
distinction, especially in the context of clearcutting, which advantaged large timber 
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companies in bidding on timber sale contracts. Unfortunately, a faction of radical 
environmentalists made no distinction between local loggers and the timber industry and 
muddled the message (see environmentalists’ characterization framing discussed below).  
While environmentalists framed community in ways that were inclusive of 
loggers, and acknowledged their legitimacy, loggers generally framed community in 
ways that were exclusive and de-legitimizing towards environmentalists. Loggers 
typically evoked community frames in two interrelated ways. First, loggers did not use 
“logging community” and “environmental community” frames to refer to legitimate 
members of the larger Plumas County community, as environmentalists did.  Instead, 
loggers framed community identity more abstractly, primarily in the context of a threat to 
their livelihoods posed by environmentalists and/or the Forest Service. As such, they 
framed community in the context of perceived losses to that livelihood. In the example 
below, the community is defined by “the working person” whose job is threatened by 
pressure from local environmentalists to protect the spotted owl (hence the reference to 
the endangered working person).   
“It's getting to the point of absurdity,” Hoskins said.  “One has to be realistic and 
if a stand is not made, our communities and our jobs are going to disappear.  The 
working person in Plumas and Sierra counties is going to be listed on the 
endangered species list.” [11] 
 
While environmentalists are not explicitly identified as the source of the threat, it is 
strongly implied. This frame is a response to the release of the draft forest plan for the 
Plumas National Forest in 1986, wherein 100,000 acres of spotted owl habitat were 
declared off limits to commercial logging.  The jobs v. owls framing captured here was 
repeated throughout the Sierras and the Pacific Northwest and has, in many ways, come 
to define the Timber wars.   
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Second, loggers framed community in ways that more explicitly defined those 
who belonged to the community and those who did not. In the following frame, for 
example, a spokesperson for the Yellow Ribbon campaign has defined the boundaries of 
the community, including the appropriate lifestyle and values that are found there. In this 
frame, “our” community is, in fact, the logging community as defined by yellow ribbon 
supporters. A clue to the exclusivity of this frame is found in the author’s identification of 
the threat to this community – preservationist adversaries.  
The Yellow Ribbon is silent, but it radiates a power for change, a power to save 
our timber industry, our communities and our natural-resources lifestyle.  A 
lifestyle that embodies all of the values that have made our Nation the greatest 
Nation on Earth.  When we pass a car or truck that is also flying Yellow Ribbons, 
a bond is formed that cannot be severed by the words or deeds of preservationist 
adversaries. [75] 
 
In addition, not only did loggers often refer to environmentalists in extreme 
and/or derogatory terms, they avoided acknowledging them as legitimate members of the 
larger community.  Instead, they preferred to see them as “special interest” outsiders who 
were out-of-touch with reality. In the following community frame, for example, a Quincy 
business spokesperson is advocating for the formation of a citizens group made up of “a 
broad cross-section of the community” to counter pressure from local environmentalists, 
who are seen as special interests. This community frame is expressed in the context of the 
forest planning process and is an attempt to rally the logging community to lobby 
Congress to overturn the forest management plan.  
“What is really effective is to have a responsible organization of local people to 
deal with the federal agencies and lobby Congress,” said Ray Rebell of Quincy.  
“With a broad cross-section of the community as members, such organizations are 
heard by Congressman, who see that such organizations are balanced, rather than 




In the examples of community frames evoked by loggers, above, references to 
community initially appear as inclusive frames in that an affiliation with what appears to 
be the larger community is more salient than an affiliation with loggers. On second 
glance, however, all three frames have an exclusive dimension to them – the exclusion of 
environmentalists who, again, live in the same community.  As such, what appears on the 
surface as an inclusive community frame is, in fact, a divisive effort by loggers to define 
the community by its logging interests and reframe environmentalists as outsiders who 
threaten that community.  
Dominant Characterization Frames 
Similar to identity frames, baseline characterization categories and subsequent 
frames were determined by, 1) identifying specific out-group references and their source, 
2) interpreting the intended meaning of third-person plural references (they, them, their), 
and 3) observing collective labels attached by the media within the context of a news 
article or document. As mentioned, Phase 1 characterization frames are intended to serve 
as baseline data from which one can observe and track change.  There are also important 
framing distinctions contained in Phase 1 that appear to facilitate the transition from 
Phase 1 to Phase 2.  These as well as the more typical frames are explored below. 
Using document analysis and naturalistic inquiry techniques (Altheide 1996; 
Lincoln and Guba 1985), characterization frames were grouped into common categories 
based on the group engaged in the characterization and the group targeted.  Dominant 
characterization frames during Phase 1 fell into the following categories. 
 Characterizations by loggers towards environmentalists 
 Characterizations by loggers towards the Forest Service  
 Characterizations by environmentalists towards loggers 
 Characterizations by environmentalists towards the Forest Service 
 
 107
 Characterizations by the Forest Service towards environmentalists 
 Characterizations by the Forest Service towards loggers 
 
It was observed during the emergent categorization process that characterization 
frames were generally either complimentary towards or critical of the group being 
characterized. Characterization frames were therefore assigned either a positive (+) or 
negative (-) “charge” based on their intent.  Positive charges were given to 
characterization frames that were generally complimentary to the recipient (inclusive) 
while negative charges were given to frames that were generally critical of or hostile to 
the recipient (divisive). Figure 5.2 provides a breakdown of the frequency and charge of 
Phase 1 characterization frames:  
 
The following analysis is designed to provide a description of the dominant 
characterization frames that emerged in phase 1, as well as a sense of the context in 
which the frames were evoked.  Tables 4-9 below contain typical examples of logging, 
environmental, and Forest Service characterization frames.  













Characterizations by Loggers towards Environmentalists:  The forest 
planning process was particularly threatening to the logging community, which feared 
changes in forest policy triggered by pressure from local and national environmental 
groups.  If the logging community was aware of broad public support for the protection 
of the national forests, it did not convey that perception in the forest planning process.  
To the logging community, the problem lay squarely with environmentalists, whom 
loggers characterized as not only out of touch with mainstream American values, but 
possessing values that were in some cases anti-American.  With few exceptions, divisive 
characterization frames were designed to reduce the credibility and influence of the 
environmental community over pending forest plans.   
An exception to this pattern can be observed in a subtle distinction among a few 
in the logging community of a difference between “mainstream” environmentalists who 
generally played by the rules and “radical” environmentalists who had allegedly 
vandalized logging equipment.  Table 5.4 is illustrative of the logging community’s 
generally negative and divisive characterization of the environmental community.  Yet, 
there is an indication that at least some in the logging community were aware that 
mainstream environmentalists, whom they knew, were a different faction than clandestine 
radicals.  There is only one positive and inclusive characterization frame in the data that 
was expressed by the logging community towards local environmentalists, however it 
appears to provide a subtle opening for a dialogue between more moderate members of 
the logging and environmental communities.   
Table 5.4: Characterizations by Loggers towards Environmentalists 
 
“The Forest Service [they] now has de-emphasized the production of forest products in favor of the preservation 
policies of a vocal minority.  Jobs are being sacrificed for visual constraints and non motorized semi private 




Lou Habersaat drove a loaded lumber truck from Eugene, Oregon to join the convoy. LG “It's not really the bird that’s 
the problem.  It’s the environmentalists not wanting anyone in the woods.  They don't want to see progress,” 
Habersaat said. [66] (-) 
 
“We [logging community] and the [mainstream] environmentalists might disagree in principle, but we’re not going to 
hurt each other.  We do our fighting in open hearings.  That's why they were created,” he [Jan Klement, a Quincy 
attorney who represents many timber industry companies] said.  [69] (+) 
 
If Proposition 130 passes, industry officials have estimated that about 75,000 workers will lose their jobs. “If the 
radical environmentalists have their way we are going to have the cleanest depression this world’s ever seen,” said 
Donna McElroy.  “If we [general] didn't have a timber industry, there would be no town here, and that's a fact.” [96]  
(-) 
 
The Forest Service pendulum is swinging toward environmental interests, agreed Collins Pine’s [Frank] Stewart.  
“Until John G. Public stands up and says what he wants, the Forest Service responds to a vocal minority -- that less 
than 1 percent of the public that wants to lock everything up for owls and wandering minstrels.  If it continues, 
something's going to have to go.  Everybody's going to be competing for the available Forest Service timber.  
Somebody's going to have to drop out,” Stewart said. [119] (-) 
 
 
 Characterizations by Loggers towards the Forest Service:  As their grip on 
local forest policy began to wane, the logging community stepped up its attacks on the 
Forest Service.  In the eyes of the logging community, whose timber interests were losing 
ground to multiple-use forest policies, the Forest Service was caving in.  The “iron 
triangle” that traditionally existed between the timber industry, the Forest Service, and 
local government, was giving way to environmental, cultural, and recreational interests 
from inside and outside the agency.  The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and 
the forest planning process forced the Forest Service to not only consider but also balance 
environmental, cultural, recreational, and economic uses of the national forests.  The 
logging community’s reaction to this threat was to attack the agency for changing 
direction, abandoning local communities, caving in to special interests, and playing God 
with peoples’ livelihoods.   
 In the process of blasting the Forest Service for caving in to pressure from 
environmentalists, some in the logging community discovered common ground with 
environmentalists over their mutual distaste for some of the agency’s policies, 
particularly clearcutting. While this did not lead to a formal coalition among loggers and 
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environmentalists to oppose the policy, in part because the policy benefited large timber 
companies that seasonally employed many local loggers, it appears to have fueled 
perceptions that agency forest management policies were beneficial to neither. By the end 
of Phase 1, the logging community had lost faith in the ability of the Forest Service to 
address the issues with which they were concerned.  Logging community 
characterizations of the Forest Service captured during the forest planning process are 
consistently negative and divisive, as Table 5.5 illustrates.   
Table 5.5: Characterizations by Loggers towards the Forest Service 
 
“Those are the people [FS] that put this town out of business.  Over the years, the way they've sold timber, they have 
definitely put the loggers out of business,” said Pew.  [26](-) 
 
“Everybody's against it,” said Quincy resident Betsy Forbes, who was handing out yellow ribbons and collecting 
signatures on the petition calling for multiple uses of national forests.  “I’m a logger and an environmentalist.  Most 
loggers are because they have to guarantee their own future.  When the Forest Service goes out and rapes the forest 
with clear-cuts, we aren’t going to lie down and be quiet anymore.  [66] (-) 
 
“I blame everything on the Forest Service.  They sit on the middle of the fence.  Whoever it looks like is going to win, 
they drop down on that side of the fence,” McElroy said.  “It looks like loggers are to blame, but it's the Forest 
Service.  We are not responsible for their clearcutting policies.  Every logger is against clearcutting, but you-know-
who takes the rap. We care about what goes on in the woods, but we don't set the policies.  The Forest Service does.” 
[120] (-) 
 
Supervisor Bill Coates took the Lassen Forest officials to task for “caving in” to special interest groups which are 
forcing more and more of California's timber base to be set aside.  “We can't allow one set-aside after another if we’re 
going to sell timber...  we sense that the Forest Service is losing its will to fight,” Coates said.  [124] (-) 
 
“The Forest Service says it manages according to what the people want.  Even the preservationists have said they 
don't want even-age management.  If this is not what the public consensus is, whose consensus is it?” asked Susan 
Baremore. [137] (-) 
 
 
Characterizations by Environmentalists towards Loggers:  While local 
environmentalists were aware of growing public sentiment for the protection of national 
forests in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they were also aware that the Forest Service and 
the logging community were deeply entrenched in the past.  Environmentalists blamed 
this in part on the agency’s internal culture and in part on the dominance of large timber 
companies.  As a counter measure, mainstream environmentalists engaged in a dual 
strategy to 1) build bridges with local loggers who they felt would benefit from 
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implementation of the Friends of Plumas Wilderness’ conservationist alternative and 2) 
reduce the influence of the timber industry by characterizing it (primarily Sierra Pacific 
Industries) as a greedy corporation bent on “getting out the cut” regardless of its impact 
on forest health or community stability.  
The bridge builders believed that logging could be a viable component of the 
forest ecosystem provided that it was accomplished sustainably.  In order to accomplish 
this goal, however, environmentalists had to convince the local logging community that 
the present path was unsustainable and that a solution lay with the environmental and 
logging communities working together.  As such, mainstream environmentalists’ 
characterization frames were designed to target common concerns and values between 
the two groups and to separate them from the timber industry. Mainstream 
environmentalists’ characterization frames are therefore both inclusive of the local 
logging community (+) and divisive towards the timber industry (-).  
Complicating matters, however, was an underground faction of radical 
environmentalists who were prone to monkey-wrenching logging operations and 
anonymously publishing scathing and derogatory ads and flyers in local newspapers. 
Moreover, the radicals’ divisive characterizations made no distinction between local 
loggers and the timber industry. Because the radicals operated in secrecy, their anonymity 
prevented the logging community from learning their identities. As a result, loggers often 
blamed mainstream environmentalists for monkey-wrenching actions including 
vandalism, bomb scares, spiked boards on logging roads, spiked trees, damaged logging 
equipment, and spiteful newspaper ads and flyers. While mainstream environmentalists 
were able to partially separate themselves from the radicals, characterization framing by 
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environmentalists towards the logging community as a whole presents a confusing 
message.  Table 5.6 illustrates these frames.   
Table 5.6: Characterizations by Environmentalists towards Loggers 
 
“El Brazo Enofre (The Angry Group) [us] is weaving a Hangman's Noose for the Evil Logging Truck [them],” a 
crucifix warning from “Mother Earth’s Department of Defense [us].” [39] (-) (radical/anonymous) 
 
“It doesn't make any sense to jeopardize the lives and careers of the men and women who work in the woods.  They 
are not responsible for the forest-management policies, which may be the focus of the anger of some people.  It's 
counterproductive to attack these people when we’re [enviros] trying to maintain a dialogue and communication to 
bring about goals for forest management we all share,” Scroggs said.  [69] (+) (mainstream) 
 
Environmentalists believe that log exports, automation, and tree plantations are depriving honest workers of their 
jobs.  Environmentalists want to see more competition in the timber industry and are appalled at Sierra Pacific's 
attempt to exterminate competition like Siskiyou Plumas Lumber Company.  Environmentalists believe that a logging 
contractor should have more than one place to take his logs and that the Forest Service should stop encouraging, by 
their unnecessary regulations, the consolidation of the timber industry into the hands of large industry. [71] (- +) 
(mainstream) 
 
“You'll be amazed as you witness the tenacity of this Super Trio, as they boldly face, and fiercely fend off their foes 
with only the use of primitive chainsaws, bulldozers, helicopters, herbicides, and the United States Forest Army, at 
their disposal.  The battle is tough and dangerous, but it must wage on, if the citizens of Emmerson are to be safe and 
free from the iron grip of the dreaded Spot. [79] (-) (radical/anonymous) 
 
“The California spotted owl is not going to close the Quincy sawmill.  If the timber industry were interested, the 
spotted owl could be protected and the timber economy of this area could continue.  They are not incompatible,” said 
Jackson. “If the timber industry makes a commitment to these rural communities, the jobs will stay here.  There's 
plenty of timber to harvest, and no environmentalist is going to stop that if it’s done correctly.” [121] (-) (mainstream) 
 
Environmentalists say the timber industry's troubles stem from years of overcutting, especially in the late 1980s. "The 
timber industry had a free lunch to 90 percent of' the old growth in the state," said Louis Blumberg with the 
Wilderness Society in San Francisco. Now the industry is undergoing an "intense and painful transition" as the most 
inefficient mills close, he said. [154] (-) (mainstream) 
 
 
 Characterizations by Environmentalists towards the Forest Service:  While 
the logging community perceived itself losing ground to a weakened Forest Service co-
opted by irrational and deluded environmentalists, the environmental community was not 
rejoicing, as one might expect.  It seemed that the forest planning process had not 
endeared the environmental community to the Forest Service either.  The agency’s 
planning process, and the compromised plans for the Plumas and Lassen national forests, 
left environmentalists reeling.  Moreover, mainstream environmentalists put forth an 
alternative forest plan they felt met their needs as well as the needs of the logging 
community.  In its analysis of forest plan options, the Forest Service touted the Friends of 
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Plumas Wilderness’ plan as the “environmentally preferred alternative,” and praised it for 
providing “community stability” better than the other options, including its own. The 
agency then rejected the plan because it abolished clearcutting.   
 The environmental community was united in its belief that the Forest Service was 
hopelessly entrenched in its extractive past and was simply serving the political will of 
the pro-industry Reagan and Bush administrations.  Further, while environmentalists 
initially had high hopes about the NFMA planning process, the reality, in their minds, 
was that the agency was using the process to justify its goal of continuing down a path of 
unsustainable timber harvests, with modest set-asides to comply with spotted owl habitat 
requirements.  In the process of criticizing the Forest Service, however, mainstream 
environmentalists began to take notice of a similar pattern within the local logging 
community, whose spokespeople were equally unhappy with the agency, albeit for 
different reasons.  By the end of Phase 1, environmentalists had abandoned hope that the 
Forest Service had any intention of significantly shifting its policies. Table 5.7 illustrates 
the divisive characterization framing that was occurring towards the Forest Service.  It is 
worth noting that environmentalists occasionally complimented the agency, as when it 
revised a proposed timber sale to protect an environmentally sensitive area.  
Table 5.7: Characterizations by Environmentalists towards the Forest Service 
 
Peter Kirby of the Wilderness Society's resource planning and economics department regrets “the wonderful 
opportunity that's been squandered.  Congress gave the Forest Service its day in the sun,” he says, “and the agency 
blew it!” [9] (-)  
 
“Until you find somebody who can actually read the computer program, the calculations are unavailable to the 
public,” he continues.  “In plan after plan we [enviros] eventually learn that its garbage in, garbage out.   They [FS] 
are plugging in the wrong numbers and getting all the wrong answers about how much and how fast to cut.” [9] (-) 
 
“They [FS] have set aside for minimum management places that are a maze of roads and past logging activity, yet 
they don't do anything (protective) around sensitive fisheries and streams,” said Michael Yost of Friends of Plumas 
Wilderness, a Quincy-based environmental group.  “It's not logical to have a timber sale right in the middle of a 
minimum management and visual-retention area.” [47] (-) 
 
“Deer Creek Canyon is the crown jewel of the Northern Sierra and southern Cascade area,” Evans said.  “It's 
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absolutely unconscionable that the Forest Service plans to log in that area.” [77] (-) 
 
He complimented Plumas Forest officials on the La Porte District for changes they made in a salvage timber sale 
which environmentalists had appealed.  Logging activities have been moved away from a watershed as a result of the 
appeal, said Baiocchi. “They [FS] did a hell of a job on it.  It goes to show you that they can really improve their 
documents,” Baiocchi said. [92] (+) 
 
“If you ask me if there is any real change going on with the Forest Service, I will tell you that there is not.  I don't 
think they are doing anything other than propaganda,” said Quincy attorney Michael Jackson. “It allows them to tell a 
judge that they looked at spotted owl protections again, recently.  How can you possibly study the cumulative impacts 
of timber sales on a Thursday afternoon and announce the results Friday morning?  It leads me to believe that this is 
nothing more than bells and whistles and paper-pushing... again!”  Jackson said. [121] (-) 
 
 
Characterizations by the Forest Service:  The Forest Service was careful to 
engage in almost no characterization framing during the forest planning process.  There 
exists anecdotal evidence from interviews with various disputants that Forest Service 
personnel were, in fact, weighing in with off-the-record opinions about the draft forest 
plans and the process that was being followed.  However that information is drawn from 
disputants’ confidential reflections on the planning process and are not considered valid 
evidence of ongoing framing.  Moreover, it is relevant to the forest planning process that, 
despite divisive characterization framing from both sides, there are few public 
characterizations from the Forest Service towards either environmentalists or loggers.  
It is also telling that Forest Service frames, when they emerged, were more 
controversial.  Part of the battle between environmentalists and loggers during the Timber 
wars was over which group could swing the Forest Service in its favor. As such, the 
groups were constantly monitoring the agency for clues as to which way it was leaning.  
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 below contain a full list of characterization frames evoked publicly by 
the Forest Service towards environmentalists and loggers respectively. One frame, it 
appears, is likely directed towards both groups but, interestingly, could be interpreted by 
each as directed primarily towards the other. It is therefore included below in both 
categories.    
 
 115
Table 5.8: Characterizations by Forest Service towards Environmentalists 
 
“Wayne [Dakan] has been a conscience to us [FS],” says Lloyd Britton, who retired in 1987 after 15 years as Plumas 
Forest supervisor. “His rather extreme views as a preservationist represent a side of the community we have to look at. 
In some rare instances, we actually agreed.” [29] (+) 
 
“When we [FS] went from the draft plan to the final, we didn’t do it in a void.  What we came out with is a 
compromise, but virtually every solution to a complex problem hurts some interest.  This is a plan for a lot of people, 
not for special interest groups [them],” Bennett said. [40] (-) 
 
 
Table 5.9: Characterizations by the Forest Service towards Loggers 
 
But any style of forest management, in the long run, seems to work out, Britton said.  “I've seen some horrible logging 
practices over the years.  They’d [timber industry/loggers] leave an awful looking mess when they were through.  And 
yet, you go back today -- if it's been long enough -- and things are healing.” [23] (-) 
 
“When we [FS] went from the draft plan to the final, we didn’t do it in a void.  What we came out with is a 
compromise, but virtually every solution to a complex problem hurts some interest.  This is a plan for a lot of people, 
not for special interest groups [them],” Bennett said. [40] (-) 
 
“Let's face it -- they (loggers) would just as soon see the owls gone,” said a Forest Service planner last year, when the 
forest plans still were being drafted. [46] (-)  
 
“That's about 200 two-foot-diameter trees.  And what about toilet paper for the other 28 million people already here?  
Where are these trees going to come from?  We [FS] need to manage the land more wisely, yes, but timber is an 
important product from a national forest.  We have to meet the demand.  Loggers [them] are not cutting trees for the 
fun of it.  They’re cutting trees because somebody is telling them, ‘I want the product,’” said Bennett. [47] (+) 
 
 
Frame Analysis – Phase 1 
Identity Framing:  Baseline identity framing during Phase 1 of the local Timber 
wars shows marked distinctions among logging, environmental, and U.S. Forest Service 
identities.  Moreover, these identities are clearly the dominant identities that were evoked 
by disputants in the local Timber wars, at least publicly and in the context of the forest 
planning process.  Phase 1 identities are consistent with patterns observed during 
preliminary research and are aligned with conventional social science research in natural 
resources that recognize logging and environmental affiliations as representing distinct 
“communities of interest” – groups whose members are bound by a common set of 
underlying interests and goals (Kusel et al., 1996).  Forest Service identity frames are 
consistent with organizational behavioral theorists that acknowledge the salience of 
organizational identities (Hogg et al. 2000).  
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Finally, there is no mention of the Quincy Library Group as a salient social 
identity, although an inclusive identity as members of a single community is salient 
among mainstream environmentalists although not among local loggers, at least within 
the context of forest planning. Pursuant to social identity theory, a common community 
identity cannot be considered a valid social identity at this point since it is not 
reciprocated by other group members. Tajfel and Turner (1986) remind us that social 
identities are categorizations that individuals choose for themselves and with which 
others concur. Since loggers apparently do not concur with the common or superordinate 
identity, it does not exist.  
Characterization Framing:  Baseline characterization framing during Phase 1 
reveals both divisive and inclusive intentions on the part of disputants.  Divisive 
characterization frames dominate the local Timber wars and are expressed consistently by 
loggers and environmentalists towards each other, by loggers and environmentalists 
towards the Forest Service, and, although rare, by the Forest Service towards both loggers 
and environmentalists. Divisive frames appear be designed to reinforce existing divisions 
between groups, reduce the influence of opposing groups on forest plan decisions, and 
exploit tensions between groups that may lead to new divisions.   
By contrast, inclusive characterization frames are expressed almost exclusively by 
mainstream environmentalists towards the local logging community and appear to be 
designed to link local environmentalists and loggers together through a common sense of 
community, purpose and support for the Friends of Plumas Wilderness’ proposed forest 
plan. However, while inclusive characterization framing by mainstream 
environmentalists was designed to build a bridge between the local logging and 
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environmental communities, the message was muddled by a divisive radical message that 
remained underground.  Unfortunately, the radical message may have been attributed to 
the environmental community as a whole, making it difficult for mainstream 
environmentalists to bridge the gap.  
Finally, analysis of characterization framing during Phase 1 reveals the 
convergence of divisive frames by both the logging and environmental communities 
towards the Forest Service.  While the logging and environmental communities were at 
odds on most forest management issues, they were surprisingly aligned with regard to 
clearcutting policies and a common belief that the agency was incapable of effectively 
solving the growing number of forest-related problems.  Despite this alignment, most in 
the logging community continued to distrust local environmentalists, to characterize them 
as extremists, and to blame them for Forest Service’s policies.  At the end of phase 1 we 
see no obvious shifts in identity frames between loggers and environmentalists that would 








Chapter VI  
Frame Analysis and the Emergence of the Quincy Library Group 
 
While the previous chapter documented the intractability of the conflict from a 
framing perspective, and provided a baseline from which to compare identity and 
characterization frames, the present chapter documents identity and characterization 
frames emerging as the conflict was transformed.  Taken together, the chapters provide 
an objective assessment of frame change as the conflict moved from local intractability to 
local resolution. This change appears to coincide with the emergence of a common 
identity in the Quincy Library Group. QLG emerged at a time when the local 
environmental and logging communities had determined that the forest planning process 
was not working for either of them.  Not only was the Forest Service’s planning process a 
failure in the eyes of local environmentalists and loggers, the inability of the plans to 
adequately protect forest health or provide for community economic stability was seen as 
a travesty. By the fall of 1992, the agency’s credibility with both communities was shot. 
Instead of relying on the Forest Service to satisfy its goals, the logging community turned 
to local environmentalists, whose alternative plan for the Plumas Forest provided a ray of 
hope not experienced with the Forest Service.  While the plan did not maximize timber 
harvest volumes, it provided more timber than had previously been harvested from the 
Plumas Forest and more than enough volume to satisfy the logging community. 
 In Phase 2 of the local Timber wars, disputant frames are triggered to a large 
extent by the emergence of the Quincy Library Group, a locally grown response to the 
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failed forest planning process.  Importantly, Phase 2 identity and characterization frames 
demonstrate a shift in salient social identities that can be systematically contrasted with 
baseline Phase 1 identity and characterization frames.  This shift appears to indicate an 
alignment between traditional adversaries and the emergence of a new social identity that 
facilitated the resolution of the Timber wars at the local level.  Similar to the previous 
chapter, this chapter follows an emergent and interpretative process to categorize and 
track identity and characterization frames.   
Dominant Identity Frames 
Consistent with Phase 1, Phase 2 social identity categories were determined by, 1) 
identifying disputants’ in-group affiliations from specific collective references contained 
in the frames, 2) interpreting the meaning of first-person plural references (we, us, our), 
and 3) observing collective labels attached by the media within the context of a 
document.  In Phase 1 of the conflict, three dominant social identity frames emerged – 
loggers, environmentalists and the US Forest Service (Figure 1 above).  These frames are 
considered base-line data from which the researcher can track and compare changes that 
might emerge in Phase 2.   
In Phase 2 of the Timber wars, a distinctly new identity frame emerged – a 
coalition of previous adversaries initially calling itself the “Library Group” after its 
chosen meeting place, and soon after the Quincy Library Group to indicate its location 
(the library is officially the Pitkin County Public Library). The new identity appears to 
replace the dominant existing identities, evidenced by a steep decline in the number of 
logger and environmental identity frames in Phase 2 (Figure 1) and, more importantly, 
the emergence of a new identity among key disputants. The quote below, typical of the 
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new identity frame captured in Phase 2, contains sufficient information to categorize the 
statement as an identity frame characteristic of QLG. It is also noteworthy that the 
disputant, County Supervisor Bill Coates, was a strong advocate and spokesperson for the 
logging community during Phase 1.   
“None of us has ever done this before, and I'm sure we'll make mistakes,” said 
Coates.  “But the work we've done represents a four-letter word called ‘hope.’ We 
haven't had a lot of that in the past.” (127-7/93) 
 
Logging and environmental identities persist in Phase 2, although no longer 
dominant, and appear to be displaced by the new and more salient QLG identity.  Forest 
Service identity frames, on the other hand, follow a pattern that is similar to Phase 1, 
although slightly “off message” due to the disconcerting presence of QLG.  Finally, 
community identity frames appear in Phase 2 as well, with patterns shifting from a 
predominance of divisive and inclusive community frames coming from the logging and 
environmental communities respectively to a predominance of inclusive community 
frames coming from QLG members (who are former adversaries) in Phase 2.  
As Figure 6.1 graphically illustrates, in Phase 1 of the local Timber wars, 36% of 
the identity frames were attributed to members of the logging community, 21% to the 
environmental community, and 43% to the Forest Service.  In Phase 2, by contrast, 13% 
of the identity frames were attributed to members of the logging community, 4% to the 
environmental community, 19% to the Forest Service, and 64% to the Quincy Library 
Group.  The drop in the frequency of Forest Service identity frames in Phase 2 can be 
explained in large part by the shift in attention away from the forest planning process, 
which provided many opportunities for the agency to explain and defend its proposed 
plans.  Unlike vocal members of the logging and environmental communities, Forest 
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Service spokespeople did not join or publicly affiliate with the Quincy Library Group, at 
















The discussion below follows a similar format as above for QLG, Forest Service, 
and recurrent logging and environmental identity frames. The discussion also includes an 
analysis of the use of a community identity frame. Tables 10-13 contain examples of 
QLG, Forest Service, and recurrent logging and environmental frames. Because they are 
infrequent, community identity frames are discussed individually and have not been 
placed into a table.   
QLG Identity: According to QLG members interviewed in the research, 
spokespersons for the local environmental and logging communities began meeting in 
private in the fall of 1992.  However, public acknowledgement of the coalition did not 
occur until the following summer when the group presented its forest management 
proposal to the greater community.  Once the group went public with its “community 
stability” proposal, however, almost all of its energy was consumed in explaining the 
group’s formation, defending its plan, and justifying its chosen path to work 
collaboratively.  These descriptions of solidarity played well with the local and regional 
% 
Figure 6.1 
Frequency of Identity Frames in Phases 1 and 2 
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media, in part because they were so unexpected and in part because they were so 
impassioned. They also played well with local and national politicians, who were 
growing weary of the seemingly intractable Timber wars.  That a group of 
environmentalists, loggers, and local officials could step across ideological boundaries 
and overcome monumental differences provided hope for other forest-dependent 
communities facing similar challenges.   
Table 6.1 contains examples of the 68 QLG identity frames that were virtually 
nonexistent in Phase 1 of the Timber wars.  The new identity frames illustrate the 
alignment of previous identities around an alternative forest plan that provided mutual 
benefits.  As the plan, and QLG’s very existence, is explained and defended in the public 
arena, the group’s identity is solidified. 
Table 6.1: QLG Identity Frames 
 
The July 17 meeting in Susanville, like an earlier meeting in Quincy, was designed to gain "bipartisan community 
support" for the proposal, Self said. "We [QLG] know that not all timber industry people will support it," he said.  
"And neither will all the environmentalists," said Jackson . "They think it weakens their position." [164] 
 
The Quincy Library Group has changed the community’s approach to other issues, according to Jackson. “It [QLG] 
has gone a long way toward unifying people,” Coates  agreed.  “Before the project, each camp had its own restaurant.  
It's not like that anymore.” [199] 
 
The plan evolved from three years of painstaking negotiations by the 41-member Quincy group that had taken to 
meeting in the town library in hopes that the quiet atmosphere would discourage early inclinations to shout at one 
another. “We [QLG] were like the Israelis and the Palestinians,” said Howe. [224] 
 
Bill Coates , a Plumas County supervisor who co-founded the coalition, called the funding award “a stunning 
breakthrough.” “We've [QLG] managed to get rid of ‘us versus them.’... If we’re successful doing it here, it can 
happen anywhere,” Coates  said. [226] 
 
And up in Tehama County, the Quincy Library Group continues to meet. If its proposals were made policy, 
forester Nelson says, everyone would win - environmentalists, loggers, local residents and business owners. “We [QLG] 
got the concerns of a very diverse group satisfied,” he [Nelson] points out. “When was the last time government did 
that for us?” [238] 
  
  
 Forest Service Identity: Forest Service identity frames in Phase 2 of the Timber 
wars are similar to Phase 1 frames.  For the most part, in both phases agency officials 
spoke with a common voice and delivered a positive message.  However, while Phase 1 
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identity framing occurred in a context that the Forest Service led and controlled – the 
forest planning process – Phase 2 framing occurred in a context that was unfamiliar and 
often disconcerting.  QLG’s sudden emergence and the unique challenge it presented for 
the Forest Service placed enough strain on the agency that its previously consistent 
message regarding the familiar planning process grew muddled. Moreover, while the 
agency outwardly supported the group’s efforts, internally it resisted the obvious 
challenge to its authority.  As QLG pressured the Forest Service to implement its plan, 
the agency was compelled to explain not only its public support of the group but its 
inability or reluctance to fully implement the group’s plan.  
As mentioned, the frequency of Forest Service organizational identity frames 
(Table 6.2) is markedly lower in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, primarily due to a shift in 
attention from the forest planning process to the Quincy Library Group.  Nevertheless, 
agency spokespersons’ organizational identities remained salient and intact, at least 
publicly.  Table 6.2 is illustrative of the 20 Forest Service identity frames captured in 
Phase 2 of the Timber wars and reveals similarities and differences with Phase 1.   
Table 6.2: Forest Service Identity Frames 
 
The loss of 150 full-time positions since then has left the Plumas forest understaffed and overworked, said Calvin B. 
Bird, Thornton's assistant. “We [FS] totally support the (Quincy Library Group).  We’re killing ourselves trying to find 
ways to do something, but we have to obey the law,” Bird said. Thornton also wants time, saying it would take at least 
18 months to implement the Quincy group's proposals. [190] 
 
Matt Mathes, a spokesman for Regional Forester Ron Stewart in San Francisco, called the stalemate an unfortunate 
irony.  Environmental concerns caused a reduction in timber harvests, which reduced Forest Service budgets and forced 
personnel cuts. “The very things that led the Quincy Library Group [them] to meet in the first place are the very things 
that are limiting our [FS] ability to respond,” Mathes said. [190] 
 
Local Forest Service officials are less enthusiastic about the group, seeing it as citizen involvement run amok. “We 
[FS] have been involved with the Quincy Library Group [them] for almost one year,'' Leonard Atencio, supervisor of 
the Lassen National Forest, wrote in an agency memo circulated last January. “This group is not going to be easy to 
work with.'' [198] 
 
The challenge for the Forest Service is implementing a forest management alternative developed outside the agency, 
says Stewart, the former regional forester. “We're [FS] used to setting the agenda. This is a whole new way of doing 
business.” So far, however, the Forest Service hierarchy has done little more than talk about it. “We're [FS] starting 
from ground zero,” Stewart says. “We don't have anything else like this, but we’re committed to making it work as long as 




Lassen National Forest officials plan to sell the 2.5 million board-feet of Barkley timber to the highest bidder 
Wednesday.  The plan has drawn conflicting appeals from U.S. Reps. Wally Herger, R-Marysville, and Vic 
Fazio, D-West Sacramento. “We [FS] have an opportunity to reduce the fire danger and create some jobs. ... To 




 Recurrent Identities – Loggers and Environmentalists: Logging and 
environmental identity frames, while recurrent, are relatively uncommon (and no longer 
dominant) in Phase 2 of the local Timber wars (tables 6.3 and 6.4 below).  Moreover, the 
majority of recurrent logging and environmental identity frames contain a common theme 
– they are evoked primarily by QLG spokespeople to reflect on and explain the dramatic 
changes that have occurred, to distinguish individual roles within QLG, and to defend 
themselves against challenges from colleagues skeptical of the group.  Finally, a small 
number of identity frames are evoked by skeptical colleagues who did not embrace the 
QLG coalition. While these frames are minimal in Phase 2, they increase dramatically in 
Phase 3, especially within the outside environmental community. Several of the 
environmental identity frames captured in Table 6.3 below allude to growing tensions 
within the larger environmental movement over the emergence of the Quincy Library 
Group.  These tensions eventually led to a break between QLG and non-QLG 
environmentalists and a subsequent escalation of the conflict over QLG’s efficacy. 
Examples of the 14 recurrent logging identity frames and five recurrent environmental 
identity frames are captured below.  
Table 6.3: Recurrent Environmental Identity Frames 
 
"At first, quite frankly, we [enviros] didn't trust [timber industry] them," said Jackson of the timber industry 
representatives, "and I'm sure they felt the same way about us.  But we've [both] all learned over the past few months 
that we're not always going to get our own way, and we've come to a realization that perhaps the best way to reach a 
solution is to work from the ground up." [164] 
 
At a forest activists' conference in Ashland [OR] in February, consensus groups were hotly debated.  Jackson sounded 
combative: “My card as an environmental terrorist [us] is about to be revoked.  The loggers [them] in my community 
want me to tell you the following things: `Clearcutting was wrong.  Thank you for your help. It's gone now, and we're 
glad.' The loggers in my community want to tell you that the streams were silting.  They knew they were silting 
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because they fished there.  They didn't design those sales.'' [198] 
 
“The environmental movement is so young it underestimates its own influence,” Jackson says.  “Environmentalists are 
afraid they'll be overwhelmed by the superior money and influence of the extractive industries.” Instead, he said, 
environmentalists [need to learn how to win – and then reach out to a large constituency and move forward.  [208] 
 
For Friends of Plumas Wilderness and other environmentalists, the plan they hammered out with the timber 
industry is nothing but good for the forest, says Jackson. “We [FPW] retain 100 percent of our roadless area. We apply 
scientific standards to all of our riparian habitat. And we don't export logs out of our towns. It's everything we ever wanted.” 
[215] 
 
Loggers once tossed Jackson out of a bar where he'd been gloating about winning the battle for designation of a nearby 
wilderness.  “It had reached the point that most of the logging community wouldn't set foot in here [Morning Thunder 
Cafe],” he says, looking around the laid-back coffeehouse, “and environmentalists wouldn't set foot in Bob's Fine 
Foods [blue collar diner].” [242] 
 
 
Table 6.4: Recurrent Logging Identity Frames 
 
“I don't know anywhere else in the United States where an entire county has gotten environmentalists [them] and 
people interested in jobs [us] to agree on anything.  All at once there are no sides.  This is a brand-new day,” said 
Coates.  [179] 
 
And mistrust toward Jackson still abounds in the mountain communities, particularly among families whose roots in 
the timber industry sink four and five generations deep. “He took us [timber industry] right to the bottom, and now he's 
going to save us?” said Donna McElroy, a logger's wife who is one of the few to speak out against the coalition. [188] 
 
Other stakeholders joined the trio, not wanting to be out of a loop that included the influential Sierra Pacific. “It's been 
one of the smartest things we've ever done,” said Frank Stewart, resource manager for Collins Pine Co., a family-
owned timber company in nearby Chester that forbids clearcutting. The Quincy group adopted Collins' method of 
selective logging - taking only those trees that are diseased or whose growth rate has slowed, while leaving the most 
vigorous. [188] 
 
Once the work begins, Quincy Library Group members plan to be looking over everybody's shoulder. “It's not 
any different from what Friends of Plumas Wilderness [them] have always done except that this time we’re going to be 
standing right next to them,” says Nelson, the Sierra Pacific forester. [215] 
 
“We [loggers] were under a lot of pressure to break with the group,” said Bill Howe, forest manager for Collins 
Pine, one of the timber companies that persuaded the U.S. Forest Service to keep [salvage] logging off-limits 
around Deer Creek.  “Industry people were calling, saying, 'Are you crazy, or what?' But three years ago, we 
[QLG] decided to speak with one voice,” Howe said. “It was a matter of principle.” [224] 
 
 
Recurrent identities by local loggers and environmentalists appear to be 
“receding” in salience and are being replaced by a new affiliation with QLG.  However, 
loggers and environmentalists who joined QLG did not abandon their previous identities, 
as these frames indicate.  In fact, it appears that identities have taken on new dimensions 
for both loggers and environmentalists who continued to affiliate with their respective 
groups while adopting a new and (in their minds) congruent identity.  Of course, the 
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perceived inconsistencies of their actions were not lost on many of their peers outside of 
the community, who decided not to join or support the group.  
 Community Identity: Consistent with QLG identity frames described above, 
community identity frames in Phase 2 are entirely inclusive of the larger community and 
are expressed by both loggers and environmentalists, who are now QLG members.  In 
fact, community identity frames found in Phase 2 are mostly inseparable from QLG 
identity frames since the group was in many ways representing the larger Plumas County 
community. In this section, however, I analyze identity frames that explicitly reference a 
“community” affiliation, even though they may also reference other affiliations or first-
person plural pronouns such as we, us, and our, that could be interpreted as community 
identity affiliations. 
 Community identity frames in Phase 2 are remarkably consistent in their message 
regarding the need to work together for the benefit of the larger whole. In the early days 
of the group’s formation, QLG members were often reflective of the deeper meaning 
behind their willingness to collaborate. Community frames from this period offer 
compassionate reflections on the way things were in the past, such as Michael Jackson’s 
insights into the larger “social experiment” the group had embarked upon. In this frame, 
Jackson makes a distinction between QLG and the larger community, and attributes the 
efforts of QLG to helping the community realize its potential: 
We sat down, and we worked it out. In doing so, we began rediscovering our 
sense of community.  The conversations, both formal and informal, that have 
occurred as a result of the efforts of the Quincy Library Group have been very 
positive.  They have made us realize how dysfunctional a community we were 
before, always fighting each other, instead of trying to move forward on common 
goals.  The social experiment of working together as neighbors is perhaps as 





Community identity frames also allowed QLG spokespeople to acknowledge the 
important link between economic and environmental needs, a topic that local 
environmentalists pursued and loggers avoided. Either/or distinctions between jobs and 
owls were perpetuated within the logging community, it appears, as long as logging 
advocates perceived a threat from the environmental community. A common community 
identity may have reduced the perceived threat and enabled the logging community to 
acknowledge the link. In the following community identity frame, Bill Coates, a 
Republican and strong timber industry advocate, emphasized a directive from President 
Clinton to protect forests and forest-dependent communities: 
“We think Congress is tired of getting hit from both sides. Clinton asked us to 
keep our environment healthy and our communities alive. That's exactly what 
we are doing,” says the Plumas County Supervisor Coates. [179] 
 
Finally, community identity frames were evoked by QLG spokespeople to define 
and/or reinforce intergroup boundaries between the community, united in support of the 
QLG forest plan, and the Forest Service, which was supporting its own plan. Consistent 
with QLG characterization frames discussed below, the community identity frames 
discussed here provide opportunities to create in-group/out-group distinctions that are 
particularly relevant in the context of the Timber wars. The most relevant distinction, it 
appears, is the one between the community and the agency. In the following frames, the 
three founders and principal spokespeople for QLG, Mike Jackson, Tom Nelson, and Bill 
Coates, respectively framed community identity by drawing a distinction between the 
community and the Forest Service:  
Jackson: In trying to find resolutions to the issues on which we disagree, we have 
discovered many important issues on which we all agree.  For example, we 
agree… that speaking as a community, we can and should compel the Forest 
 
 128
Service to change to adapt to better meet the community's economic and 
environmental needs. [170] 
 
Nelson: I told Michael that what environmentalists and what we as an industry 
want are not far apart.  Everyone wants community stability.  We agreed that in 
order for timber-dependent communities to survive, we needed different policies 
from the federal government.  These communities rely heavily on the Forest 
Service for the timber program, recreation and for employees who live there and 
are part of their society. [199] 
 
Coates: It occurred to us at the same time that we could not rely on the federal 
government to solve our problems. Eventually, every community has to take 
matters into its own hands and control its own destiny. [199] 
 
Dominant Characterization Frames 
 
Consistent with Phase 1, characterization categories in Phase 2 were determined 
by, 1) identifying collective out-group references contained in the frames, 2) interpreting 
third-person plural references  such as they, them, and their and 3) observing collective 
labels attached by the media within the context of a document. Using document analysis 
and naturalistic inquiry techniques (Altheide 1996; Lincoln and Guba 1985), 
characterization frames were grouped into common categories based on the group 
engaged in the characterization and the group targeted.  Phase 2 characterization frames 
fell into the following categories: 
 Characterizations by QLG towards environmentalists/loggers/Forest Service 
 Characterizations by loggers towards environmentalists/Forest Service/QLG 
 Characterizations by environmentalists towards loggers/Forest Service/QLG 
 Characterizations by Forest Service towards environmentalists/loggers/QLG 
 
Characterization frames were then assigned either positive (+) or negative (-) charges 
based on their intent.  Positive charges were interpreted as inclusive frames while 
negative charges were interpreted as exclusive or divisive frames. These distinctions are 
represented in tables 6.5-6.10 and are explored below.  Figure 6.2 provides a breakdown 




Characterizations by QLG:  Not surprisingly, QLG members actively engaged 
in characterization framing in Phase 2 of the conflict, with framing directed towards 
environmentalists, loggers, and the Forest Service (Table 6.5).  Because of the differences 
in these frames, however, they will be considered in separate discussions and represented 
in separate tables.  Moreover, characterization frames directed towards environmentalists 
and loggers are relatively uncommon in the data (four and seven respectively) compared 
to those directed towards the Forest Service (26).  
Characterizations by QLG towards environmentalists are consistently negative 
and divisive, although not in a provocative way.  Moreover, the characterization frames 
appear to offer an explanation or opinion as to why some environmentalists were 
skeptical of QLG while others freely joined the group.  It is worth nothing that three of 
Figure 6.2  
Phase 2 Characterization Frames (n=61) and their Charge (+/-) 


















the four characterization frames in Table 6.5 originate from Michael Jackson, the 
principal spokesperson for QLG environmentalists.  Jackson, an outspoken 
environmental attorney, was fond of publicly chiding his “opponents,” and of providing 
juicy sound-bites for the media.  That he was given a forum by the media to talk about 
fellow environmentalists was not surprising.  
The fourth characterization frame in the table originates from Bill Coates, timber 
industry advocate, County Supervisor, and QLG cofounder. Coates’ frame is indicative of 
the perception among many in the logging community that environmentalists were part of 
a self-perpetuating “culture of conflict” that was needed to keep funds flowing into the 
organizations’ coffers.  This characterization frame is considerably more common in 
Phase 3 of the Timber wars as advocates of federal legislation to enact QLG’s forest plan 
attempted to discredit environmentalists who opposed it, and to ascribe self-serving 
motives to their actions. One of the more compelling aspects of this frame, at the time, 
was that environmentalists skeptical of QLG tended to work for medium to large 
organizations with significant budgets, while local environmentalists, who formed the 
core of QLG, were mostly volunteers.  These distinctions were not lost on Coates and 
others engaged in discrediting their opponents.  
Table 6.5: Characterizations by QLG towards Environmentalists 
 
The July 17 meeting in Susanville, like an earlier meeting in Quincy, was designed to gain "bipartisan community 
support" for the proposal, Self said. "We know that not all timber industry people will support it," he said.  "And 
neither will all the environmentalists," said Jackson. "They think it weakens their position." [164] (LG-) (ENV-) 
 
Yet some fellow environmentalists are suspicious of Jackson's efforts to broker a deal with Sierra Pacific and the Forest 
Service. “The environmental movement is so young it underestimates its own influence,'' he said. “They're afraid they'll 
be overwhelmed by the superior money and influence of the extractive industries.''  [198] (ENV-) 
 
Not everyone supports the Quincy Library effort.  Jackson referred to one group of opponents as “right-wing people 
who believe this is a left-wing plot to weaken the moral fiber of loggers and who support the cutting of more trees.”  He 
described the other foes as a “small, left-wing environmental contingent that believes the plan is too kind to loggers.” 
[199] (LG-) (ENV-) 
 
Coates suggested that large environmental groups may be “withholding support because their dues are derived from 
 
 131
things not working.  If we can do something to make the environment better, it threatens their ability to grow and 
thrive.  We hope our fears are unfounded.” [199] (ENV-) 
 
 
Characterizations by QLG towards loggers (Table 6.6) are a mixture of positive-
inclusive and negative-divisive frames.  For the most part, QLG members were 
attempting to distinguish between those members of the logging community whose 
wellbeing was at stake and who were considered a necessary component of their plan, 
and those members who appeared to show very little interest in QLG’s broader goals and 
continued to view the group as a threat.  The former group was seen primarily as a 
population of local loggers who were employed on a seasonal basis to work in the woods.  
The latter group was seen as people representing trade organizations that lobbied the 
Forest Service for larger and larger timber harvests, extremists on the logging side of the 
chasm, and executives of large timber companies who were perceived as indifferent to 
community stability. 
Characterization frames evoked here are similar to and appear to be an extension 
of characterization frames evoked by local environmentalists in their attempts in Phase 1 
to appeal to the local logging community, while linking the timber industry and Forest 
Service in an unholy alliance.  Table 6.6 contains examples of inclusive and divisive 
characterization frames evoked by QLG spokespeople towards those in the logging 
community. 
Table 6.6: Characterizations by QLG towards Loggers 
 
Jackson, an active participant in the seventh Forest Congress and numerous national environmental campaigns, said he 
got involved in the local proposal as a member of a timber-based community. “These are my neighbors,” Jackson said.  
“My heart doesn't bleed for Sierra Pacific industries, but it bleeds for the folks getting $12 an hour who don't have any 
alternatives for work.” [163] (LG+) 
 
“I hear the logger bemoaning the fact that the private lands are getting pounded, but they have gone about aggressively 
advertising to buy that timber,” says Linda Blum, an environmental advocate who signed “Independent Thinker” next 
to her name on the Quincy Library Group roster.  “For them to now bemoan that is pretty silly.” [195] (LG-) 
 
“Rural areas were getting beaten up badly in the national arena,'' Coates said. “The national leadership of the timber 
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industry has not been particularly perceptive and farsighted, so rural communities needed their own strategy.''  [198] 
(LG-) 
 
Not everyone supports the Quincy Library effort.  Jackson referred to one group of opponents as “right-wing people 
who believe this is a left-wing plot to weaken the moral fiber of loggers and who support the cutting of more trees.”  He 
described the other foes as a “small, left-wing environmental contingent that believes the plan is too kind to loggers.” 
[199] (LG-) 
 
“I would much rather live with the rednecks than the Brie eaters, even though I tend to represent the Brie eaters in 
court and agree with them on environmental issues,” said Jackson, who came to California from rural Oklahoma. 
“I want Quincy to survive because I want to live here.” [224] (LG+) 
 
 
Characterizations by QLG towards the Forest Service in Phase 2 (Table 6.7) are 
similar to characterization frames by the logging and environmental communities in 
Phase 1 and reveal common tensions with the agency.  Neither loggers nor 
environmentalists believed that the agency was adequately addressing its concerns and 
both let it know, in no uncertain terms.  This pattern continued in Phase 2 but now the 
groups were united as the Quincy Library Group. Moreover, divisive characterizations by 
QLG towards the Forest Service took on an added dimension.  Loggers and 
environmentalists were led to believe during the forest planning process that the Forest 
Service was attempting to balance their interests.  Since QLG’s plan accomplished this 
balance, group members assumed the Forest Service would enthusiastically embrace it. 
Moreover, loggers and environmentalists believed that their long-standing conflict 
was the principal obstacle preventing the agency from developing and implementing a 
timely forest plan.  By removing the conflict, they assumed that they had cleared the way 
for agency action.  Neither occurred.  While the agency publicly embraced QLG’s forest 
plan, it was paralyzed to do anything with it.  Instead, it continued to follow its chosen 
plan, which was in trouble shortly after it was approved.  QLG’s response was consistent 
with Phase 1 characterizations by both the logging and environmental communities – 
attack the agency for its ineptness.  Divisive characterization frames by QLG towards the 
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Forest Service were common in Phase 2.  In fact, 25 of 26 characterization frames were 
negatively charged. Table 6.7 is illustrative of these frames.   
Table 6.7: Characterizations by QLG towards the Forest Service 
 
The five-year plan for managing 2.5 million acres of federal timber land grew out of a common belief that the U.S. 
Forest Service has failed to provide either healthy forests or stable local economies. “Forest Service management today 
is terrible forestry.  They’re cutting our future,” said Frank Stewart, a spokesman for Collins Pine Co. of Chester. [163] 
(FS-) 
 
Since then, the group has waited for their efforts to be translated into action. “We can’t get (officials of) the Plumas 
National Forest to do anything but talk,” said Michael B. Jackson, a Quincy environmental attorney and a founding 
member of the group.  “They tell us they like our program but they can’t do anything about it.  They ought to change 
their name to the U.S. Lip Service.” [190] (FS-) 
 
Plumas County Supervisor Bill Coates , also a coalition co-founder, shares Jackson's conclusion. “The Forest Service's 
preoccupation with that piece of ground in a critical watershed area seems like an effort to cause disharmony,” Coates  
said. [231] (FS-) 
 
But Michael Jackson, a Quincy attorney and co-founder of the Quincy Library Group, maintains that the 2.5 million-
board-foot timber sale is a well-conceived wedge driven by Forest Service officials to divide the coalition. “I have no 
doubt the Forest Service's sole goal is to divide us, so it can go back to being in charge of a dying empire,” Jackson 
said. [231] (FS-) 
 
“The Quincy Library Group has demonstrated that even when all of us get on the same side and push, it doesn't mean 
the Forest Service will do anything,” says Linda Blum of the Sierra Nevada Alliance, an umbrella organization 
encompassing grassroots coalitions like the Quincy Library Group. “We don't have a federal partner; we have a federal 
sparring partner.” [242] (FS-) 
 
 
 Characterizations by Loggers:  Characterization framing by the logging 
community in Phase 2 decreased significantly compared with Phase 1. This was primarily 
due to the emergence of the Quincy Library Group as a dominant identity among 
members of the logging community and a subsequent decline in the salience of a logging 
identity. In other words, characterizations were now coming from QLG’s logging 
members instead of the traditional logging community, as indicated from the above 
discussion. In addition, the characterizations themselves changed. Although their 
affiliations with the logging community are not as salient as their affiliations with QLG, 
they sometimes participated in characterization framing from a logging community 
perspective.  Logging spokespeople sometimes found themselves explaining, reflecting 
on, or simply justifying their actions to reach across ideological boundaries and work 
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with their adversaries.  In three of the frames below (Table 6.8), loggers characterize 
environmentalists in inclusive ways through reflections on their perceptions of 
environmentalists’ motives and actions. The fourth frame is an attempt by a logger to 
convince fellow loggers of the benefits of supporting the QLG plan (while criticizing the 
Forest Service). In each example, the frame is originating from an individual wearing 
their logging community hat. 
Table 6.8 provides examples of loggers’ inclusive characterizations directed 
towards environmentalists and divisive characterizations directed towards the Forest 
Service.  Inclusive characterizations of environmentalists indicate a reconciliation of 
some sort based on past misperceptions of either the environmental community as a 
whole or of specific individuals.  This type of characterization was relatively common in 
interviews conducted between 1998 and 2005 with QLG members from both the logging 
and environmental communities.  Divisive framing directed towards the Forest Service is 
consistent with Phase 1 characterizations of the agency.   
Table 6.8: Characterizations by Loggers 
 
No one is positive of the environmental effects, either, but both timber operators and local environmentalists are betting 
that they will be better than the recent past.  “US Forest Service management today is terrible forestry.  They’re [FS] 
cutting our future.  If we [loggers] don't go with this program [QLG], that's what you have coming at you,” says Frank 
Stewart, a resource planner with Collins Pine Co. in Chester. [163] (FS-) 
 
“I wished them [enviros] ill,” Baremore said of Jackson and his allies. Yet, last fall, Baremore wound up supporting 
Jackson's bid to withdraw two timber sales that would have logged relatively undisturbed areas of the Plumas National 
Forest. Jackson, meanwhile, has championed Baremore's goal of expanding local sawmills' access to federal timber. 
[188] (ENV+) 
 
“What's amazing to me is how much I relied on perception,” Baremore said. A fellow participant, Mike Yost, came to 
mind. Yost, a forestry instructor at the Feather River Community College in Quincy, is an avowed environmentalist 
who has helped block timber sales in the region. “I thought he was intent on taking every stick of wood out of 
circulation he possibly could,” Baremore said. “I was stunned to find out he had worked for the Forest Service, that he 
thought there was a time and a place for logging.” [188] (ENV+) 
 
Sierra Pacific officials consider their compromises with environmentalists a means of keeping their sawmills open, says 
Nelson. “We're [timber industry] in business, and we want to stay in business for a long, long time. We've got to get along 





Characterizations by Environmentalists:  Characterization framing by the 
environmental community in Phase 2 also decreased significantly compared with Phase 
1. Similar to the logging community, this was primarily due to the emergence of the 
Quincy Library Group as a dominant identity among local environmentalists and a 
subsequent decline in the salience of an environmental identity. One difference between 
loggers and environmentalists in this regard, however, is that not all in the environmental 
community endorsed the QLG proposal and in some cases even challenged their peers. 
Those individuals retained their affiliations with the conventional environmental 
community. As such, characterization frames by environmentalists in Phase 2 (Table 6.9) 
originate both from individuals affiliated with QLG and those not affiliated. 
Characterization framing by environmentalists in Phase 2 is directed towards 
loggers, the Forest Service, and the Quincy Library Group. While detecting patterns is 
difficult with so few frames to examine, frames originating from QLG affiliates are 
generally inclusive of the logging community and tend to be reflective of past 
misperceptions of loggers’ motives and actions. Frames originating from non-QLG 
affiliates are generally divisive towards the timber industry, the Forest Service, and QLG. 
An exception to this pattern are characterization frames from environmentalists who were 
on the fence regarding QLG. In Table 6.9 below, environmentalist Steve Evans is 
strongly critical of the Forest Service for attempting to destroy community consensus. A 
Sacramento-based environmentalist, Evans was a supporter of QLG although not directly 
affiliated. If Evans were a member of the group, these frames would be categorized as 
characterizations by QLG towards the Forest Service. It is important to note in Table 6.9 
the seeds of discontent among environmentalists not affiliated with QLG.  As the QLG 
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case indicates (Chapter IV), a break occurred between QLG environmentalists and those 
not affiliated with the group over the decision to seek federal legislation. Characterization 
framing among environmentalists in Phase 2 of the timber wars hints at this pending split.  
Table 6.9: Characterizations by Environmentalists 
 
And while he applauded local efforts to resolve disputes over natural resources, Edelson said the Plumas coalition 
[QLG] made no attempt to involve national environmental groups. “We're talking about public land.  All citizens have 
a stake in how it is managed,” said Edelson. [163] (QLG-) 
 
"At first, quite frankly, we [enviros] didn't trust them," said Jackson of the timber industry representatives, "and I'm 
sure they felt the same way about us.  But we've all learned over the past few months that we're not always going to get 
our own way, and we've come to a realization that perhaps the best way to reach a solution is to work from the ground 
up." [164] (LG+) 
 
“I would say this [salvage logging] is bad for forest management policy in California,” said Louis Blumberg, assistant 
regional director for the Wilderness Society in California. “And I would say it's a cynical attempt by big timber 
[them] and its friends in Congress to prey on the public's fear of wildfire to stuff their coffers.” [218] (FS -) (LG-) 
 
The Barkley sale is a clear signal that the Forest Service is willing “even eager” to destroy community 
consensus, he said. “I thought the Forest Service was tired of confrontation and controversy. I thought the agency 
supported community consensus and had entered a new era where good science and public concerns mean 
something,” said [Steve] Evans. [231] (FS-) 
 
But, as [Steve] Evans noted, the sale may well have destroyed the cooperative spirit that could ultimately have 
saved our local forests and the logging economy. “Why should I spend my time working to achieve fragile 
alliances which the Forest Service is going to dynamite? In the future, I may be too busy fighting lawsuits to 
participate,” Evans said. [231] (FS-) 
 
 
Characterizations by the Forest Service:  The Forest Service chose not to 
engage in the contentious dialogue that defined the timber wars during Phase 1.  The 
agency stayed on point and, with few exceptions, managed to avoid characterizing the 
other parties, either divisively or inclusively, at least in public.  The agency’s strategy 
changed during Phase 2, however, in part because it had little choice but to acknowledge 
QLG, which had landed in its lap.  To be sure, the approach QLG was suggesting – 
replacing the agency’s forest plan with its own – was so unconventional that the Forest 
Service struggled for a response.  In the meantime, QLG was gaining attention and praise 
from members of Congress and the Clinton Administration.  President Clinton’s 
Northwest Forest Conference (April 1993), and the President’s admonition to disputants 
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to “get out of the courtroom and into the meeting room,” boosted the group’s credibility 
and made it difficult for the agency to ignore.  However, while Clinton’s words provided 
a direction for community members, it did little to address Forest Service conventions.   
While Forest Service characterizations of QLG are limited, they are nevertheless 
powerful.  The agency’s challenge was in showing support without appearing to hand 
over the reins.  Unfortunately, as Table 6.10 illustrates, the agency’s characterizations are 
both inclusive and divisive, resulting in a confused message to QLG and those watching.   
Table 6.10: Characterizations by the Forest Service 
 
Although the community proposal is not yet a formal, signed document, Plumas Forest Supervisor Wayne Thornton 
was enthusiastic about its potential. “Something really unique and special has gone on here.  All sides are applying 
equal pressure to the Forest Service, but they’re [new coalition] singing from the same song sheet, and that's music to 
my ears,” he said. [163]  (QLG+) 
 
Local Forest Service officials are less enthusiastic about the group, seeing it as citizen involvement run amok. “We 
have been involved with the Quincy Library Group for almost one year,'' Leonard Atencio, supervisor of the Lassen 
National Forest, wrote in an agency memo circulated last January. “This group is not going to be easy to work with.'' 
[198] (QLG-) 
 
G. Lynn Sprague, Stewart's replacement as regional forester, made a similar commitment in a September letter to 
Coates.  “I am very supportive of this kind of community interest and involvement and very much want to see some 
successes.” [215] (QLG+) 
 
Within local Forest Service ranks the plan has met with mixed reviews.  Some employees are as frustrated with 
their agency as community group members are and have welcomed the opportunity for real change in forest management.  
Others resent the intrusion of what they consider nonprofessional outsiders.  “This group does not have all the answers, 
and they don't have the expertise they claim,” says Lassen National Forest Supervisor Leonard Atencio.  [215] (QLG-) 
 
“Here's a group that's not threatening each other or challenging the authority of the federal government,” said 
a spokesman for Glickman.  “They are the kind of model of consensus-building that the [Clinton] Administration 
wants to encourage.” [224] (QLG+) 
 
 
Frame Analysis – Phase 2 
Identity Framing: Document analysis of identity frames in Phase 2 revealed 
distinct changes in identity framing compared to Phase 1.  First, document analysis 
revealed the emergence and stability of a new social identity – the Quincy Library Group 
– made up of individuals who had previous affiliations with the local environmental and 
logging communities.  As mentioned, this frame was not present in Phase 1. Second, 
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while environmental and logging identity frames are present (recur) in Phase 2, document 
analysis verified a sharp decline in the frequency of those frames as the QLG identity 
became more salient. Third, document analysis revealed the convergence of a community 
identity that local environmentalists initially framed in Phase 1 and that loggers 
eventually came to embrace in Phase 2. Finally, document analysis also reinforced the 
presence and stability of the U.S. Forest Service’s organizational identity in both phases 1 
and 2. These findings are consistent with patterns observed during preliminary research.  
Identities among most local environmentalists and loggers appear to have shifted 
from in-group/out-group distinctions to the emergence of a common identity in the 
Quincy Library Group. Moreover, a common community identity is now reciprocated by 
both loggers and environmentalists and therefore satisfies Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) 
requirement that social identities are self categorizations with which others concur. 
Community identity also appears to fit Kusel’s definition of a “community of place” 
(Kusel et al., 1996) in that group members are defining community not as people who 
share a common set of interests but as people who share a common space, which they 
define as “community.” Forest Service identity frames continue to be consistent with 
organizational identity theorists (Hogg et al. 2000).  
Characterization Framing: Characterization frames also shifted in Phase 2 
compared to Phase 1.  Most striking, divisive characterization frames evoked by the 
logging community towards environmentalists – common in Phase 1 – disappeared 
entirely with the emergence of the Quincy Library Group and were replaced by inclusive 
characterizations of environmentalists that were QLG members. In addition, divisive 
frames by both environmentalists and loggers towards the Forest Service continued, but 
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were now emanating from a combined source – QLG.  And while the Forest Service 
engaged in little characterization framing during Phase 1, it was compelled to explain the 
emergence of QLG and its plan in Phase 2.  While characterization framing by the Forest 
Service continued to be limited, agency spokespeople nevertheless sent a mixed message 
to the public through both inclusive and divisive characterization frames.   
Finally, characterization framing by the environmental community hints of a split 
between environmentalists affiliated with QLG and those not affiliated. First, QLG 
characterization frames are inclusive of the logging community while non-QLG 
characterizations are exclusive and divisive. QLG’s empathy towards the local logging 
community and its acknowledgment of the role the logging community would play in 
implementing its forest plan was generally not shared by non-QLG environmentalists. 
Second, non-QLG environmentalists were beginning to challenge the efficacy of QLG’s 
plan, in part because of the growing perception that they could get better results through 
administrative actions now that the political pendulum had swung in their direction. This 
split would eventually lead to a chasm between QLG and non-QLG environmentalists 
that emerged as a “locals versus nationals” debate in which QLG environmentalists’ 
identities as valid members of the environmental community were contested. 
 Identity and characterization frames in phases 1 and 2 of the local timber wars 
have markedly changed, especially the emergence of the Quincy Library Group as a new 
and dominant identity frame for both loggers and environmentalists. From a social 
identity perspective, this change should result from a changing context since identity is 
context dependent. If so, the following chapter should reveal the contextual forces 








External Forces: the Role of a Changing Context 
 
As chapters V and VI demonstrate, social identities among disputants in the local 
Timber wars shifted from disparate identities tied to communities of interest – loggers 
and environmentalists – to a common and new identity as members of the Quincy Library 
Group.  In addition, we see among loggers a shift in their description of a community 
identity from an identity exclusive of local environmentalists to one that is inclusive. 
From the perspective of social identity theory, these changes should be tied to a changing 
context. As we recall from chapter II, social identities vary in order to better represent the 
individual’s changing relationship to reality, and are expandable and contractible across 
different domains, resulting in transformations in the definition of self (Brewer 1991).  
Most studies of social identity and context explore a shift in identity salience resulting 
from the movement of the individual from an existing to a new social reality. This 
research, as we recall, explores how the complex and dynamic context surrounding the 
conflict can shift, causing social identities to align in ways that facilitate a transformation 
from conflict to cooperation.  
This chapter explores the context surrounding the conflict and its dramatic change 
over time. If a changing context is responsible for the alignment of identities, evidence of 
it should emerge from the descriptions below. QLG biologist Linda Blum (pers. comm., 
3-3-99) captured much of the contextual dynamics in an interview focusing on the 
conditions that created an environment that was ripe for a truce in the local timber wars: 
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It’s an interesting sequence of events.  In the summer of ‘92, this part of 
California had a long period of drought – almost seven years at that point.  And it 
was starting to show that and decades of fire suppression, grazing and logging, 
and other management activities had come to a head.  We were starting to have 
big areas of mortality in the forests and there were about six or eight large 
wildfires in this part of the Sierra Nevada that burned probably 30 to 35 thousand 
acres.  And, during that summer is when we first started realizing you can’t just 
say, “Don’t log it.”  You’ve got to treat the problem that leads to these big, 
catastrophic wildfires.  Meanwhile the local political drumbeat was this thing of 
environmentalists as a whole are anti people – they want the forest to burn up, you 
know, the end of the world kind of stuff.  Also in the summer of ’92 is when the 
Forest Service published the CASPO report – the California Spotted Owl 
technical assessment that was intended, and we helped make it, to establish a new 
management direction for the forests.  Some people perceived that to be a total 
lock-up of the timber supply.  Others of us saw that there was considerable room 
to do other stuff – that there was logging to be done and that it did not mean that 
the mills in Loyalton and Susanville, you know, that everything had to come to a 
grand halt.  And, so it wasn’t just this great, courageous, out-of-the-blue step that 
somebody from Sierra Pacific Industries approached the environmentalists.  There 
were a number of factors rolling up to that.   
 
Shifting context provides a plausible albeit partial explanation for identity 
alignment, provided that contextual shifts move disputants towards alignment rather than 
away from it.  In exploring the shifting context surrounding the QLG case, it appears that 
it had two overall effects, which together create conditions ripe for alignment to occur.  
The contextual influences that created these conditions are complex and dynamic, and 
need to be understood in order to fully account for the changes that occurred.  They are 
best understood, as Blum alludes to above, as four overlapping categories of contextual 
change: 1) changes in the local community, 2) changes in the environmental movement, 
3) changing forest conditions, and 4) changes in the Forest Service. 
Changing Community Context  
The northern Sierra Nevada communities and surrounding forestland provide a 
contextual backdrop for the local Timber wars and the emergence of the Quincy Library 
Group. While the northern region has changed very little compared to other parts of the 
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Sierra Nevada (Duane 1999), demographic and economic changes point to a shifting 
context that gradually altered the dynamics of the local Timber wars.  Importantly, 
community context changed in two fundamental ways.  First, the region’s dominant 
commodity-based culture and economy was offset by an emerging amenity-based culture 
and economy that brought new values and new ideas to the region, thus helping to foster 
and empower the local environmental community (Duane 1999).  Second, economic and 
social changes in the region began to take their toll on the commodity-based culture, and 
on the community itself.  These two dimensions are explored below.   
Amenity Migration 
From the 1850s until the 1960s, the northern Sierras were dominated by small and 
relatively stable towns that were highly dependent on mining, forestry and agriculture 
(Duane, 1996; 1999).  About 1970, however, all of that began to change.  Between 1970 
and 1980, Sierra Nevada counties witnessed a “rural renaissance” of sorts that increased 
the region’s population by 65% (compared to an 18.6% increase in CA).  During the 
recession and recovery of the 1980s, Sierras added another 39%.  The two decades 
together saw growth of 130% across Sierra Nevada counties (Duane 1996).  Described as 
“the second gold rush,” population growth throughout the Sierras began to dramatically 
change the social, demographic, and economic structure of the region.  The rural 
renaissance of the 1970s included primarily young professionals, back-to-the-land types, 
and retirees leaving congested cities and suburbs for quiet mountain communities (Duane 
1999).  Writing in the early 1990s, Kia Snyder (1993), reflected on the back-to-the-land 
movement of the early 1970s in the Yuba River valley of the northern Sierras: 
Twenty years ago this area was reinhabited by a flurry of people escaping the city 
who formed a community living in hand-built cabins without electricity or 
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telephones, and many without water. Even today few are on the power grid, but 
many have solar electricity which powers lights and computers. We like to joke 
that we’ve gone straight from the 19th to the 21st century (p. 39).  
 
Snyder also reflected on the political evolution of many of the back-to-the-land refugees 
from the era: 
Over the years, we’ve become very active in local and regional politics, fighting 
off proposed mining and development, appealing Forest Service timber sales, and 
learning the natural history of the area (p. 39).  
 
In the 1980s, the migration continued, led by so-called “equity refugees” who 
could flip home investments in coastal California cities into tracks of land and second 
homes in the mountains (Duane 1996).  The trend continued through the 1990s and into 
the present decade. 
According to Duane (1996), conventional economic development theory would 
predict that growth in the Sierra nevada would occur only when there was an expansion 
in already-dominant resource extraction industries.  Such a view reflects the assumption 
that the foundation of rural economies continues to lie in the exploitation of natural 
resources.  While some increases in extractive industries occurred in the Sierras between 
1970 and 1990, a more telling statistic revealed that in most instances extractive 
economies actually declined even while population dramatically increased.  In fact, Sierra 
Nevada communities with the greatest dependence on timber production actually grew 
slower than those with less dependence on such production.  Instead, according to Duane 
(1996), “the basis for the subtle yet profound transformation of the 1970s and 1980s has 
been increasing recognition of the amenity value of natural resources” (p. 261).  This 
trend, he adds, “reflects a broad social change in the environmental values of Americans 
that has simultaneously challenged traditional approaches to land and resource 
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management over the past three decades” (p. 261).  Rather than the search for 
employment, Duane (1996) lists seven drivers fueling migration into the Sierra nevada: a) 
quality of life and recreational preferences, b) employment decentralization and a 
growing service sector economy, c) new information and telecommunication 
technologies, d) globalization, e) a growing retirement population, f) lower cost of living, 
and g) growing urban problems.   
Isolated geographically and more economically distressed, the northern Sierras 
have not experienced the level of growth and change that the central and southern Sierras 
have, although the demographic patterns are similar (Duane 1999).  Plumas County, the 
heart of the northern Sierras and the political epicenter of the Plumas National Forest, 
increased its population by 49% during the 1970s, 13.2% in the 1980s, and by 5.5 % in 
the 1990s.  In all, Plumas County grew by more than 78% from 1970 to 2000 (U.S. 
Census Bureau).  By contrast, neighboring Lassen County, with a more diverse economy 
and natural resource base, grew more steadily, at 28.8% in the 1970s, 27.6% in the 1980s, 
and 22.6% in the 1990s, and a total of 101% from 1970 to 2000 (US Census Bureau).   
More telling, however, is the shifting demographics of the northern Sierras.  
Plumas County’s elderly (age 65+) increased from 10% of the population in 1970 to 18% 
in 2000, while its school-aged cohort (ages 5-17) declined from 26% to 18% (US Census 
Bureau).  Moreover, the influx of retirees brought with it an increasingly significant 
income stream from non-labor sources such as interest, dividends, pensions, rent, social 
security, and public assistance.  In fact, non-labor income in 2000 accounted for 42% of 
the total personal income in the county compared to just 28% in 1970.  By contrast, 
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timber-related income dropped from 18.4% of total personal income in 1970 to just 7.2% 
in 2000 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis).   
During the same period, Plumas County’s workforce (ages 18-64) maintained a 
relatively consistent segment of the overall population, between 57% and 62%.  Its 
composition, however, changed considerably.  In 1970, the county’s Services and 
Professional sector comprised the largest portion of its job base – 49.2% – while the 
Manufacturing sector, including the forest products industry, comprised the second 
largest portion – 18.6%.  In 2000, however, the Service and Professional sector had 
grown to 55.3% of the job base while the Manufacturing sector shrunk to just 9.7% (U.S.  
Census Bureau).  The fastest growing industries in the County in terms of absolute job 
growth included state commercial banks, private timber tracts, public golf courses, social 
service providers, public hospitals, trucking, plywood and millwork, real estate lessors, 
and special trade contractors.  Industries that experienced the greatest decline included 
national commercial banks, logging, and medical offices, which were siphoned off by 
hospital increases (Plumas County Economic Development Strategy 2002-2003).   
In actual numbers, Plumas County saw a net increase of 5,499 jobs (104%) 
between 1970 and 2000.  Of these new jobs, 3,367 (61%) were in the Services and 
Professional sector – 2,027 (37%) of which were self-employed “proprietors,” or so-
called life-style entrepreneurs, who can often work where they choose.  Proprietors 
increased from 21% to 29% of the population between 1970 and 2000.  (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis).   Voter registration records also show 
shifting community demographics.   
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While one might expect the region to move from a more conservative commodity-
based population to a more liberal or moderate amenity-based population, in fact, the 
trend appears to go in the other direction.  Figure 7.1 above illustrates the trend in voter 
registration for Plumas County from 1972 to 2000 (source: CA Secretary of State). 
























The table illustrates a steady decline in registered Democrats (62.8% to 37.9%) 
and a gradual increase among Republicans (31.4% to 43.4%).  It is difficult to know the 
extent to which the demographic changes listed above have contributed to changes in 
voter registration patterns.  One could reasonably speculate that the steady decline in 
registered Democrats reflects a decline in the manufacturing labor force, a traditionally 
Democratic stronghold.  One could also speculate that the increase in registered 
Republicans reflects a growing retirement community, a traditionally conservative 
stronghold.  One might further speculate that an upswing in registered Republican voters 
may coincide with growing anti-government sentiments that helped elect Ronald Reagan 
in 1980.  It is likely that all of the above as well as national trends contributed to shifting 
voter registration patterns in the northern Sierras. 
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Two additional trends in voter registration are worth reporting.  The first is the 
growth, albeit slight, of other political party affiliations including Libertarian, Green, 
Independent, and American parties.  Collectively, these affiliations accounted for only 
1.2% of registered voters in 1972 and rose to 5.9% in 2000.  Second is the increase in 
registered voters declining to identify any party affiliation.  Collectively, these so-called 
independent voters accounted for 4.6% of registered voters in 1972 and rose to 12.8% in 
2000.  Together these differences account for 13.1% of the registered voting population.   
Similar demographic trends occurred in Lassen County and other parts of the 
northern Sierras.  These trends generally meant that fewer people in the region were as 
dependent on the timber industry for their economic well-being.  The result was that the 
region gradually and subtly shifted from a resource-dependent economy to one that was 
more diverse.  More importantly, many of the newcomers were moving to the region for 
so-called quality of life considerations.  With them came new values and new ways of 
addressing issues.  As Blahna (1990) notes, newcomers tend to come from urban areas 
and are either older, retired couples or are relatively young, affluent professionals and 
their families.  Because of these characteristics, “newcomers often act as ‘advocates of 
change’ as they infuse into rural communities their own needs, competencies, and ideas 
of what constitutes the good life” (p. 159). 
The northern Sierras were no exception.  Disputants in the local timber wars point 
to symbolic changes introduced by newcomers that are now community icons. The 
Mourning Thunder Café, for example, opened in 1976 followed by Quincy Natural Foods 
in 1978.  Morning Thunder, a bohemian-style coffee shop serving a breakfast and lunch 
fare of Nuevo California cuisine, was frequented by a growing hippie and progressive 
 
 148
population.  Loggers and the community’s conservative establishment stayed away, 
frequenting Bob’s Fine Foods, a standard Main Street American fare – greasy spoon – 
connected to the neighboring tavern by a common restroom access (Michael Jackson, 
personal communication 8/98; Tom Nelson, personal communication 3/4/99).  Quincy 
Natural Foods became the community connection for the growing progressive movement 
(Pat Terhune, personal communication 5/20/99). 
Decline of the Commodity-based Culture and Economy 
The northern Sierra region has the lowest average socioeconomic status of any 
region in the Sierras.  While the region has pockets of moderate wealth, it also has the 
largest proportion of people in poverty, the highest level of “intense poverty,” the largest 
unemployment, the highest rate of children in families receiving public assistance, and 
the lowest average education level (Doak and Kusel 1996).  Finally, the region has the 
lowest average “community capacity” score based on Doak and Kusel’s (1996) 
assessment of the “collective ability of residents in a community to respond to external 
and internal stresses; to create and take advantage of opportunities; and to meet the needs 
of residents” (p. 380).  In other words, the region is quite vulnerable to changes that may 
adversely impact these conditions.  
The largest employers in Plumas County in 2000 were Plumas Unified School 
District (400 employees), the US Forest Service (359 employees), Plumas County 
Government (333 employees), Collins Pine Mill (332 employees), Sierra Pacific 
Industries Mill (209 employees), and Union Pacific Railroad (165 employees) (CA 
Employment Development Dept., Labor Force Statistics).  Between the Collins Pine, 
Sierra Pacific lumber mills, and numerous independent loggers, it is apparent that the 
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timber industry continues to play a dominant role in the county’s employment.  However, 
timber industry dominance has significantly waned in the northern Sierras.  Like other 
Sierra Nevada forests, both the Plumas and Lassen national forests had their heyday of 
timber production in the late 1980s.  On the Plumas National Forest, timber sales 
averaged 185.5 million board feet annually from 1988 through 1990 and dropped steeply 
to an average of only 20 million board feet in the period from 1994 through 1996.  Lassen 
National Forest timber sales dropped from an average of 134.9 million board feet 
annually from 1988 through 1990 to an average of only 19.3 million board feet annually 
from 1994 through 1996 (USDA 2003).   
Timber sales on all Sierra Nevada national forests declined by nearly half during 
the period from 1991 through 1993 compared to 1988 through 1990 production levels.  
Timber sales dropped even further during the period from 1994 through 1996 – to less 
than one-third of 1991-93 levels.  Declines throughout the Sierras amounted to an overall 
drop in timber sales of 84.6% from 1988 to 1996 (Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment 
2003), even though production on private forests has remained steady (Laaksonen-Craig 
et al. 2001). 
Precipitous drops in timber sales had two immediate effects.  First, employment in 
the timber industry, which varies seasonally by more than 10%, declined sharply.  Annual 
unemployment figures for Plumas County reflect drastic changes in community economic 
and social stability.  As a reference point, during the 1983 recession, a low point in the 
timber economy, Plumas County had an average annual unemployment rate of 16.4%, 
with seasonal fluctuations as high as 27.5% in mid-winter and as low as of 8.6% in late 
summer.  Employment levels rebounded by the end of the decade as the economy 
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recovered; in 1990 average unemployment had dropped to 9.8%, with a high of 16.6% in 
the off-season and a low of 4.9% in August.  In 1970, Plumas County’s timber-related 
income was 18.4% of total personal income. By 1992, timber-related income had 
dropped to 7.2% of total personal income (Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department 
of Commerce 2000). 
Steep declines in timber production in the early 1990s, however, took their toll.  
In 1993, average unemployment climbed to 15%, with seasonal fluctuations as high as 
23.5% and as low as 9%.  Average unemployment at the end of 1996, the end of phase 2 
of the Timber wars, was 12%, with seasonal variations from a high of 20% to a low of 
6.7% (CA Employment Development Department, Labor Market Information Division, 
2005).  Moreover, while overall employment grew from 7,030 jobs in 1983 to 8,690 in 
1996 (23.6% gain), timber industry employment fell from 1300 jobs to 880 (32% loss) 
during the same period (CA Employment Development Department, Labor Market 
Division, 2005). Moreover, almost everyone in the community knew a logging family 
displaced by the downturn and forced to relocate or, worse, could relate a story about 
alcohol or drug abuse, spousal abuse, or divorce (Rose Comstock, personal 
communication, 3/3/99).  
Second, declining timber production on the national forestlands translated into 
lost revenues for county roads and schools.  To compensate state and local governments 
for lost tax revenues resulting from the tax-exempt status of federal lands, in 1908 the 
federal government began paying states 25% of total revenues from public land activities 
within their borders.  The states, in turn, reallocated the funds to local and county 
governments for roads and schools (Lloyd 2001).  An additional program was established 
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in 1976 to augment the original program in situations where federal revenues fell short of 
county expectations.  The new program (payments in lieu of taxes – PILT) was no longer 
tied to revenue generation but, instead, was based on the acreage of federal land within 
each county (Lloyd 2001).  As timber sales on the national forests declined, payments to 
counties also declined, even with PILT augmentation.  From 1989 through 1997, annual 
payments to Plumas County dropped from $3.7 million to $1.8 million, resulting in a 
significant decline in school revenues that threatened to cut school programs, reduce 
hours, and close and consolidate schools throughout the region.  
Did declines in the timber economy, increasing unemployment, and revenue 
losses to county roads and schools have the impact on the community that many feared?  
It is unclear, based on the information available, the extent to which a decline in the 
timber economy directly affected the socioeconomic structure and wellbeing of the 
region. Along these lines, Berck et al. (2003) looked at participation in county Food 
Stamp programs and two Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs for 
11 timber-dependent counties in northern California between 1983 and 1993, including 
Plumas and Lassen counties. The researchers challenged the assumption often made in 
forest management debates that a rise in unemployment within the local timber industry 
was linked to an increase in participation in county aid programs, or whether other 
variables played a more significant role.  
While the researchers discovered linkages between local timber employment and 
participation in such programs, especially AFDC programs, they found stronger evidence 
of a link between timber employment and statewide rather than local economic trends. 
Berck et al. (2003) conclude that, “policy that is effective at alleviating poverty at a state 
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level may be more effective in reducing poverty in these local areas than a policy targeted 
at increasing local timber-related employment (p. 774). Nevertheless, there were certainly 
strong perceptions of a correlation between timber employment and community 
wellbeing, and to a large extent disputants were acting on those perceptions. Moreover, 
there were additional indicators of an impact. For example, Plumas County’s poverty rate 
increased from 9.7% in 1980 to 11.9% 1990.  Lassen County’s poverty rate increased 
from 10.3% in 1980 to 13.3% in 1990.  Between 1989 and 1997, public health 
expenditures in Plumas County increased from $1,885,000 to $3,936,000 (Plumas 
Communities Vision 2020, 2000). Although it is not possible here to draw statistical 
correlations between crime increases and declines in logging, the information appears to 
support local perceptions of community decline.    
Local Model of Collaboration 
The region was in a unique situation.  That is why, in the mid-1980s, community 
economic development interests in Plumas County decided to invest money in the 
restoration of the region’s streams. It started in response to a recession in the early 1980s 
that left the region struggling for new economic growth. Lacking the dramatic scenic 
qualities characteristic of the central Sierras, and off the beaten path of California 
tourists, the northern Sierras were struggling to survive. “Unlike the Sierras famous mid-
section, toothed with 14,000-foot high slabs of bare granite,” a Sierra Bulletin article 
lamented, “the northern end of the range slouches” (Hamilton 1993, p. 100).  
In 1984, the Plumas Corporation, the non-profit economic development arm of 
the County, ran out of ideas for sparking new economic development. Typical industries 
were not welcome in the region. Moreover, as mentioned above, demographic trends 
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indicated that newcomers were moving to the region less for employment and more for 
the amenity values it offered, primarily hunting and fishing (Bernard and Young 1997). 
So the Plumas Corporation took stock of the situation and began looking for 
opportunities to support the emerging trend. The corporation landed on the idea of 
restoring severely degraded tributaries of the Feather River, which provided power to 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) through hydroelectric facilities that were 
literally choking in sediment (Hamilton 1993).   
The Plumas Corporation approached PG&E with a proposal to ecologically 
restore tributary streams in the watershed, which if successful would greatly reduce the 
utility’s maintenance. The Corporation enlisted the support and participation of the local 
officials, citizens, and students and together with PG&E and other government agencies 
restored a 75-acre meadow along Red Clover Creek, an important tributary. By 1993 the 
Feather River Coordinated Resource Management Group had raised $2.5 million from 
PG&E and other participating groups and had conducted 33 restoration projects and 
studies. In 1992 the group raised $800,000, an eighth of which came from PG&E. 
The group also initiated a Watershed Management Certification Program at Feather 
River College in Quincy to train students to monitor restoration work. 
The Plumas Corporation’s goal was to work through a community-based 
collaborative process to restore streams that fed the Feather River and, in the process, 
enhance economic viability. By tying economic viability to ecological integrity, the 
Corporation was attempting to respond to demographic trends and reverse the 
historic pattern of advocating resource extraction at the expense of the 
environment. “We need to take care of our resource base so it can take care of us 
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– the same way an entrepreneur would manage capital,” Leah Wills, an economist 
for the Plumas Corporation observed, “Our capital as a county is our beauty and 
resource wealth” (99). 
Environmentalists engaged in the forest management conflict were skeptical of 
industry’s motives and did not participate in early restoration efforts. They were also 
cognizant that the streams were being degraded primarily through logging and grazing 
practices that they were attempting to reform. Environmental attorney Michael Jackson 
was initially skeptical of the group's cooperative approach. But slowly the group’s efforts 
produced tangible results. “Now I can see I was wrong,” stated Jackson (Hamilton 1993).  
While the restoration work moves slowly in terms of river miles, it has rapidly 
changed the politics of the community. Our opposition is now pointing to their 
accomplishments in restoring the damages done by cattle. That's a step forward 
– maybe a more important step than the restoration of the creek (p. 105).  
 
Changes in the Environmental Movement  
The Quincy Library Group is the product of an environmental movement in the 
Northern Sierras that was influenced by the national environmental movement as well as 
by regional and local events.  The seeds of an environmental movement in the Northern 
Sierras were apparent as early as 1968 when 77 miles of the Middle Fork of the Feather 
River were designated under the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.  The Middle Fork 
was listed in part to prohibit the federal government from licensing new hydroelectric 
dams and major water diversions, which had impacted every major stream and tributary 
in the Feather River watershed.  In 1968, however, the remote Middle Fork, containing 
Feather Falls, the sixth highest waterfall (640 ft.) in the US, was undeveloped.   
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While designation of the Middle Fork provided a public record of an emerging 
environmental conscience, an unlikely hero of sorts was busy laying the groundwork for 
grassroots activism.  According to Michael Jackson,  
There has always been a small environmental conscience here.  Led by an old 
railroad worker, Wobbly, by the name of Wayne Dakan.  Wayne was a truth 
speaker and spoke truth to power regularly.  When the back-to-the-land people 
came here in the ‘70s he became their leader.  He left a legacy for those of us who 
knew him of completely principled absolute vigilance to the environment.” 
(Jackson, pers. comm., 10-25-98) 
  
Local journalist Jane Braxton Little contends that Dakan became “a magnet for 
environmentalists, hippies and the rest of the newcomers who thought clear-cuts and 
gravel pits should be more closely regulated” (Little, pers. comm.  10-30-98). Dakan 
moved to Plumas County in the 1930s as a gold prospector along the North Fork of the 
Feather River (Little 1988). If his quirkiness endeared him to the local environmental and 
hippie community, Dakan’s acerbic style created lots of enemies.  “He's more like a 
voice from the wilderness than a teacher,” said Jackson.  “I see no difference between 
Thoreau and Wayne except that Thoreau wrote and Wayne shouts” (Little 1988, p. 132).   
For years Dakan was a lone voice.  In 1969, however, Feather River College 
opened in Quincy, bringing new faculty and a student population to the region.  One of 
the new faculty members was Michael Yost, a Duke-trained forester and environmental 
advocate.  Yost and his artist-wife Sally moved to Quincy in 1975 and soon joined a 
growing contingent of locals interested in protecting roadless and wilderness areas on the 
national forests.  Yost also introduced his students to Dakan.  “Wayne knew what was 
going on, and he was very concerned about it,” said Yost.  “But he didn't know what to 
do.” (Little, 1988, p. 132).  With Yost’s help, Dakan joined college students and 
instructors to form a community activist group that convinced Plumas County to ban the 
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use of the herbicide 2,4-D on county property, and eventually convinced the Forest 
Service to suspend spraying on national forestlands.   
The contingent soon formed the nucleus of citizens advocating for the designation 
of a wilderness area near Bucks Lake, 15 miles from Quincy (Yost, pers. comm., 3-4-99).  
Long-time resident Wilbur Vaughn first proposed a 21,000-acre old-growth forest for 
protection in the 1950s, along with Sierra Club director David Brower (Little 1984).  
With no plans to log the area, and with little support for wilderness protection, the 
proposal languished.  In 1970, however, the Forest Service began a salvage logging 
operation in the remote area.  As would have it, a logger accidentally felled an ancient 
tree on top of a pickup truck, drawing attention to the operation. Under pressure, the 
Forest Service abandoned the sale, but left the land unprotected.  According to Little 
(1984), “More than 1000 people signed a petition opposing the logging, and a group later 
called the Friends of Plumas Wilderness was born.” By the 1980s, despite strong 
opposition from timber companies, the group gathered enough support to include the area 
in federal wilderness legislation.  Surprised by the broad base of support, the Sacramento 
Bee reported on the successful campaign of “an unlikely alliance of lumber mill workers, 
housewives and conservationists” (Little 1984).   
Environmentalists and their allies had won the Bucks Lake wilderness battle but, 
as Little reflected, “were not particularly gracious in victory.”  This, she contends, “set up 
the battle ground for the national forest planning process, easily the most contentious 
natural resource conflict Plumas County has seen” (Little, pers. comm., 10-30-98).  The 
leader of the battle was attorney Michael Jackson, who came to Quincy in 1977 to start 
an environmental law practice.  Jackson ran for a Plumas County Board of Supervisors 
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seat in 1984.  He lost by just 12 votes but was buoyed by the discovery of a more 
equitable distribution of power in the county.  “This is one of the most logging-dependent 
areas in California,” Jackson reflected.  “But there is no majority here to cut down more 
big trees” (pers. comm., 8-25-98).   
 The Larger Movement – In Three Waves 
The local environmental movement in Plumas County and the northern Sierras is 
embedded in a larger, complex movement that influenced its emergence.  Without 
retracing the environmental movement’s entire history, its modern structure can be traced 
to events that created a context within which conditions were ripe for the emergence of 
local collaborative groups such as the Quincy Library Group.  Two related events 
occurring in the 1960s and 1970s had a dramatic impact on the larger environmental 
movement – the passage of major environmental legislation and Earth Day, April 22, 
1970 (Gottlieb 1993; Shabecoff 2003).  A third event, occurring in the early 1980s, 
highlighted a rift within the budding movement – the election of Ronald Reagan and the 
conservative backlash that followed (Shabecoff 2003).  These events and their influence 
on the local movement are briefly traced below.   
Despite a growing interest in public health and quality of life issues throughout 
the U.S., the earliest environmental legislation was focused primarily on protecting public 
lands that had been spared from logging, mining and dam building.  The Wilderness Act 
of 1964 focused on preserving public lands for primitive and non-motorized recreational 
uses.  The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 sought to maintain undeveloped and semi-
developed rivers in primitive and scenic conditions.  Influenced by John Muir, Teddy 
Roosevelt, Aldo Leopold, and others, this “first wave” of environmentalism was led by 
 
 158
mostly white middle and upper class hikers, backpackers, birders and sportsmen affiliated 
with the Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, National Wildlife Federation, National 
Audubon Society, and the Isaac Walton League (Gottlieb 1993; Shabecoff 2003).   
These organizations were instrumental in the early 1970s in passing major 
environmental laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), and anti-pollution legislation characteristic of the 
“second wave” of the movement (Gottlieb 1993; Shabecoff 2003).  However, the 
organizations largely responsible for advocating the highly technical laws and policies 
lacked the capacity to adequately monitor them.  The principal conservation 
organizations at the time, as well as new organizations such as the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), adapted to the 
situation through increased professionalization, thus fostering a new industry focused on 
scientifically defensible decision-making (Gottlieb 1993; Mitchell et al. 1990).  In 
particular, NEPA created “a broad and expansive environmental policy system” that 
required lawyers, scientists, and economists to navigate (Gottlieb 1993, p. 125).   
As the 1970s progressed, four main arenas of action increasingly defined the 
second wave of environmental activism: legislation and policy-making, regulatory action, 
the courts, and the electoral process.  An obvious consequence of this focus was the 
centralization of power in Washington, D.C. and in state capitals.  Moreover, power was 
increasingly consolidated in the hands of roughly a dozen national organizations whose 
leaders were largely responsible for laying the legislative foundation (Gottlieb 1993; 
Mitchell et al. 1990).  Environmental policies, however, were often ignored on the 
ground. This was due in large part to the lack of traction local environmentalists were 
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able to achieve through administrative channels. Jackson recalled the political climate in 
the region at the time:  
For a long time there was total power on the timber side during the 60’s, 70’s and 
early 80’s in this area.  It was basically both parties – the Republicans and 
Democrats – it did not make any difference who was in charge.  There were some 
environmental laws but there was no enforcement of them whatsoever because 
they did not have the budget or the staff to do it. Basically here the environmental 
laws were seen as an attack on the way of life. (pers. comm. 8/98) 
 
To ensure their implementation, environmentalists began to emphasize the enforcement 
of policies through administrative procedures and the courts, which in turn highlighted 
the role that lawyers played in the movement and reinforced the adversarial posture the 
groups had adopted (Gottlieb 1993).   
As the mainstream organizations expanded and became more entrenched in 
Washington, D.C. bureaucracy, they were, as Gottlieb (1993) contends, “increasingly 
absorbed by the operation and maintenance of the policy system itself” (p. 130).  
Moreover, the emerging professional staffs tended to limit their activities to their areas of 
expertise and made little effort to mobilize local support.  Local groups often sought 
assistance from the nationals but, as Gottlieb notes, “the process of interaction was 
largely one-way and failed to counter the growing impression that the mainstream groups 
were becoming indistinguishable from the environmental policies they had helped create 
and maintain” (p. 132).  The result was an increasingly professionalized mainstream 
movement, but one that was losing touch with grassroots supporters and constituents.   
Earth Day 1970 had a different effect, sparking a groundswell of local “eco-
activist” and consumer action organizations focused on public health and pollution issues 
(Gottlieb 1993; Shabecoff 2003).  Earth Day was the brainchild of Wisconsin Senator 
Gaylord Nelson, who sought to mobilize a growing student activist movement and 
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distance it from the more radical New Left and anti-war politics of the 1960s (Gottlieb 
1993).  Shabecoff (2003 p. 105) contends that Earth Day,  
…touched off a great burst of activism that profoundly affected the nation’s laws, 
economy, corporations, farms, politics, science, education, religion, and 
journalism; created new institutions; and, in time, changed the physical world 
itself by reducing pollution and preserving open space and other resources. 
 
 The proliferation of grassroots activists following Earth Day filled a gap left by 
the increasingly centralized, mainstream organizations (Gottlieb 1993).  But 
professionalization among the mainstream groups still served as a barrier for local 
activists relying on their assistance to navigate the complex array of federal laws and 
policies.  For local groups, according to Gottlieb, the use of expertise “was frequently a 
disempowering experience, a method of defining issues that effectively eliminated 
participation by those most affected by such decisions” (p. 167).  Expertise also 
established a “hierarchy of participation” in which “those engaged in the minutia of 
specialization and technical details were given authority, while ‘non-experts’ were 
perceived as nonparticipants” (p. 168).   
Frustrated with the existing system, Earth Day activists found a new model in 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader’s brand of citizen-centered action coupled with legal 
support.  This new movement was, in Gottlieb’s words, “predominantly local in nature, 
more participatory and focused on action, and critical of the roles of expertise and 
lobbying in defining environmental agendas” (p. 170).  Nader’s influence was also 
apparent in the growing perception among activists that unregulated corporate power was 
their greatest threat.  “The multinational corporation thus became the focus of attack,” 
Gottlieb (1993) contends, “the engaged citizen the instrument for change” (p. 172).   
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Environmental legislation and the professionalized “CEO culture” (Gottlieb 1993) 
it fostered contrasted sharply with the citizen-based movement that followed Earth Day.  
Despite these tensions, McCloskey (1990, p. 78) observed, from 1972 until the mid-
1980s the environmental movement was “remarkably free of stress over ideology.” There 
was, however, growing unrest.  Focused on environmental issues more broadly, the 
movement as a whole was more anthropocentric than many activists desired.  The “deep 
ecology” movement began to challenge all of that.  Deep ecology, coined by Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess, defined a more “eco-centric” view of the relationship between 
humans and nature (Dowie 1995).  Rather than human-centered environmentalism, deep 
ecologists sought a nature-centered approach wherein the natural environment was no 
longer subordinated to an anthropocentric paradigm.   
Deep ecology, according to Dowie (1995), provided an “ideal counterpoint to the 
centralized, bureaucratic environmental activism” that had constrained radical thought (p. 
227).  As the deep ecology movement took hold, advocates began to clash with what they 
termed the professionalized “shallow ecology” movement, whose central objective, in 
their view, was the health and affluence of people in developed countries (Naess 1973, p. 
97).  One of the early leaders of the deep ecology movement was David Brower, director 
of the Sierra Club during the 1950s and ‘60s.  While Brower attracted thousands of new 
members with his charismatic style, he rankled many of the old guard and resigned in 
1969 under pressure from the Sierra Club board (Sessions 1995). He subsequently 
founded two national organizations grounded in deep ecology philosophy.   
Brower was not the only deep ecology advocate to clash with the mainstream 
movement.  Among the hundreds of organizations influenced by the philosophy, Earth 
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First! was the most prominent (Gottlieb 1993).  Earth First! defined the genre of the 
uncompromising organization that mixed civil disobedience with a “flair for theater” and 
a rejection of industrialized society (p. 197).  Rejecting the conventional paradigm, co-
founder Dave Foreman set out to “consciously step outside of the system, to eschew the 
temptation of political access, to deliberately try to stir the stew” (Foreman 1995, p. 55). 
The deep ecology movement’s sudden debut in the early 1980s was in part a 
response to the Reagan Administration’s hostility towards environmentalism (Shabecoff 
2003).  Disillusioned with the mainstream groups’ inability to counter the Reagan 
agenda, deep ecologists broke ranks and publicly skewered their mainstream counterparts 
(Borelli 1988).  The mainstream groups, wrote Sierra Club director Michael McCloskey 
(1990),  
…were attacked for not getting the job done – for being complacent, co-opted, 
bureaucratic, distant, arrogant, interested only in professional ‘perks’ and money, 
and for being too conservative (p. 79).  
  
The rift, according to McCloskey, presented a dilemma for the mainstream organizations.   
Increasingly, the radical groups embody the passion over the issues and articulate 
the visions of what the future should hold, whereas the mainstream organizations 
have far more resources and strong management.  The dilemma is how to get 
these two ingredients into a productive relationship” (p. 85).   
 
At the same time, some of the mainstream organizations were experimenting with 
what, to many, was the antithesis of the deep ecology philosophy – free market 
environmentalism.  This “third wave” of environmentalism grew out of a desire to use the 
market to bring corporate America into compliance with federal environmental 
regulations and standards (Dowie 1995).  Mainstream organizations like the 
Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Fund, and the National Wildlife Federation 
embraced a philosophy aimed at shifting the environmental battle, as Dowie (1995) 
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describes, “from the courtroom to the boardroom” (p. 106).  National Wildlife Federation 
director Jay Hair, a spokesperson for the movement, argued that if environmentalists’ 
message is to appeal to corporate America it must “translate into profits, earnings, 
productivity, and economic incentives for industry” (Dowie 1995, p. 107). 
Instead of pursuing legal options through federal regulations, free-market 
environmental leaders prefer to “hammer out deals” that allow each party to “declare 
victory and appear green” (Dowie 1995 p. 106-107).  While the philosophy found an 
obvious foothold in U.S. policy, it failed to draw much support from the larger 
movement.  Skeptics of the philosophy deride free-market environmentalism as nothing 
more than “the institutionalization of compromise” (p. 107).  According to Foreman 
(1984), “we must redefine the battle.  We must stop playing the games of political 
compromise the industrial power brokers have designed for us…” (p. 24-25).   
Dialing Down in the Northwest – A Fourth Wave 
The rift between the mainstream, radical, and market-based wings of the 
environmental movement planted seeds for a “fourth wave” of environmentalism 
characterized by the proliferation of local niche-based groups and activist networks 
(Dowie 1995).  The Sierra Nevada Conservation Directory, published by The Wilderness 
Society (1998) to facilitate intergroup networking, lists over 230 nongovernmental 
organizations concerned with the environmental health of the Sierra Nevada.  Of these, 
127 are “conservation organizations” supporting various forms of advocacy and activism, 
20 are land trusts engaged in voluntary land conservation, 48 are watershed projects 
supporting non-confrontational land management practices, and 37 are “other 
institutions” having overlapping environmental, economic, and social interests.  Among 
 
 164
the conservation organizations, 87 are local organizations or chapters focused on a single 
forest, river, park, or natural feature, 14 are regional organizations and coalitions 
topically focused on the entire Sierra Nevada, and 26 are statewide organizations and 
coalitions focused on a specific environmental niche.   
According to Hays (2007), the proliferation of niche-based groups focused on 
forest issues was a response in part to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 
(NFMA), which required the Forest Service to develop comprehensive plans for each 
national forest.  The result was the formation of numerous “citizen forest reform 
organizations” focused on individual national forests and their forest plans. Their 
formation, Hays contends, “represented a distinctly new agenda and a new type of 
organization on the environmental scene” (p. 21). These groups, in turn, led to the 
formation of activist networks facing similar challenges as well as assistance and support 
from regional and national conservation organizations focused on the forest planning 
process (Sample and Kirby 1983).  Since each forest had its own unique set of problems 
and issues, however, local forest activists had to develop their own knowledge of the 
forest as well as unique strategies for addressing forest management issues.   
NFMA provided an avenue for groups to advocate specific ecological objectives 
in pending forest plans and engage specialists in helping them formulate their own plans, 
which promoted ecological objectives as alternatives to conventional approaches.  To be 
effective, citizens groups had to develop an understanding of ecological principles and 
their application on a managed forest.  This required them to move beyond their 
conventional knowledge of wilderness and roadless values since they were now dealing 
with forest disturbances created by human activities (Hays 2007). Moreover, with regard 
 
 165
to logging, NFMA forced environmentalists to confront an uneasy management question 
– how should logging be conducted on a landscape where it is deemed appropriate? 
Activists, it turned out, needed an ecological approach to forestry (Hays 2007).  
As the number and capacity of citizen forest reform organizations evolved, Hays 
(2007) contends, they developed a remarkably consistent set of ecological principles 
focused on biodiversity, habitat protection, structural diversity, native and old-growth 
preservation, watershed management, ecological restoration, and fire. For most citizen 
reform groups, these principles translated into specific actions to, a) protect threatened 
and endangered species, b) assess the habitat requirements of flora and fauna as well as 
habitat richness (wetlands and riparian areas), c) replace clearcutting and even-aged 
management with uneven-aged management and patchiness, d) set aside remaining old-
growth forests, e) benchmark desired outcomes to pre-European settlement conditions, 
and f) organize management activities around watersheds. Hays (2007) describes this 
approach as a “dual action program of protection and restoration” whereby citizen reform 
organizations “sought to reduce forest uses that presented a threat to the existence and 
health of ecological resources… and restore what they felt were more desirable forest 
conditions, which those practices had degraded” (p. 49).  
Ecological sciences and the budding fields of conservation biology, ecosystem 
management, and ecological restoration were tantamount to this understanding, 
especially with regard to ecosystem services and the biological value of old growth 
forests (Yaffee 1994). In addition, environmentalists were aware of models of sustainable 
forestry that showed promise for forest reform. One such model was dubbed “New 
Forestry” by its pioneers, forest ecologist Jerry Franklin and colleagues (1989). New 
 
 166
Forestry focuses on the maintenance of complex ecosystems and uses timber harvesting 
as a tool to maintain ecosystem health. New foresters, according to Franklin, focus not on 
what they are removing from the forest but on what is left behind. According to Steve 
Eubanks, one of Franklin’s colleagues, “our primary motivation was to perpetuate a 
healthy ecosystem that could provide products as well as all the benefits, beyond 
products, that a healthy ecosystem provides” (Taylor 1991 p. 50).  
While New Forestry had its skeptics among environmentalists (Zuckerman 1992; 
Yaffee 1994; Taylor 1991), skeptics were mainly concerned with the ability of the Forest 
Service to be true to the concept. One such skeptic was Chris Maser, another of 
Franklin’s colleagues. Maser believed that New Forestry was still too commodity 
oriented and endorsed the vision and spirit that produced it but not the concept as it was 
being applied. “In New Forestry,” said Maser, “the product is still more important than 
the process, and we are still trying to manage nature rather than work in harmony with it” 
(in Taylor 1991, p. 51). Instead, many environmentalists argued for a return to “old 
forestry” as it had been practiced during the Forest Service’s custodial era and as it was 
being applied on a few private forests such as the Collins Almanor Forest in the northern 
Sierras.  Zuckerman (1992, p. 44) made a comparison between “new” and “old” forestry 
as applied on the Almanor forest:  
This is not a New Forestry experiment, but a system developed by Forest Service 
researchers in the 1930s. Although this way of logging has fallen into disuse on 
public land, it is maintained by the Collins Almanor Company and held up by 
many observers as an example of sound forest management. Unlike New 
Forestry, which attempts to mimic both major and minor natural jolts to the forest, 
this system recreates only the minor disturbance of light fires.  
 
As mentioned in the QLG case, the Friends of Plumas Wilderness’ 1986 conservationist 
alternative was modeled after the Collins Almanor Forest near Chester, CA. QLG 
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members took Senator Barbara Boxer to the forest in 1993 to show her what their efforts 
would look like.  
Hays’ (2007) description of a fourth wave of citizen forest reform groups 
triggered by NFMA is precisely what occurred in the northern Sierras in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The Friends of Plumas Wilderness, for example, initially formed to 
advocate for the Bucks Lake Wilderness area but remained together to develop the 
conservationist alternative to the Plumas Forest Plan. The formation of such groups also 
follows a pattern described by Dowie (1995) in which the proliferation of niche-based 
groups coincides with the splintering of mainstream groups (NFMA may have been a 
factor in that process). In the Sierra Nevada, as Dowie describes, niche-based groups 
attempted to work with regional/national groups, which provided resources (Sample and 
Kirby 1983), and carry out joint campaigns through activist networks.  This combination 
provided a potentially powerful force if the groups could leverage their efforts in both 
local and regional/national political arenas.   
While the combination worked well in some situations, and continues today, it 
was strained by what QLG biologist Linda Blum describes as “differences in scale and 
place.”  Blum contends that a local/national rift was inevitable.  “The grassroots folks… 
were inclined to fiercely defend their local places and resources,” she recalls, whereas 
“the nationals maintained their goals of affecting national environmental policy through 
legislative and executive branch lobbying” (personal communication, 5-22-05).  In deal-
making at the national level, Blum contends, local environmental issues sometimes “got 
traded off by the national staffers up on Capitol Hill and in the White House.”  Plumas 
Forest activists were particularly sensitive to this issue – the proposed Bucks Lake 
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Wilderness area was initially cut from the 1984 California Wilderness Bill by Sierra Club 
lobbyists who traded it for another area.  The Friends of Plumas Wilderness had to 
scramble to get it back into the legislation. As Blum observed, “One person's Big Picture 
Deal Cutting is another person's Capitulation” (pers. comm., 5-22-05).  
  Another dimension of Blum’s “differences in scale and place” resulted in a 
natural split between Sierra Nevada forest activists and those in the Pacific Northwest.  
For a time, environmental activists throughout Northern California and the Pacific 
Northwest leveraged resources and shared common strategies.  Wilderness, old-growth, 
and roadless area protection were common themes on forestlands throughout the region.  
By the late 1980s, however, environmental issues affecting California coastal and 
Northwest forests and those affecting Sierra Nevada forests began to diverge.  Blum 
recalled how new federal mandates, including the ESA listing of the northern spotted 
owl, marbled murrelet, and Pacific coast salmon species, “imposed such differences in 
what coastal California and Northwest forest activists had to deal with, compared to 
Sierran activists,” that broad coalitions gradually began to splinter (personal 
communication, 5-20-05). 
Moreover, coastal and Northwest forest battles, and the resources they consumed, 
began to draw attention away from the plight of the Sierras.  In 1991, however, the Sierra 
Nevada was thrust into the spotlight with the release of the Sacramento Bee series 
“Majesty and Tragedy: The Sierra in Peril,” a scathing assessment of the environmental 
health of the range (Knudson 1991).  For the first time publicly, the series legitimized 
concerns about the relationship between forest health, water supply, population growth, 
and air quality, and presented a new context for viewing federal forest and land use 
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policy. The Pulitzer prize-winning series also identified a principal villain, the U.S. 
Forest Service. Moreover, the series vindicated environmentalists and greatly empowered 
the movement.  “In one bold stroke,” Duane (1998) observed, “the series changed the 
terms of the debate about environmental quality and land and resource management 
issues in the Range of Light” (p. 23). It also served to galvanize the environmental 
movement and presented it with a unique opportunity to turn the attention the series 
created into more effective policies.  
The Sacramento Bee series was not the only contextual dimension that tipped the 
balance of power towards environmentalists, although it was significant regionally. Two 
other factors also contributed to the sense of empowerment that environmentalists were 
experiencing. One was the growing recognition that the national forests were viewed by 
the American people as much more than a source of timber. As Franklin (1989) argued 
concerning the need for an approach to forestry that reflected changing societal values:  
Time has come for a shift in agenda. Forestry needs to expand its focus beyond 
wood production to the perpetuation of diverse forest ecosystems. Industry users 
need to recognize that society views forestlands as more than just another form of 
agricultural land with a slowly-maturing crop (p. 43-44).  
 
The second contextual factor contributing to the empowerment of environmentalists was 
the important string of victories through administrative actions and the courts, in 
particular the Endangered Species Act listing of the northern spotted owl in June 1990 
(Yaffee 1994) and its recognized similarities with the California spotted owl (Marcot and 
Thomas 1997; Verner et al. 1992).  
Changing Forest Conditions 
Records indicate that the Sierra Nevada Range was occupied by Native 
Americans for almost 10,000 years prior to Anglo settlement (Heizer and Elsasser 1980).  
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Various Indian tribes depended on the resources around them and gradually began to 
affect those resources in ways that aided their survival.  The most significant impact on 
the landscape resulted from the practice of burning, which altered the composition of 
plants, stimulated new growth, and maintained open, park-like conditions (McKelvey et 
al. 1996).  Intentional burning also reduced the risk of fire around Indian villages, 
encouraged the growth of plants for food and basket making, and increased deer browse 
(Anderson and Moratto 1996). In the region of what is now the Plumas National Forest, 
2000-3000 Mountain Maidu Indians established villages and seasonal camps and used 
fire in traditional ways described above (Young 2003). 
Anglo migration to the Sierras was limited until the discovery of gold in 1948. 
The Gold Rush that followed dramatically altered the region from what Native 
Americans had experienced in their 10,000-year occupation (Duane 1998).  Mining, 
logging, grazing, and trapping throughout the central and northern Sierras between 1865 
and 1890 led to severe degradation of forests and streams and triggered a strong outcry to 
protect the public domain (Beesley 1996).  In 1890 Congress established Sequoia, 
General Grant, and Yosemite national parks, thus staving off uncontrolled exploitation of 
resources within their boundaries (Beesley 1996).  In 1891 Congress established the 
national forest reserve system and designated three reserves in the northern, central, and 
southern Sierra Nevada range.  By the early 1900s, these and other forests became part of 
the national forest system.  By that time, however, timber companies had harvested most 
of the Sierras productive forestlands (Beesley 1996).  
Since the early 1900s, the forest environment in the Sierras has undergone 
dramatic change.  Mostly gradual and cumulative, changes in the forest environment fall 
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into three broad categories: 1) changes in forest structure and composition; 2) decline in 
species viability, most notably the California spotted owl; and 3) an increase in the 
severity of forest fires triggered by periodic and severe drought. These changes had a 
profound effect on disputants in the local timber wars, particularly as they came to a head 
in the summer of 1992. Changes in the forest environment and their relationship to the 
dispute are discussed in more detail below.   
Forest Structure and Composition 
Forest Service management of the national forests had two dominant impacts on 
forestlands in the Sierras.  First, in 1924 the agency adopted a policy calling for the total 
suppression of wildfires on lands under its jurisdiction (Beesley 1996).  The agency had 
been fighting fires on the national forests for a number of years prior to the policy, but 
had not made fire suppression a priority. Second, as population boomed following World 
War II, and as public demand for natural resources increased, the agency’s mission 
migrated from a primarily custodial relationship to the forests to one that favored 
intensive forest management (Hirt 1994). Along with the agency’s move toward intensive 
forest management, it also adopted a policy of clearcutting swaths of timberlands, which 
the agency argued was more efficient than other harvesting techniques (Ruth 1996). 
 Regarding fire suppression, McKelvey et al. (1996) found in field research 
throughout the Sierras that forest fire frequencies prior to Anglo settlement occurred at 
approximately 20-year intervals. Skinner and Chang (1996) report pre-settlement fire 
intervals in northern Sierra and southern Cascade forests at between eight and 18 years.  
Swetnam and Baisan (2003) have tied the frequency of fires occurring during pre-
settlement times to climatic processes such as El Niño events, which altered temperature 
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and moisture conditions associated with the forests. In addition, Moody et al. (2006), 
correlated significant pre-settlement fire years in the northern Sierras with drought 
conditions affecting the region. Fires also varied in their frequency and intensity 
depending upon elevation, topography, vegetation, soil conditions, and cultural practices 
(Skinner and Chang 1996).  Pre-settlement fires were predominantly low-intensity 
ground fires that damaged the trees’ cambium layer, and left a scar, but did not kill the 
tree itself. Pre-settlement fires were common enough, according to the authors, “to 
significantly affect forest structure and composition over much of the Sierra Nevada” 
(Skinner and Chang 1996, p. 1034). The frequency with which fires burned on a 
landscape scale produced canopy trees that averaged between 250 and 350 years old with 
a structure consisting of a patchwork of sizes and ages of trees confined to individuals or 
small groups (McKelvey et al. 1996; Skinner and Chang 1996).  
 Forest fire suppression was initiated by the Forest Service in the early 20th century 
and dramatically changed the fire regime of Sierra Nevada forests. In particular, fires 
were not only considerably less frequent but also burned far less acreage, especially at 
higher elevations. The dramatic effect caused by the reduction in the area burned by fire 
throughout the 20th century, combined with the effects of timber harvesting practices and 
climate change has led to substantial increases in the quantity of live and dead fuels in 
Sierra forests and, as important, to changes in the “arrangement” of live and dead fuels 
(McKelvey et al. 1996, p. 1035).  Moreover, fuel levels increased in parallel with the 
development of denser forests, which contained large concentrations of small and 
medium-size classes of shade tolerant and fire-sensitive tree species. The more dramatic 
impact of fire suppression, the authors’ contend, is a large increase in the amount of live 
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fuels near the forest floor that “provide a link between surface fuels and the upper 
canopy” (p. 1035). 
 One consequence of the agency’s fire suppression policy is the intensity of fires 
that do occur. According to McKelvey et al. (1996), forest fires in the Sierra Nevada 
occur less frequently and cover a smaller area than they did during pre-settlement times, 
however, because they contain substantially more fuels and fuel “ladders,” they are more 
likely to be severe and burn at intensities that are “detrimental to the integrity and 
sustainability of Sierran ecosystems” (p. 1037). Instead of ground fires that periodically 
reduce or remove live and dead fuels, modern fires decimate entire stands of trees, often 
scorching the soil surface and eliminating important microorganisms.   
McKelvey et al. (1996) argue that forest management practices throughout the 
20th century have served to accelerate these trends.  Logging practices on Sierra national 
forests, and elsewhere, have primarily resulted in the removal of large canopy trees, thus 
accelerating the growth and density of understory trees and decreasing the heterogeneity 
of the forest. Such practices, in combination with the tendency to abandon forest slash 
after a logging operation, has resulted in additional accumulation of fuels. Compared with 
pre-settlement conditions, trees making up Sierra Nevada forests are generally younger, 
denser, smaller, and more homogenous. They are also subject to increased disease and 
insect infestation during periods of stress.  
 A shift towards more intensive forest management occurred following World War 
II when demand for wood products from the national forests rose by more than 200%. 
According to Wilkinson and Anderson (1987), twice as much timber was harvested from 
the national forests in a 16-year period from 1950 to 1966 than in a 45-year period from 
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1905 to 1950.  More locally, foresters on the Eldorado National Forest, oversaw the 
harvest of a total of 148.9 million board feet of timber in the 38 years between 1902 and 
1940. By contrast, in a mere four year period between 1941 and 1945 the Eldorado 
produced a total of 175.4 million board feet (Beesley 1996). Logging in the Sierras 
increased steadily until about 1950, remained fairly constant until the recession of 1982, 
and then increased again to a historic peak in 1990 (McKelvey and Johnston 1992).  
 Management prescriptions employed in Sierran forests were unique to the region 
(McKelvey and Johnston 1992).  Interestingly, logging on Sierra forests prior to the 
1980s seldom employed clearcutting as a harvest method.  While a policy shift towards 
clearcutting began in the 1970s, the practice did not emerge as the dominant method of 
harvest until the mid-1980s. As such, rather than an interspersed patchwork of clear-cut 
and virgin old-growth forest stands that characterize Pacific Northwest forests, Sierra 
Nevada forest stands were primarily selectively logged and salvaged until 1990, thus 
removing the largest trees from the entire forest system while maintaining a younger and 
denser forest (Helms and Tappeiner 1996). In general, unlike Pacific Northwest forests, 
Sierran forests have “few or no stands remaining that can be described as natural or 
pristine” (McKelvey and Johnston 1992, p. 241). To varying degrees, the authors argue,  
…the forest system has been changed from one dominated by large, old, widely 
spaced trees to one characterized by dense, fairly even-aged stands in which most 
of the larger trees are 80-100 years old. This forest appears to be unstable. It is 
highly susceptible to drought-induced mortality, as competition for water weakens 
trees on drier sites. It is impacted by massive bark beetle infestations. And it is 
very flammable (p. 241).   
 
Alteration of the structure and composition of Sierran forests led to two 
significant policy changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s that altered the course of 
logging on Sierra Nevada forests. First, concerns for the protection of the California 
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spotted owl resulted in a two-thirds reduction in the volume of timber harvested, along 
with the protection of forest stands surrounding owl nesting sites.  Along with this 
reduction was the elimination of clearcutting as the preferred harvest method and a return 
to selective logging of individual trees and group selections. Second, growing public 
concern for the loss of old growth forests – for their recreational value and as critical 
habitat for the spotted owl – led to efforts to withdraw the remaining old growth 
forestlands from the federal timber base. By the early 1990s, only 8.2% of Sierra Nevada 
forests were considered high-quality “late successional including old growth” (LS/OG) 
remnants (Franklin and Fites-Kaufmann 1996).  Franklin and Fites-Kaufmann concluded 
in their analysis of Sierra Nevada forests that the current extent of high quality LS/OG 
forest ecosystems in the Sierra Nevada is “far below levels that existed prior to western 
settlement” (p. 651). They base their conclusion on descriptions contained in historic 
surveys of forest reserves, knowledge of fire regimes existing at the time, and conditions 
in national parks that were not logged. 
Species Decline 
 An additional change in the forest environment was the decline of species that 
depended on certain forest conditions for their survival. Primary among these species was 
the California spotted owl, a cousin of the northern spotted owl – listed as a federally 
threatened species in 1990 (Yaffee 1994).  While the California owl was not yet listed, its 
population trajectory and potential impact on logging was similar to the northern spotted 
owl and for many in the Sierras was an omen of things to come.  
The first studies of the status of the spotted owl were conducted in California in 
the early 1970s (Verner et al., 1992). Those studies located owls at only 159 locations 
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and in the late 1970s the Forest Service designated the California spotted owl as a 
"sensitive species" on national forests in California. Yet the agency did not begin 
extensive surveys of the owl’s status until 1981. When it did, the agency discovered two 
distinct populations in California based on diverse physiographic provinces with little 
overlap among the resident owl populations – the Sierra Nevada (the focus of this 
research) and the Southern California provinces (Verner et al. 1992). Studies at that time 
determined that the primary threat to the owl’s survival in the Sierra Nevada Province 
was the management of timber on seven national forests on the west side of the Sierra 
range and on private industrial timberlands. Subsequent studies of the owl’s status in 
between 1987 and 1991 revealed an estimated 1250 spotted owl sites (Verner et al. 1992), 
with approximately 92% of the sites on public forestlands. Spotted owl nesting pairs were 
confirmed at 697 of the sites however only 162 sites were on protected lands in either 
national parks or wilderness areas.  Researchers also found that 80% of the national forest 
sites were in industry-preferred mixed-conifer forests. The remaining sites were in red fir 
(10%), ponderosa pine/hardwood (7%), and foothills riparian/hardwood forests (3%) 
(Verner et al. 1992).  
In the late 1980s, the Forest Service established an interagency spotted owl 
Technical Assessment Team to more thoroughly assess the status of owls in the region 
and recommend an interim strategy for maintaining and restoring owl populations 
(Verner et al., 1992).  The assessment team was charged with finding answers to three 
fundamental questions informing a recommendation regarding future management 
options.  The questions were: Is the California spotted owl's population declining in all or 
part of its range? Is the owl a habitat specialist? If yes, then is the habitat upon which the 
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owl specializes declining? Studies by the assessment team to answer the first question 
produced mixed results, primarily because samples containing marked birds at the study 
sites were small. While data from field sites indicated a 3% annual rate decline during the 
short study period – 1988-1991 – the research team could only conclude that “we are 
uncertain about the true trend of this population” (Verner et al. 1992, p. 8). Moreover, the 
study team had no data regarding past trends in owl populations with which to compare 
their findings. Without such data, a study of such short duration and small sample size 
could only be considered inconclusive. Questions two and three would have to help fill in 
the blanks. If the owls were found to be habitat specialists and their habitat was in severe 
decline, scientists could reasonably predict population trends.  
 Studies to determine whether the California spotted owl is a habitat specialist 
were more conclusive (Verner et al., 1992).  The assessment team found that owls used 
forested habitats almost exclusively, although California spotted owls were found in a 
greater variety of habitats than the northern spotted owl. Within forested habitats, they 
found that 45 percent of all nests in the mixed-conifer forest zone were in stands with 
relatively large trees and closed canopies.  Similarly, studies indicated that owls foraged 
at locations with higher canopy closure, greater basal areas of both live trees and snags, 
and more dead and downed wood. In general, owls foraged in intermediate to old-aged 
stands, usually with greater than 40% canopy closure. 
In addition, field analysis of 276 nest sites provided fairly conclusive evidence 
that owls preferred very large, old trees, averaging about 96 feet in height and 45 inches 
dbh, and with approximately 75% canopy cover in the surrounding forest (Verner et al., 
1992). Cavity nests were found at 66% of the nest-sites indicating that most nest trees 
 
 178
were large, old and “decadent.”  Researchers found that many of the nesting cavities 
formed when decay invaded trees where branches were torn from the trunk. Large 
cavities were required to accommodate the nest, the female owl, and two nestlings. 
Hence, very large trees were needed to produce the cavities. “Not only were the 
diameters of nest trees significantly larger than the average tree in today's conifer forest,” 
the assessment team reported, “but also they exceeded the mean diameter of trees in plots 
sampled in the Sierra Nevada at the turn of this century. The owls are apparently nesting 
today in a legacy of very large, old trees that were present in 1900 and before” (p. 9). The 
assessment team concluded that California spotted owls are indeed habitat specialists.   
The assessment team was also charged with determining whether there was a 
significant decline in the amount of habitat used by the owl (Verner et al., 1992). In their 
analysis, the assessment team observed that Sierra Nevada forests have been “markedly 
impacted” by human intervention, especially during the past 150 years (p. 10). Consistent 
with other studies, sheep grazing, extensive logging, and fire suppression were the 
principal human activities leading to changes in forest conditions beginning in the early 
part of the 20th century and becoming “increasingly effective and aggressive” since that 
time (p. 10). Specifically, a combination of logging large trees and attrition of the oldest 
trees amounted to a marked decline in the number of suitable nesting trees.  Meanwhile, 
the buildup of surface fuels and the extensive increase in shade-tolerant trees resulted in 
extensive vertical fuel ladders that connect surface fuels to the crowns of dominant forest 
trees, causing additional risks to old trees. “We expect the net result to be a much higher 
incidence of stand-destroying fires in the future than was characteristic of the Sierran fire 
regime prior to this century,” predicted the assessment team. “And with those fires we 
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will continue to lose remnant, individual old trees, stands of old trees, and other old-
growth attributes” (p. 10).  
The assessment team (Verner et al., 1992) also reviewed timber harvest targets 
and harvesting techniques in national forest plans (LMPs) and predicted that 
implementation of the plans would decimate the remaining unprotected old growth 
forests and alter the structure and ecology of the remaining forests. “Given these 
projections,” the team concluded, “it seems most likely that the forest to be generated by 
adherence to current LMPs will be susceptible to fire disturbance, nearly devoid of large, 
old trees, and depauperate in terms both of plant and animal species that depend on 
attributes of the older forests that were common last century” (p. 10). The assessment 
team concluded that the owl’s preferred habitat was in steep decline.  
Rather than call for larger reserves, the assessment team recommended that the 
Forest Service alter its forest management practices (Verner et al., 1992). Because the 
remaining owl nesting sites were still “widely and fairly evenly dispersed” throughout the 
conifer forests of western Sierra Nevada, the team believed that improved management 
practices, rather than reserves, offered the best hope for at least an interim solution (p. 
19).  “The desired objective,” in the team’s estimation, “would be to determine how to 
maintain spotted owls throughout Sierran conifer forests in a manner compatible with 
some sustainable level of timber production” (p. 20). The team concluded its analysis 
with three primary objectives for altering the agency’s forest management practices. 
First, they recommended protecting known owl nest sites and main roost stands from 
significant degradation. Second, they recommended protecting very large, old trees 
throughout Sierra Nevada conifer forests. Third, they called for the reduction in fuel 
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loads. The team also recommended an interim management period of five years while 
scientists more thoroughly assessed the status of the spotted owl in the Sierras. 
Drought and Fire 
 
 Severe drought conditions hit Sierra Nevada forests in the mid-1980s and lasted 
for approximately six years. The primary effect of the drought on the forests was to 
weaken trees that were then vulnerable to insect attack.  Drought conditions also lowered 
the moisture content and slowed the decomposition of forest biomass, resulting in a 
larger, drier, and more combustible fuel load.  The drought of 1986-92 was being 
monitored by a number of agencies in California and Nevada. However, because of its 
severity, and its visual impact, the drought played out in real time in the media, and in 
rather dramatic fashion. Media attention appears to have elevated the fear of catastrophic 
wildfire that, while present, was severely exacerbated by the drought.  
Newspaper coverage of the drought was carried by the Sacramento Bee in 
February 1989 when the Bee reported that tree mortality on the Eldorado National Forest 
was so higher that, for the first time, the Forest Service was offering more dead or insect-
infested “salvage” trees for sale than live trees. The Bee reported that, “two consecutive 
years of drought have brought to the forest the worst insect kill in years, and the situation 
is expected to worsen” (59). The Eldorado National Forest salvage operation was thought 
to be the most aggressive in the state at that time, offering to sell a record 90 million 
board feet of dead timber as compared to 77 million board feet of live trees.  The Los 
Angeles Times picked up the story in July 1989, reporting the “loss of more than a million 
trees – the state's worst die-off in more than a decade.” The dead trees, the Times 
reported, “represent enough lumber to build 300,000 new houses and more are being 
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discovered every day...” The toll of dead trees for 1989 was expected to top 4 billion 
board feet and would continue mounting in subsequent years (64).  In dramatic fashion, 
the paper reported that the lack of water itself was not killing the trees. The trees were 
only weakened by lack of water, “then finished off by an opportunistic epidemic of 
burrowing, mating bark beetles that foresters are powerless to stop.” 
The Times raised the issue of increased fire risk but buried it beneath a greater 
concern for the loss of production. “Forestry officials are mainly concerned however, that 
all the dry, rotting wood will be fuel for wildfires and that it represents a waste of usable 
timber” (64). As the drought worsened, however, concerns shifted from salvage timber to 
the fear of wildfire. The Sacramento Bee carried the story again in May 1992, now in the 
sixth year of the drought. (5-10-92). In a provocative article titled “Drought Sets Stage 
for Disastrous Fires,” the Bee reported that, “As the 1992 fire season fast approaches, 
officials at the cooperative of federal, state and local fire-fighting agencies looking over 
their 14-million-acre domain and don't like what they see.” “It's like a piece of dynamite 
ready to be matched,” Claude Marsh, operations coordinator for the Sierra Front Wildfire 
Cooperators told the Bee.  
In late August 1992, the Bee (8-25-92) reported an “unpredictable and ravenous” 
fire on the Shasta National Forest. Shasta County’s Fountain fire, the Bee reported, 
“leaped past containment lines early Monday, consuming rare northern spotted owl 
habitat and sending residents scurrying from subdivisions once thought to be safe.”  After 
five days, the fire zone was established at 64,000 acres confirming the Fountain fire as 
one of the 10 largest fires ever to strike California.  Moreover, because of the unusual 
conditions, the fire was not behaving as predicted, according to a California Department 
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of Forestry spokesperson. “We thought we'd have a better handle on it by this time. 
Mother Nature is not going our way, with the winds and the six-year drought.”  The most 
devastating fire of the season, the Fountain fire also consumed pristine wildlife habitat.  
“In just one 1,000-acre fraction of the burn area,” the Bee reported, “biologists know of 
the destruction of one nest of the endangered northern spotted owl, two osprey nests, one 
goshawk nest and an important elk calving area.” The Bee also reported a suspected 
incidence of arson on the forest and throughout the state since the “statewide fire siege” 
began two weeks earlier.  
 As the 1992 fire season was ending, a final devastating fire ignited, this time in 
the northern Sierras. The Bee (10-1-92), with increasingly dramatic affect, reported a 
“ravenous fire” rampaging through the Eldorado National Forest, consuming more than 
18,000 acres of timber, destroying structures and “awing veteran firefighters with its 
ferocity.”  The Cleveland fire, the third major fire to hit northern California since August, 
burned both sides of Highway 50 on the western slope of the Sierra, closing the highway 
to Lake Tahoe.  About 2,300 firefighters were at the scene of the fire, which incident 
commander Ron Dougherty described to a Bee reporter as “roaring through the area like 
an atomic bomb.” The Bee described the advance of the fire as “a starving man set loose 
on a banquet.”  The fire, it reported, “sent plumes of flame thousands of feet into the air, 
while huge embers floated several feet above the charred ground, held aloft by the heat.” 
Winds up to 30 mph, it stated, “set the blaze on a wickedly whimsical path that dodged 
firebreaks and hop-scotched over rivers and streams.” 
 The Washington Post carried the story of the worsening drought and the 
devastating effects of the Cleveland fire under the headline “Forest Fires Rage in Sierra 
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Nevada…” (October 2, 1992).  Focused primarily on Lake Tahoe, the Post reported that 
“six consecutive years of drought have dried up man-made reservoirs and natural trout 
streams, wiped out at least 90 percent of wildfowl nesting areas, devastated two national 
forests and killed deer and wild horses.” Nevada’s state climatologist told the Post, "It's 
so dry in the forests it's like walking on corn flakes.” And a spokesperson for the Forest 
Service confirmed to the Post that half of the trees in the Tahoe National Forest were 
declared dead or dying. 
In late October, the Bee ran a story (10-25-92) under the headline “Drought Made 
Summer’s Fires Fiercer, Officials Say.” At $20 million, the Bee reported, the Fountain 
fire was more costly than any fire in the history of California’s Department of Forestry 
and Fire Protection.  The Bee also expressed concerns raised by forestry officials that 
drought-induced fires marked a new era in fire management. “The fury of the Fountain 
fire, as well as two other large blazes in Northern California, has veterans worried,” the 
Bee reported. “They fear that the hotter, faster-burning blazes that marked this year's fire 
season will become more common if the state's drought continues.” 
“This is the most incredible burning situation many of us have ever seen,” a state 
forestry official said of the Fountain fire (10-25-92).  The fire, the Bee reported, “spit out 
flaming chunks of debris that landed a half-mile away. And it spawned fire tornados that 
twisted pine trees 2 feet in diameter and broke them into pieces.”  Fire captain Mike 
Witesman told the Bee that the Fountain fire even generated its own weather system and 
gusting winds generated by the fire made it difficult for fire fighters to stand in some 
places. Smoke columns, stated the Bee, “shot so high into the atmosphere that they hit 
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cooler air and formed a large icecap in the sky. A forester stationed at a lookout even 
spotted lightning strikes created by the fire.”   
Six years of drought were blamed for conditions that gradually turned northern 
California forests into what one forester called “giant fireplaces.” The Forest Service 
reported 4,570 fires on national forestlands in California in 1992, compared to a five-year 
annual average of 2,000 fires. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection 
(CDF) reported 7,567 fires on all California forestlands in 1992, compared to a five-year 
annual average of 6,457 fires. The rash of fires in 1992 was blamed in part on arsonists 
affiliated with the logging community. Although it was seldom discussed or pursued 
criminally, it was generally accepted that out-of-work loggers occasionally started fires to 
create temporary work on salvage projects. CDF determined that 1100 of the 1992 fires 
were arson-caused, as compared to 280 the previous year (Weiss 1993). While the 
number of acres consumed by the 1992 fires did not increase, their intensity and their 
danger to life and property did. “What is unusual is they are reaching these huge 
proportional sizes so much faster,” a forestry official told the Bee (10-25-92). “They just 
completely outdistance the initial attack and become so large, so fast, that we're 
overwhelmed within hours.”  
Changes in the Forest Service 
According to Kent Connaughton, Ph.D., Deputy Regional Forester for the U.S. 
Forest Service Region 5, to understand Forest Service changes, and many of the agency’s 
current issues, one must begin with Samuel Hays’ book Conservation and the Gospel of 
Efficiency (1999).  Hays studied the conservation movement in the U.S. during the 
Progressive Era of the late 1800s and early 1900s and explored the establishment and 
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evolution of federal resource management institutions and policies. Connaughton (pers. 
comm., 5-21-99) contends that the relics of the Progressive Era are alive and well in the 
Forest Service and other federal resource management agencies: 
It is a good place for you to start in putting in context why it is that you have 
some of the conflicts that you’ve got today.  Because it is a difficult thing for an 
organization like this, born in that kind of a background, thinking that it has the 
answers or is at least expected to have the answers.  And you get into the messy 
environment of empowerment and inclusiveness and all this other stuff in which 
no one is declared to have the final answer.  You have a piece of it but you don’t 
have the whole thing.  And therein lies the real rub with our own traditions.  And 
if traditions define what your cultural identity is, then you potentially have a 
cultural reformation on your hands or a revolution in existence internally. 
 
The Progressive Era, according to Hays (1959/1999), was a broad-based 
movement advocating the centralization of governmental authority and control, with the 
reliance on expertise, specialization, and efficiency as guiding principles.  Governmental 
authority and control, Hays contends, evolved into, “a more elaborate process of 
measurement and prediction, reliance on experts who could develop and manipulate 
information, and techniques for shaping the course of events to reach predictable 
outcomes” (p. xi).  To maximize efficiency, Progressive Era institutions shifted the 
location of decision-making “away from the grass roots, the smallest contexts of life, to 
the larger networks of human interaction,” including centralized government agencies 
and large corporations (p. x).   
Federal natural resource institutions and policies were deeply influenced by 
Progressive Era thinking.  The early conservation movement was led primarily by 
Progressive Era “technicians” who promoted the rational and orderly use of natural 
resources and who, above all, focused on efficiency, planning, and “the application of 
expertise to broad national problems” (Hays 1959/1999 p. xii).  The conservation 
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movement was primarily a science-based movement, in part a reaction to abuses of 
political and industrial power obvious on the public domain at the time.  Conservation 
leaders emerged from the applied sciences and cultivated professional networks with 
fellow practitioners. “Loyalty to these professional ideals, not close association with the 
grass-roots public, set the tone of the Theodore Roosevelt conservation movement” (Hays 
1959/1999 p. 2).   
Fundamental questions of who should decide the course of natural resource 
development were the topic of considerable professional discourse within these networks.  
Since natural resource matters were basically technical in nature, Progressives thought 
that technicians, rather than legislators, should deal with them.  Gifford Pinchot, a 
German-trained forester and the first Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, was the 
embodiment of Progressive Era thinking in natural resource management and is credited 
with helping Roosevelt turn his conservation ethic into federal policy.  A private forester 
at the time, Pinchot was appointed chief of the Division of Forestry in 1898 and assumed 
the role of chief of the newly created Bureau of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture 
in 1900.  Pinchot emerged at a time of massive abuses of the public domain by an 
unconstrained timber industry.  According to Hays (1959/1999),  
Low prices for forest land and the meager amount of capital required encouraged 
many enterprising Americans to enter the field.  The industry was highly mobile; 
lumbermen rapidly cut and abandoned lands, and moved on to new areas.  Few 
cut more than the most valuable trees; they left second-grade timber as waste.  
Lumbermen showed little concern for fire and disease damage, the destruction of 
trees during logging, or provisions for adequate reproduction (p. 27). 
 
In response, by the late 1800s forestry professionals began to demand that the 
federal government implement an orderly program of “scientific management” of the 
public domain, which Nelson (2000) describes as a Progressive theory about “the 
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capabilities of not only scientific knowledge to transform the physical world but also the 
political institutions by which this knowledge would be put to use” (p. 59).  Pinchot 
assumed leadership of the movement and began to promote the concept of sustained yield 
management, a principle tying timber production to annual growth rates, reducing waste 
from timber harvests, and controlling forest fires.  Pinchot was a strong advocate of using 
public forestlands to promote economic development, and argued that scientific 
management of the forests was the key to their productive use. 
One of Pinchot’s most significant battles was over the disposition of the public 
domain itself.  Until the 1880s, the Interior Department’s General Land Office 
maintained a policy of divesting the public domain.  Due in part to Pinchot’s persistence, 
in 1891 Congress passed the General Land Law Revision Act, which reversed the federal 
government’s divestment policy and allowed for the retention of the public domain.  The 
Act, however, renewed the controversy over who would manage the domain and how it 
would be managed.  Many of the Act’s proponents, especially in the Department of 
Interior, sought to curtail commercial use of the lands and advocated retention of the 
lands for parks and nature preserves.  Others, including Pinchot, sought to develop “a 
trained forestry force” to aggressively manage the forest reserves, suppress forest fires, 
control disease, and supervise the harvest and sale of timber, as well as maintain the 
integrity of the forests (Hays 1959/1999 p. 36). 
Wary of continued abuses by the timber industry, Congress opposed Pinchot’s 
pressure and restricted commercial use of the lands.  Undeterred, Progressive Era 
advocates persisted in promoting the Forest Management Act of 1897 (the Organic Act), 
which granted the Secretary of Interior powers “to regulate the occupancy and use” of the 
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forest reserves and paved the way for federal officials to open the lands to commercial 
use. A problem still remained, however.  The reserves were still under the jurisdiction of 
the Interior Department’s General Land Office and were being managed by a staff of 
attorneys, a culture that at the time favored political appointments and personal 
favoritism. Pinchot’s answer was to transfer the lands to the Bureau of Forestry in the 
Department of Agriculture.  Pinchot again persisted and in 1905 Congress transferred the 
reserves to the Bureau.  At the same time, Roosevelt began to expand the reserve system, 
from 41 reserves and 46.4 million acres when he took office to 159 national forests and 
150.8 million acres by 1907 (Hays 1959/1999). Pinchot prevailed “through sheer force of 
personality and conviction,” Hays contends, and influenced Progressive Era natural 
resource management in all aspects of federal natural resource policy (p. 30). Adds Hirt 
(1994 p. 31): “The basic institutional structure and guiding principles of federal forest 
management laid down by Pinchot have carried on to the present.”  
Eras of National Forest Management 
From the early days of the Forest Service until the beginning of World War II, the 
agency managed the national forests according to a “custodial” model of resource 
management (Hirt 1994; 2000; Kessler and Salwasser 1995). Pursuant to the model, the 
national forests were managed as much for the watershed values they provided as for the 
timber that could be harvested. Hirt (1994) contends that the push to establish the 
national forest reserves in the late 1800s was the result of a strong movement by a wide 
variety of interests to set aside portions of the federal government’s extensive land 
holdings as “forest reservations” (p. 29). The Organic Act of 1897 identified the purpose 
of the forest reserves, “to protect the forests from fires and depredations, to secure 
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favorable water flow conditions, and to provide a continuous supply of timber.” As 
mentioned, the Act also allowed the federal government to regulate the “occupancy and 
use” of the reserves, which served as the legal foundation for the agency to set grazing 
fees, provide campgrounds and summer home sites, and establish regulations (Hirt 1994 
p. 30). This clause, Hirt contends, translated into the agency’s early philosophy of 
sustained yield, “a philosophy of conservative use that would allow sustained production 
of timber yet leave the forest unimpaired” (p. 31).  
The custodial era was also marked by the introduction of the concept of 
conservation. Pinchot claimed to have coined the word, intending to make a distinction 
between conserving natural resources and preserving them (Hirt 1994). To Progressives, 
conservation was “the utilitarian maintenance of nature’s ability to produce goods and 
services rather than the preservation of nature per se” (p. 32).  For Pinchot, it meant “the 
greatest good to the greatest number for the longest time” (p. 32).  In his first State of the 
Union address, Theodore Roosevelt introduced conservation as a new administrative 
policy. “Forest protection,” Roosevelt stated, “is not an end of itself; it is a means to 
increase and sustain the resources of our country and the industries that depend on them.” 
In response to an unconstrained timber industry, Roosevelt added; “The preservation of 
our forests is an imperative business necessity… Whatever destroys the forest threatens 
our wellbeing” (p. 32).  
The custodial era was gradually replaced by the era of intensive scientific 
management that led up to and followed World War II (Hirt 1994; 2000; Kessler and 
Salwasser 1995). Demand for the production of timber to support the war effort and to 
serve the housing needs of a post-war population boom placed increased pressure on the 
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Forest Service to greatly expand timber production on the national forests. The post-war 
boom also brought unprecedented economic prosperity to the American people and with 
it an insatiable demand not only for wood products but for outdoor recreation. The Forest 
Service welcomed the increase in demand but was initially overwhelmed by what was 
expected. Rather than retreat to its custodial role, however, the agency “enthusiastically 
sought to increase supply through intensive management” (Hirt 1994, p. 44). 
Timber sales on the national forests increased by 238% between 1939 and 1945.  
However, it was not long before problems developed, both internally and externally. 
While interpretations of sustained yield were evolving towards a production model, the 
agency itself began to recognize that the wartime level of timber production was both 
unsustainable and incompatible with other resource values. Each year during World War 
II, for example, Forest Service chiefs cautioned Congress that logging on both national 
and private forestlands was not only unsustainable but destructive. The agency claimed 
that the timber industry was liquidating old growth forests on its own lands with little 
regard for erosion or reforestation. Unfortunately, the same thing was happening on the 
national forests. The agency, however, was powerless to control it. By the end of the war, 
Chief Lyle Watts estimated that wartime timber production on the national forests had 
exceeded their annual growth rate by 50 percent (Hirt 1994).  
Recovering from this destructive period was critical. The post-war housing boom, 
however, created additional pressures on the Forest Service to harvest even more timber. 
In 1946, the Forest Service identified lumber supply as “perhaps the number one 
bottleneck” in preventing the housing boom from achieving its full potential and 
recommended that the agency intensify its efforts (Hirt 1994, p. 50).  That year, timber 
 
 191
production from the national forests was 2.7 billion board feet. By 1955, timber 
production had risen to 6.3 billion board feet and by 1960 it reached 9.4 billion board 
feet. The bulk of production occurred in eleven western states but most notably in the 
Pacific Northwest and the Northern Rockies. These regions also witnessed an 
“astonishing proliferation” of outdoor recreation resulting from increased expendable 
income, more leisure time, and greater mobility (Hirt 1994, p. 52). In 1945, the Forest 
Service reported that the national forests received approximately 10 million recreational 
visitors. By 1960, the number of visitors had risen to 92.5 million, a 900 percent increase 
during a period in which the U.S. population grew by 35 percent. 
During the custodial era of forest management, the agency’s lack of procedures 
for resolving conflict was not a major concern (Ruth 2000).  By the mid-1950s, however, 
increased demand for both timber and recreation set the stage for a series of increasingly 
acrimonious conflicts. The agency’s inability to effectively respond to those conflicts in 
many ways defined the era of intensive forest management. The first significant conflict 
occurred over wilderness designation. By 1958, 14 million acres of national forestland – 
roughly 7% – had been informally designated as wilderness, wild or primitive by the 
Forest Service.  These lands were primarily forests with limited commercial value or 
were rock and ice. According to Hirt (1994), the areas were established by the agency in 
the 1920s and 1930s in response to influential resource managers who recognized their 
wild character.  The Forest Service as a whole supported and even defended wilderness 
preservation. However, as Ruth (1996, p. 149) observed, “many conservationists did not 
believe that the agency valued wilderness enough to ensure that existing primitive area 
designations would survive the timber industry’s preference for increased timber harvest 
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levels in national forest lands.” The agency also appeared satisfied with the wilderness it 
had informally set aside and was not interested in additions to its portfolio.  
Wilderness advocates had another vision. They recognized significant non-timber 
values in commercially valuable timber stands in the form of ancient trees and old growth 
forests, and believed the agency had a responsibility to set aside a portion of those 
forests. Old growth forests thus came to define the battleground over federal legislation to 
protect additional wilderness areas.  The wilderness debate carried on for eight years, 
while timber harvesting on the national forests increased at a rapid pace. Timber 
advocates were able to stave off a growing segment of society that viewed the national 
forests as more than a source of lumber. However, a surge in the environmental 
movement in the early 1960s along with a change in guard from the Eisenhower to 
Kennedy administrations tipped the balance of power in the debate (Hirt 1994; 2000). 
The Wilderness Act passed in 1964.  
 As non-timber values on the national forests gained public importance, a parallel 
conflict ensued as groups representing those values vied for attention. Hirt (1994) 
contends that this made “public relations difficult for the Forest Service.” “Increasingly,” 
Hirt noted, “each constituent user group hammered the agency for failing to provide for 
their needs, and attempted to redefine the agency’s policy rhetoric to their own 
advantage” (p. 171). At the heart of this conflict was the definition of multiple-use 
management, which the agency defined, more or less, according to timber industry 
sensibilities. From the industry’s perspective, multiple use referred to a hierarchy of uses 
with timber being dominant. From environmentalists’ perspective, multiple use implied 
equal consideration among all uses including water, wood, wildlife, wilderness, forage 
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and recreation. Not wishing to lose control of the debate to either side, the Forest Service 
positioned itself in the middle, characterizing the extremes as special interests advocating 
either “overuse” or “single use” of the national forests.  
In the mid-1950s, interest groups turned to Congress to formally define multiple 
use management. Over the next few years the debate continued, with definitions 
predictably skewed towards either timber production or resource protection. The Forest 
Service continued to define its role as arbiter of the public good, but avoided legislation. 
The agency, Hirt (1994) contends, “sought with its definition of multiple use to maintain 
the status quo that allowed it wide discretion, while commodity interests sought to firmly 
establish their priorities and noncommodity interests sought to alter the priorities” (p. 
181). Eventually, however, the agency acquiesced to a legislative definition and proposed 
an administrative bill incorporating its own language. With the Forest Service on board, 
The Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act (MUSY) was passed in 1960.  
In the end, MUSY was vague enough that it provided the agency with the 
discretion it desired (Ruth 1996). Even as the Kennedy administration assumed power, 
the Forest Service was unable to reconcile timber production with other multiple use 
requirements. First, Congress still considered the Forest Service timber management 
program to be its primary purpose. As such, congressional appropriations 
overwhelmingly supported a robust timber program (Ruth 2000). Second, leadership 
choices made at the beginning of the Kennedy administration led to the appointment of a 
decidedly production-oriented Forest Service Chief – Edward Cliff. Cliff’s appointment 
“symbolized loyalty to the old status quo and initiated a period of unprecedented hostility 
between the Forest Service and environmentalists” (p. 221). By the end of the 1960s, 
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little had changed in how the national forests were managed, other than the designation of 
new wilderness areas that were off limits to logging.  
The decade of the 1970s marked a major period of controversy over forest 
management (Hirt 1994). The period began with enactment of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(ESA), and was highlighted by the enactment of the National Forest Management Act of 
1976 (NFMA). While NEPA was intended to ensure that environmental factors be 
considered in federal decision-making processes, and the ESA was intended to identify 
and protect federally threatened and endangered species, NFMA required the Forest 
Service to develop long-range plans for individual national forests. The importance of 
NEPA to this period was its requirement for public involvement. Specifically, NEPA’s 
public information and disclosure provisions provided citizens with opportunities to 
challenge agency decisions through political and administrative processes and the courts. 
Similarly, the ESA allowed citizens to petition the federal government and the courts to 
list threatened and endangered species and to force their protection (Ruth 1996).   
NFMA called for comprehensive planning that attempted to reconcile public 
demands for resource protection, including maintaining the viability of native vertebrates, 
with timber production and resource development (Ruth 1996).  NFMA was also 
intended to “reinvigorate the idea of multiple use” by employing planning as a 
mechanism for resolving conflicts (Ruth 2000, p. 222). The public involvement 
component of the planning process was expected to “reorient” decision-making from a 
process based primarily on expertise to a process “resembling a political dialogue 
between the administrator and the public” (p.223). Instead, the planning process provided 
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the agency with an opportunity to showcase and then defend intensive management on 
individual national forests. To wit, the forest plans “uniformly adopted unjustifiably 
optimistic assumptions to support high timber harvest targets” (Hirt 1994, p. 265).  
The controversy intensified during the 1980s, a period in which both Congress 
and the Reagan administration pressured the agency to continue to set unrealistic timber 
targets. This was especially true of the Reagan administration, which strongly favored 
aggressive commodity-based programs and viewed the national forests primarily as 
timber plantations, including the widespread use of clearcutting (Hirt 1994). However 
pressure from above only served to affirm what many foresters had been practicing, and 
were rewarded for, since the postwar housing boom. What Congress had envisioned as a 
“bottom-up process, emphasizing capabilities of the land and desires of the people,” 
became instead a top-down process influenced by political appointees and congressional 
appropriations committees (Kessler and Salwasser 1995, p. 173). This perception was 
eventually confirmed by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA 1992) in a report 
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the NFMA planning process. Published in 
February 1992, the report concluded that, 1) forest plans emphasized commodity 
production over non-commodity values; 2) monitoring and evaluation of management 
actions was inadequate to assess long term impacts; 3) budgetary decisions continually 
overrode planning and management decisions; and 4) targets imposed at the national 
level continually negated local management decisions.  
As Ruth (1996) confirmed, “much of the opposition to the [forest plans] has been 
due to the inability of the agency to satisfy the ecological protection provisions of federal 
law and policy” (p. 160). This was no more apparent than with threatened and 
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endangered species, which finally forced the agency to confront the ecological realities of 
its policies (Hirt 1994; Yaffee 1994). Several species, it was discovered in the 1970s and 
1980s, were highly dependent on forest conditions that were prized by the timber 
industry. First to be recognized for their declining status were the northern spotted owl, 
grizzly bear, and several native salmon populations. As awareness of the species’ 
biological requirements grew, it became evident to most observers that changes were 
coming. The wakeup call for the Forest Service came with the proposed ESA listing of 
the northern spotted owl by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 1989, and the formal 
listing of the species in 1990 (Marcot and Thomas 1997; Yaffee 1994).  
As threatened and endangered species issues became more ominous, they 
eventually began to affect timber targets contained in the forest plans. Precipitous 
declines in timber sales appeared inevitable if the species was to be protected. “Amidst 
the swelling controversy,” Hirt (1994) concluded, “ground level managers of the national 
forests came to a growing sense by the end of the decade of the 1980s that their 
capabilities and the ecological capabilities of the national forests were overstretched” (p. 
278). Former Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas (1998 p. 18) described the 
agency’s grudging acknowledgment of the need to change:  
Between private lands and public lands, the world that was once covered with a 
sea of green was now pocked with clearcuts and crisscrossed by roads. But we 
still continued until we were face to face with a segment of the public that had a 
differing view of what their national forests should be. 
   
Battle over Administrative Appeals 
That segment of the public had been armed since the mid-1930s with the power to 
appeal administrative decisions (Vaughn and Cortner 2005, p. 46). In 1936, Forest 
Service appeal procedures were officially codified in the Federal Register, stating that:   
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An appeal may be taken from any administrative action or decision by filing with 
the officer who rendered the decision a written request for reconsideration thereof 
or notice of appeal. Decisions of forest officers shall be final unless appeal is 
taken therefrom within a reasonable time. The decision appealed shall be 
reviewed by the immediate superior of the officer by whom the decision was 
rendered; that is, in the following order: Supervisor, Regional Forester, Chief of 
the Forest Service, Secretary of Agriculture. 
 
Up until the passage of NEPA and NFMA in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
however, Forest Service appeals were filed primarily by parties holding permits with the 
agency or having other business deals. NEPA and NFMA expanded opportunities for 
public participation in agency decision-making and opened the door to increased appeals 
of agency actions. NFMA, in particular, established a legal and regulatory framework for 
public involvement in forest planning. According to an Office of Technology Assessment 
(1992) report evaluating the forest planning process, this framework was “designed to 
encourage public involvement in three general stages…: 1) in plan development, review, 
and implementation; 2) through requests for administrative review of plans and decisions; 
and 3) through judicial review” (p. 77). In addition, NFMA instructs the agency to 
coordinate its planning process with those of other Federal agencies and State, tribal, and 
local governments. “Taken together,” OTA reports, “these channels for public 
participation are intended to expand and elevate the public’s historic role in Forest 
Service decisionmaking and to assure that public values, needs, and desires are reflected 
in forest plans” (p. 77). At Senate Committee hearings on the planning process in 1989, 
however, Senators Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and James McClure (R-ID) concluded that the 
planning process had ‘‘broken down.” The problem, according to OTA researchers, “is 
commonly attributed to Forest Service failure to involve the public effectively in forest 
planning” (p.77).  
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One significant avenue for public involvement, mentioned above, is the right of 
citizens to appeal agency plans and decisions through administrative review. The 
increased number of administrative appeals filed post-NFMA, and their technical nature, 
however, placed new burdens on the agency. In response, in 1977 the Forest Service 
recommended placing restrictions on the appeals process that limited appeals to those 
who had previously participated in the planning process. The agency was deterred from 
imposing limits on the appeals process by the Committee of Scientists established under 
NFMA, which supported greater public access to agency decisions. The agency, 
however, resisted the Committee’s recommendations and instead offered planning rules 
that limited appeals to those who had established “standing” via previous involvement. 
This change, which would be dropped and added over the next 15 years, had the effect of 
increasing the number of public comments filed during the planning process to assure 
that legal standing was secure (Vaughn and Cortner 2005). 
In response to the agency’s actions, in 1978 President Carter issued Executive 
Order 12044, which required federal agencies to develop procedures allowing public 
comment on all new rules and regulations as they were developed. Carter also directed 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to report on agency regulatory activities 
and progress in implementing the Order. In 1980, however, the Reagan administration 
immediately revoked Carter’s EO and replaced it with Executive Order 12291, which 
granted a 60-day moratorium on new administrative rules and established the Presidential 
Task Force on Regulatory Relief to review, and essentially delay, any new rules that ran 
counter to Reagan’s views. In 1983, the agency finally released a new set of rules 
governing administrative appeals. Although the requirement for prior standing was 
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dropped, the rule changes this time codified an appeal process that was much more 
adversarial and that required more formal procedures (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).  
The Reagan administration witnessed a proliferation in both numbers and 
activities of mainstream and grassroots environmental organizations that were eager to 
challenge its interpretation of environmental policy and law. The number of Forest 
Service administrative appeals rose from 581 in 1983 to 1609 in 1988. In 1989 they 
dropped slightly to 1291. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) study of the appeals 
suggested that the jump during this period coincided with the release of many of the early 
forest plans (Vaughn and Cortner 2005). The trend also coincides with the rise in timber 
harvest levels on many national forests, including the Plumas and Lassen forests in the 
northern Sierras (USDA 2003).  
As the number of appeals increased, the Forest Service became increasingly 
frustrated with the perceived delays they were causing. Forest Service managers were 
concerned that while the appeals were designed to be a tool to resolve disputes, they were 
being used by environmentalists to delay or postpone what they considered worthy 
projects (Coulombe 2004). In 1989, the agency made further revisions to the appeal 
process that put into place efficiency measures that created three separate avenues for 
appeal – occupancy and use permits such as grazing allotments; projects proposed 
pursuant to forest plans; and the forest plans themselves. Removed were provisions 
allowing appellants to make oral presentations, and restrictions were placed on requests 
for a “stay of decision” while appeals were reviewed. Finally, timeframes were placed on 
the submission and review of different types of appeals (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).  
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 Shortly after the new rules were finalized, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
released a report on the appeal of timber sales in response to a Senate request. The GAO 
examined the appeals filed between 1983 and 1988 and concluded that the agency’s 
justification for revising the rules was unsubstantiated, stating that, “the increases in 
appeals processing times and in the backlog of unresolved appeals do not appear to be 
due to problems with the appeals system itself. Rather, they most often occurred because 
the Forest Service has experienced difficulties in resolving complex environmental issues 
raised in the increasing number of timber sale and forest plan appeals.” The report also 
noted that the new rules “do not directly address the difficulties that the Forest Service 
has experienced in resolving environmental issues raised by appeals – the factor that is 
principally responsible for these time overruns” (GAO report quoted in Vaughn and 
Cortner 2005, p. 53).  
In spite of the GAO findings to the contrary, Vaughn and Cortner (2005) observed 
that, “the 1989 GAO report was the first of many that would be requested by members of 
Congress…, all intended to find justification to further limit the administrative appeals 
process” (p. 53). Congress made several attempts to amend NFMA over the next three 
years to address the common perception that administrative appeals were delaying forest 
plans. Each attempt came closer to codifying two key changes. First was the provision 
requiring appellants to demonstrate standing through prior involvement in the planning 
process. Second was a provision that automatically denied an appeal if the Forest Service 
failed to make a decision within the prescribed time period.  
 In the early 1990s, both Congress and the Forest Service, with support from the 
timber industry, continued to push for changes to the appeals process. While less vocal, 
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environmentalists were also dissatisfied with the process and argued that they were not 
being given sufficient opportunity to participate, that line offers were positioned against 
them, that appeal decisions were unresponsive to their claims, and that time frames were 
constrained. In February 1991, the agency again revised its procedures, this time 
requiring it to publicize proposals in newspapers easily accessible to the publics most 
affected by a decision. This minor change had the affect of increasing the number of 
appeals and other comments that the agency could receive and gave the appearance of 
greater transparency.  Somewhat cynically, it also “helped to establish a paper trail that 
could be used to document Forest Service attempts to enhance public participation” 
(Vaughn and Cortner 2005, p. 55).  
Later that year, timber advocates in Congress introduced federal legislation to 
address the issue. Senators Robert Packwood (R-OR) and Slade Gorton (R-WA) 
cosponsored the Federal Lands and Families Protection Act, which sought to legislate 
two key provisions raised above – requirement for legal standing for appellants and the 
automatic denial of appeals if the agency failed to act within the timeframe. According to 
Vaughn and Cortner (2005, p. 55), “[b]oth senators were riding on public opinion that 
blamed the decline in logging jobs and delays in timber sales on the Northern spotted 
owl, which was being considered for designation as a threatened species under the 
Endangered Species Act.”  The Forest Service, to a fault, interpreted Congressional 
interest in the issue as confirmation of support for further limiting the appeal process. In 
March 1992, the agency published a proposed rule to eliminate all appeals of forest 
projects, while retaining appeals of forest plans. Instead, the agency proposed a “pre-
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decisional” public comment opportunity designed to reduce the uncertainty resulting 
from the existing process (Vaughn and Cortner 2005, p. 56).  The rule stated in part: 
Administrative appeals adversely affect jobs, families, and communities by 
delaying or withdrawing projects which support the local economy, thus creating 
uncertainty for communities dependent upon Forest Service goods and services… 
The current post-decisional appeal process creates uncertainty as to the Forest 
Service’s ability to deliver those goods and services, impeding economic growth 
and development. Delays in delivery of National Forest System goods and 
services can place the economic viability of communities at risk (proposed rule 
57FR 10444 quoted in Vaughn and Cortner 2005, p. 56).  
 
In contrast to previous rules, the new rule would allow the public to comment only on 
proposed actions in draft Environmental Assessments (EA) and Findings of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI). Public comments would be addressed by the agency in the 
formal Decision Notice, which would be mailed to those submitting comments. The new 
rule also allowed the agency to bypass the rules in response to extraordinary conditions, 
such as catastrophic wildfire and insect and disease infestations that required immediate 
attention (Vaughn and Cortner 2005).  
Throwing caution to the wind, the agency and Congressional supporters again 
asked CRS to report on the status of administrative appeals and their impact on Forest 
Service timber sales. Again, the CRS findings failed to support the perceptions of the 
agency and congressional timber advocates. The CRS report found that of the 1386 
appeals filed in 1991, 397 timber sales, representing only 10.3 percent of the agency’s 
commercial sales, had been appealed. The CRS report concluded that appeals could be 
reasonably blamed for preventing the achievement of only 5 percent of the agency’s 
timber targets (Baldwin and Gorte 1992). The report also concluded that most appeals 
were resolved in a timely manner, were not frivolous in nature, and may have actually 
saved the federal government money. In addition, the Office of Technology Assessment 
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(1992) released an analysis of the forest planning process in the spring of 1992 that 
supported the administrative appeals process as a reasonable extension of public 
participation under NEPA and NFMA and concluded that the process was a valuable tool 
in agency decision-making.  
Media accounts and public opinion came down strongly in favor of rejecting the 
proposed changes. The Bush administration blamed environmentalists for abusing the 
process by delaying and halting logging and by destroying local economies in timber-
dependent communities. Environmentalists quickly rallied behind the CRS report and the 
appeals process, repeating many of the arguments contained in the report (Goodman 
1994). The agency received more than 30,000 comments in response to the proposed rule, 
the majority of which supported the right of citizens to object to agency decisions 
(Vaughn and Cortner 2005). A similar majority was reflected in the Forest Service rank 
and file (Goodman 1994).  
In May of 1992, while the agency’s proposed rules were still under consideration, 
members of Congress resumed their debate, but with a new awareness of public 
sentiment on the issue. Senator Wyche Fowler (D-GA), who had previously sought a 
balance between Forest Service efficiency and public participation, strongly challenged 
the Bush administration’s motives for continuing to push for limits on the appeal process. 
As chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Conservation Forestry, Fowler opened 
hearings on the issue:  
As chairman of this subcommittee… I intend to find out what the President really 
has in mind with respect to sales of timber on Federal lands… The system should 
not be abused – we agree on that much. But closing the system the public relies 
upon is certainly not the answer… The Forest Service claims that, “the intended 
effort is to expand opportunities for pre-decisional involvement of the public in 
Forest Service decision-making.” I submit, on the contrary, that – while “the 
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intended effort” is disguised here in pretty God-awful bureaucratic perversion of 
plain English – the actual result will be the exact opposite.” (Fowler testimony 
quoted in Vaughn and Cortner 2005, p. 58) 
 
Fowler decided to fight the agency’s proposed rules and in July 1992 introduced 
his own legislation. The first bill – the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals 
Reform Act – was stalled in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry. In August 1992, Fowler reintroduced the measure as an amendment to the 
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The amendment was unique in its 
scope because, “for the first time the Forest Service would be required to implement an… 
appeals process that had strict timelines for the filing and review of appeals and, perhaps 
most importantly, a notice and comment period for all projects, including those requiring 
only an EA rather than an EIS” (Vaughn and Cortner 2005, p. 59).  
Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) offered an amendment to Fowler’s amendment that 
reestablish legal standing, required the Forest Service to attempt to resolve disputes 
through informal meetings, and shortened processing timelines. Both the Fowler and 
Craig amendments were accepted on voice vote as part of the appropriations bill, which 
was enacted in October 1992. The Fowler/Craig amendments to the Appropriations Act 
not only expanded the scope of the appeals process by including Environmental 
Assessments, but took the rule setting process out of the hands of the Forest Service. “At 
this point,” note Vaughn and Cortner (2005, p. 59), “the Forest Service became the only 
federal agency with a legislatively mandated appeals process.”  
Hints of Change – a New Era? 
Early accounts of agency soul searching resulted in hints of change. In 1989, a 
Forest Service public information packet revealed the agency’s new goal of increasing 
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the “environmental sensitivity” of commodity production on national forests (Hirt 1994 
p. 284). Then, in early 1990, the agency announced a major new initiative designed to 
significantly change the way it managed the national forests – New Perspectives. To 
promote its new environmental sensitivity, the agency appointed a wildlife biologist, Hal 
Salwasser, as director of the initiative (Hirt 1994). Kessler and Salwasser (1995) 
observed that the reason for the change was the agency’s recognition that the context for 
forest and natural resource management had shifted and that the “fitness” of the Forest 
Service in this new context had been affected (p. 171). The shifting context, they argued, 
required agency leaders to ask a different management question. “The key question 
addressed in the planning process (how should we manage these lands?) would remain 
moot until a more basic question was answered first: for whom, and for what values and 
purposes, should we manage these lands?” (p. 174). Kessler and Salwasser suggest that 
the particular “brand” of multiple use management practiced by the Forest Service in the 
1980s was “growing increasingly discordant with society and with developments in the 
scientific community” and thus required a fresh look (p. 174).  
Charles Cartwright, assistant director of the program, told science writer Seth 
Zuckerman (Zuckerman 1992), that New Perspectives “first focuses on providing for a 
healthy, vibrant ecosystem, and then delivers sustainable products in the process of 
maintaining that healthy state” (p. 41). The cornerstone of the program, according to 
Cartwright, was a model of forest management referred to as “New Forestry,” a term 
coined by forest ecologist Jerry Franklin and his colleagues (Franklin 1989). Franklin, at 
the time professor of ecosystem analysis at the University of Washington and chief plant 
ecologist for the Forest Service’s Pacific Northwest Research Station, pioneered New 
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Forestry as “a kinder and gentler forestry that better accommodates ecological values, 
while allowing for the extraction of commodities” (p. 38).   
New Forestry was based on research on the ecology of old-growth forests in the 
Pacific Northwest and was designed to move the traditional practice of forestry away 
from a narrow focus on the commercial harvest and regeneration of timber and towards 
the long-term maintenance of complex ecosystems.  The principal effect of the paradigm 
was in redefining the practice of forestry, making timber production a tool for restoring 
ecological health.  However, the emerging paradigm did not fall neatly into either 
environmental or timber industry camps.  Instead, it challenged both: 
Industry users need to recognize that society views forestlands as more than just 
another form of agricultural land with a slow-maturing crop. Forestry 
professionals need to acknowledge that what is good for wood-fiber production is 
not necessarily good for other forest values.  Conversely, environmentalists must 
stop relying on setting aside preserved lands as the only approach to the 
protection of ecological values (Franklin 1989 p. 44). 
 
Although skeptical, environmentalists in some regions were willing to give New 
Forestry a try. As forest activist Jim Britell recalled of a New Forestry proposal in 1990 
on the Siskiyou National Forest, “No one was enthusiastic about logging in a roadless 
area. But Oregon was cutting record numbers of trees and would continue to do so until 
the laws were changed. We figured we’d better come up with a method that didn’t trash 
the place” (Zuckerman 1992 p. 42). What emerged through a local collaborative process 
was a “highly constrained” logging plan for the Shasta Costa basin that environmentalists 
supported. “If logging has to be done in a roadless area,” Britell stated, “this is how we 
would like to see it done. Shasta Costa gives us a model” (p. 45). But the plan failed to 
produce the volume of timber needed to entice the timber industry and the Forest Service 
subsequently altered the plan, allowing more old-growth to be cut, doubling road 
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construction, and increasing the harvest. Now a strong critic of collaboration, Britell 
(www.britell.com) expressed his frustration with the experience: “Agencies are willing to 
give us an endless supply of elk viewing areas, maps, rides in helicopters, new trails, and 
schmoozing: anything and everything except trees” (Zuckerman 1992, p. 45). 
Many Forest Service professionals welcomed New Perspectives, but were less 
than optimistic the agency was capable of significant reform. New Perspectives was 
viewed by some as the usual “smoke and mirrors public relations games” typical of 
Forest Service reform efforts. Others were “cynically optimistic” and wanted to believe 
the agency was finally serious about change (Hirt 1994, p. 285).  Unfortunately, while 
New Perspectives led to a number of creative projects during the initiative’s two-year 
experiment, it conflicted with many of the forest plans recently developed pursuant to 
NFMA. At a congressional hearing on national forest management in April 1991, for 
example, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) challenged the agency’s commitment to the 
initiative. “You cannot have New Perspectives,” Leahy argued, “and at the same time 
have a 66 percent increase in the Green Mountain’s [national forest] timber sale program. 
That is contradictory and it has got to stop” (p. 285).   
In fairness to the agency, many forest supervisors tried unsuccessfully to lower 
their NFMA timber targets to more sustainable levels using New Perspectives as 
justification. In response, timber-oriented members of Congress pressured the agency to 
retain the high targets and to castigate forest supervisors who resisted the pressure.  In 
June 1992, amidst great skepticism, Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson announced to 
regional and national foresters that the New Perspectives experiment was being adopted 
under the title of “Ecosystem Management.” Robertson stated: “…the Forest Service is 
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committed to using an ecological approach in the future management of the national 
forests and grasslands” (Hirt 1994 p. 288). Robertson defined ecosystem management as 
“a multiple use philosophy built around ecological principles, sustainability, and a strong 
land stewardship ethic, with a better recognition of the spiritual values and natural beauty 
of forests” (Robertson 1991 p. 19).  
Sierra Nevada National Forests 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) considered the spotted owl a 
“threatened species” even before the passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 
1973. The FWS included both the northern and California subspecies of the spotted owl 
in their informal listing, although neither made the list of Threatened and Endangered 
species when the Act was passed. Forest Supervisors in California were first made aware 
of the owl’s status in 1972. In 1973 and 1974, the Forest Service, the California 
Department of Fish and Game, and the National Park Service jointly funded the first 
survey to document the status of the owl in California. Their findings revealed a more 
abundant population than first anticipated – 159 confirmed locations within the owl’s 
known range. Because of these findings, concern by government officials for the owl’s 
viability was slow to develop (Beck and Gould 1992).  
The passage of NFMA in 1976 increased attention to the California spotted owl, 
in part because the Act mandated the maintenance of viable populations of native 
vertebrates on the national forests. NFMA also required the identification and use of 
Management Indicator Species (MIS) to inform decisions regarding wildlife communities 
and associated habitats. While the owl was designated a MIS for wildlife requiring 
extensive “late-seral-stage” conifer forest, little more occurred until 1981 when the Forest 
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Service convened an interagency task force of federal and state agencies with jurisdiction 
over California spotted owl management. The purpose of the task force was to review an 
approach to spotted owl protection recommended by the interagency Oregon Endangered 
Species Task Force, a parallel group dealing with the northern spotted owl.  The Oregon 
task force’s management plan recommended that 1000 acres of old-growth forest within a 
1.5-mile radius of an owl nest-site be maintained for each nesting pair. Recognizing 
similarities between the owl’s plight in California and the Pacific Northwest, the 
California task force adopted the recommendations of the Oregon group. In July 1981, 
the Regional Office of the Forest Service directed the national forests within the Sierra 
Nevada to integrate the strategy into their upcoming forest plans (Beck and Gould 1992).  
National forests with owl populations responded to the directive by creating 
networks of Spotted Owl Habitat Areas (SOHAs) within their forest plans. The strategy 
permitted some timber harvesting in parts of SOHAs not immediately adjacent to nesting 
trees but did not protect forestlands outside the SOHAs, even though they were used by 
the owls for nesting, roosting and foraging. As such, the forest plans greatly expanded the 
use of clearcutting as a harvesting technique and proposed significantly higher harvest 
levels on forestlands outside the SOHAs. The agency’s rationale for the increase was that 
the forests were mainly composed of mature or over-mature trees that had exceeded their 
peak productivity (i.e. old growth) (Ruth 1996; 2000).  
As forest plans were being completed, ongoing research on the northern spotted 
owl began to suggest that the SOHA strategy may be ineffective in maintaining the 
viability of spotted owl populations. Concerned with the efficacy of the strategy, federal 
agencies responsible for northern spotted owl management – the Forest Service, Fish and 
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Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management – began work 
on an interagency agreement to develop a common strategy for maintaining the viability 
of the spotted owl throughout its range. The agreement, in 1989, established the 
Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) to address the growing crisis surrounding the 
northern spotted owl, which by that time had been proposed for ESA listing (Ruth 1996; 
Yaffee 1994; Beck and Gould 1992).   
Led by Forest Service biologist Jack Ward Thomas, the ISC was given six months 
to “develop a scientifically credible conservation strategy for the northern spotted owl” 
(Beck and Gould 1992 p. 39). The ISC’s report was released on April 1, 1990 and 
concluded that the SOHA strategy would lead to increasing loss and fragmentation of 
suitable owl habitat and threaten the owl’s continued existence. The ISC report 
recommended a strategy that called for the designation of large, well-distributed reserves, 
called Habitat Conservation Areas (HCAs). Each HCA, the report recommended, should 
support at least 20 nesting pairs, with the forestlands between the HCAs managed so as to 
facilitate movement among the reserves. The ISC report had a significant impact on 
northern spotted owl management (Marcot and Thomas 1997; Yaffee 1994) and greatly 
heightened concern over California spotted owl management (Beck and Gould 1992).  
As the ISC study was nearing completion, the committee’s findings began to 
surface confirming the belief that the SOHA policy and subsequent administrative actions 
employed to protect the California spotted owl were also inadequate and, further, were 
vulnerable to legal challenge (Ruth 1996 p. 157). In response, in 1989 the Forest Service 
modified the SOHA policy on Sierra Nevada forests by requiring that field surveys be 
conducted in the preparation of biological evaluations for proposed timber sales. The goal 
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of the field surveys was to assess potential owl locations on forestlands outside the 
SOHA networks that were scheduled for timber sales. According to Beck and Gould 
(1992), the evaluations improved the coverage of forestlands surrounding SOHA 
networks but were considered inadequate because they required only three project-site 
visits to determine whether owls occupied the areas. 
Troubled that the agency was not adequately considering spotted owls in project 
evaluations, in March 1991 the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a 
number of administrative appeals challenging timber sales on the Tahoe National Forest 
(Ruth 1996). The appeals challenged the agency’s decision to continue using the SOHA 
strategy, in light of additional research, and argued that NFMA mandates required the 
agency to take greater steps in protecting spotted owl habitat. As a follow-up, in May of 
1991 NRDC attorney David Edelson wrote a letter to Regional Forester Ron Stewart 
threatening to sue the agency for violation of NFMA if it approved additional timber 
sales in spotted owl habitat (119).   
According to Ruth (2000), the Forest Service decided that NRDC’s argument had 
substantial merit and chose instead to alter its policies without waiting for the results of 
the appeals. “This development,” Ruth contends (1996 p. 158), “may be regarded as the 
clearest signal that the land management plans were not going to be fully implemented.” 
In May 1991, with growing concern over the efficacy of the SOHA strategy, the Forest 
Service and the State of California convened the California Spotted Owl Assessment and 
Planning Team, comprised of federal and state owl biologists and resource managers 
(Beck and Gould 1992; Ruth 1996; 2000).  The goal of the group was to further assess 
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the status of the owl in California and to develop a “long-term ecosystem planning 
strategy” that would protect the species and its habitat (Ruth 1996 p. 158).  
Then, in July 1991, one month after the release of the Sacramento Bee series 
“Majesty and Tragedy: the Sierra in Peril,” the Regional Forester directed the national 
forests of the Sierra Nevada to temporarily suspend all sales of green timber pending a 
review of the cumulative effects of the timber sales on the California spotted owl. 
According to Beck and Gould (1992), “the protocol for project surveys for spotted owls 
was changed to match that used for the northern spotted owl. This entailed six visits with 
longer time periods between visits, ensuring a higher likelihood of detecting owls that 
might be present” (p. 42). The agency characterized the suspension and review, according 
to Matt Mathes, a regional spokesman for the Forest Service, as “part of a move towards 
more of a landscape approach to managing national forests. Instead of looking at just the 
individual timber sale,” said Mathes, “we will look at the entire ecosystem in which our 
timber sales take place.” (119)  
The policy essentially precluded the large-scale use of clearcutting and other 
even-aged management strategies and precipitated the first of several steep declines in 
timber sales on Sierra Nevada national forests. On the Plumas Forest, which harbored the 
largest population of California spotted owls, timber sales dropped from an annual 
average of 185 million board feet between 1988 and 1990 to an average of 75 million 
board feet between 1991 and 1993. On the Lassen, timber sales dropped from an annual 
average of 134 million board feet between 1988 and 1990 to an average of 124 million 
board feet between 1991 and 1993 (USDA 2003). More importantly, the agency 
predicted deeper cuts as new owl policies were put into effect.  
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In July 1992, the California Spotted Owl Assessment and Planning Team released 
the “CASPO Report,” confirming the findings of the ISC report that the SOHA policy 
would likely lead to further declines in California spotted owl populations and 
recommending an interim strategy pending further studies.  According to Ruth (2000 p. 
229), the assessment team “clearly regarded current management direction as detrimental 
to the long-term well-being of the habitat and the species.” The report pointed 
specifically to the logging of large-diameter trees and long-standing fire suppression 
policies that jeopardized the owl’s survival. The Technical Assessment Team estimated 
that implementation of the existing forest plans would result in further loss of suitable 
habitat at the rate of 229,000 acres per decade (Verner et al. 1992). The team also 
emphasized that suppression of fire had accelerated the accumulation of fuels and 
significantly increased the likelihood that fires would destroy important timber stands, 
including those essential to the spotted owl (Verner et al. 1992). The CASPO report 
recommended three immediate steps for addressing the emerging crisis: 1) a halt to the 
logging of large, old trees; 2) aggressive thinning and fuel reduction activities in or near 
owl habitat, and 3) additional research on the owl’s status (Ruth 1996).  It had become 
apparent from the CASPO recommendations that Sierra Nevada forests were on a 
collision course similar to Pacific Northwest forests if the agency did not immediately act 
to protect the owl.  
The contextual changes described in this chapter created an environment that, it 
appears, was conducive to some sort of change. By the summer of 1992 the region was in 
its sixth year of a severe drought that was showing no sign of subsiding.  In some places, 
insect damage had killed almost half of the standing timber. By the fall of 1992, 
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catastrophic wildfire posed an increased threat to the northern Sierras and had already 
devastated thousands of acres of productive forestland and critical wildlife habitat. 
Forests were choked with dense understory trees and brush that threatened the health of 
the forest ecosystem. The remaining old-growth forests were off limits to any and all 
logging pursuant to CASPO and the California spotted owl was poised for listing under 
the Endangered Species Act. Timber production was on its way down, further depressing 
the local economy.  Lumber mills were laying off workers and unemployment was rising. 
The forests, which by now had undergone almost 100 years of fire suppression, 
threatened to ignite into almost unfathomable infernos. Blame spread to both the 
environmental community and the Forest Service for the growing crisis. Local 
environmentalists had integrated themselves into the larger community, and had 
produced a viable alternative, but were still vilified by the logging community for 
producing the crisis. However, it was increasingly apparent to both the logging and 
environmental communities that the Forest Service could not manage the growing crisis. 
By the fall of 1992, dramatic contextual shift had occurred surrounding disputants 
in the local timber wars. From a social identity perspective, these contextual changes, and 
perhaps others, should be sufficient to produce a context in which local environmentalists 
and loggers could view themselves as members of a common group.  At this point, 
however, we do not have a plausible connection between the changing context 
surrounding the conflict and a changing identity. We only know that they both changed. 
Therefore we are still in need of a mechanism or process that links them together and 










Explaining Identity Change: A Social Identity Perspective 
 
In chapters V and VI we see that identities among the disputants changed from 
disparate identities as members of the logging and environmental communities to a 
common identity with the Quincy Library Group. We also see that logging community 
members reframed a more inclusive community identity to include environmentalists. In 
chapter VII we see that the context surrounding the conflict significantly and in some 
ways dramatically changed over a period of approximately 100 years, but more acutely 
during a 15-year period between 1982 and 1997 commonly referred to as the timber wars. 
Contextual changes, and disputant accounts, also point to a turning point or sorts in the 
summer of 1992 when contextual forces appear to merge. We now have two important 
pieces of information – the context surrounding the conflict changed and disputants’ 
identities aligned. We also know from the research thus far that acute contextual changes 
in the summer of 1992 and the emergence of the Quincy Library Group in the fall of 
1992 appear to coincide.  
From a social identity perspective, we may have a plausible explanation for the 
emergence of a common identity, which then facilitated the transformation of the local 
timber wars. However, we do not have a causal relationship between contextual change 
and identity shift since we also know that similar contextual changes were occurring in 
other forest-dependent communities in the Sierras and the Pacific Northwest that 
presented similar opportunities for transformation to occur but did not produce a similar 
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shift. For those communities where similar transformations did occur, however, we 
would expect to find similar patterns. As mentioned above, the Quincy Library Group is 
one of many collaborative natural resource management groups that emerged in the U.S. 
in the early 1990s.   
While more the exception than the rule, the proliferation of such groups 
throughout the western U.S. affords a unique opportunity to study the elements that help 
or hinder their success. Studies have looked at examples of collaborative natural resource 
management and have summarized the characteristics and most salient components of 
each (Coughlin, et al., 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Yaffee et al., 1996).  These 
studies principally involve cross-case comparisons that tend to follow a variance theory 
approach to explaining organizational phenomena (Mohr, 1982; Scott, 1995).  In each of 
the studies, researchers looked for common patterns and characteristics among existing 
groups, and expressed their conclusions as discrete variables that, they argue, are 
necessary for success.  Those comparing QLG with other groups looked for divergent 
patterns and characteristics that distinguished between QLG and other existing groups 
(Duane 1997; Hibbard and Madsen 2003).   
This research takes a different approach by looking for the necessary conditions 
for collaboration to transcend intractability, while recognizing that it may still not occur.  
While other studies observe collaborative groups that are already formed, this study is 
focused on the mechanisms that enabled group members to transform an intractable 
environmental conflict and to form a cohesive collaborative.  Mohr’s (1982) process 
theory, introduced in Chapter IV, better fits this endeavor.  As mentioned, process theory 
deals with the discrete occurrence of events rather than the relationship among variables.  
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A process theory framework is appropriate when a strict causal relationship does not 
hold. This occurs when the conditions necessary for an event are present but its actual 
occurrence is tied to probabilistic processes of some sort.  Processes theory, by contrast, 
is based on a series of a events that are linked together such that one picks up where the 
other leaves off, making the events, their sequence, and their connections important to the 
behavioral outcome.  In addition, process theory focuses on three elements: 1) necessary 
conditions, 2) necessary probabilistic processes, and 3) external directional forces that 
herd the focal unit and the necessary conditions into mutual proximity. 
 Following Mohr’s framework, I have divided the discussion in this chapter into 
the above elements. However, the nature of the story requires a different ordering of the 
elements due to the importance of the external directional forces in significantly altering 
the context surrounding the conflict. Therefore, the ordering below proceeds as follows; 
necessary conditions, external directional forces, and necessary probabilistic processes. 
The behavioral outcome, again, is the action by disputants in the local forest management 
conflict – the timber wars – to engage in negotiations that led to the formation of the 
Quincy Library Group and the resolution of the local conflict. The outcome, in other 
words, is cooperation rather than confrontation. The focal unit is the set of disputants who 
were directly involved in the local forest management conflict and who participated in 
identity and characterization framing within the context of the conflict.  
 Necessary Conditions 
For comparison, Mohr (1982) lists the necessary conditions for the contraction of 
malaria to be the malarial parasite, persons already harboring the parasite, and the 
Anopheles mosquito. These conditions alone, however, do not produce the disease.  
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Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter II, Brewer (2000) argues that three interrelated 
conditions must be met for intergroup cooperation within the focal unit to transcend 
conflict – common fate, common identity, and positive interdependence. Similar to the 
contraction of malaria, these conditions alone do not produce cooperation.  
Before going further, however, it is necessary to draw a definitional distinction 
between external directional forces described by Mohr and common fate described by 
Brewer. By their respective definitions, both are external forces yet Mohr’s process 
theory framework requires the necessary conditions to be internal forces. For practical 
purposes, a common fate is both since there is both an external force producing the fate 
and an internal cognitive process that becomes aware of the fate. Brewer’s example of 
residents living in the path of an oncoming hurricane illustrates this point. While the 
hurricane is an external force, residents must still recognize it as a common fate and a 
potential threat to their wellbeing. Likewise, in a forest management context, such as 
dealing with the threat of catastrophic wildfire, the risk of such a fire occurring provides a 
common fate – an external force – however the perception that a risk exists is subject to 
internal cognitive processes and to the process of framing. 
From Brewer’s (2000) perspective, the boys’ factions in the Robbers Cave 
experiment (Sherif et al. 1961) met the conditions necessary for cooperation to transcend 
conflict, first in the crises introduced by the researchers, then in the recognition of a 
common identity via shared recognition of their fate, and finally, or in parallel, through 
positive interdependence in the form of a superordinate goal that allowed them to control 
the fate (a tug-of-war against the truck).  Similarly, disputants in the local forest 
management conflict met the conditions necessary for cooperation to transcend conflict, 
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first through the dramatically changing context surrounding the conflict, described below, 
then in the recognition of a common identity via shared recognition of their fate, and 
finally, or in parallel, through positive interdependence in the form of a superordinate 
goal that allowed them to control their fate (the Friends of Plumas Wilderness plan). 
Complicating matters, it appears that disputants responded to the fate in different ways 
and at different times, which created a lag of approximately six years (1986-92) between 
environmentalists’ recognition and initial framing of their common fate with the logging 
community and loggers’ acceptance. Following Mohr’s (1982) framework, this suggests 
that external directional forces were acting on or were perceived by the logging and 
environmental communities differently.  
Eventually, however, a common fate was acknowledged by both loggers and 
environmentalists, although it was not directly acknowledged by the logging community 
prior to the formation of the Quincy Library Group. It was, however, acknowledged 
indirectly in loggers’ recognition, for example, that neither they nor environmentalists 
were enamored with Forest Service clearcutting policies, which affected both groups. 
These kinds of subtle acknowledgements occurred primarily in the summer of 1992, as 
the following negatively charged characterization frame by logging community member 
Susan Baremore towards the Forest Service indicates: 
The Forest Service says it manages according to what the people want.  Even the 
preservationists have said they don't want [clearcutting].  If this is not what the 
public consensus is, whose consensus is it? [138]  
 
There is, however, direct retrospective evidence suggesting that the logging and 
environmental communities recognized that their common fate in the hands of the Forest 
Service was good for neither group and that they needed to rely on each other. In 1994, 
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Bill Coates reflected on his decision to approach Michael Jackson to initiate what appears 
to be a process of mutual fate control. Similar statements were made by members of both 
the logging and environmental communities to explain their unexpected behavior: 
It occurred to us at the same time that we could not rely on the federal 
government to solve our problems.  Eventually, every community has to take 
matters into its own hands and control its own destiny. [199] 
 
These statements appear to verify the recognition of a common fate, which meets 
Brewer’s (2000) first condition necessary for cooperation to transcend conflict. The 
second condition, common identity, is also contained in Coates’s statement above and is 
framed in terms of loggers’ and environmentalists’ common fate as residents of the same 
forest-dependent community.  This is in sharp contrast to the divisive community identity 
frames expressed by loggers in phase 1 of the timber wars. Unfortunately, there is no 
direct evidence captured in the identity and characterization framing data that publicly 
acknowledges the logging community’s recognition of a common identity with local 
environmentalists prior to Coates’ and Nelson’s initial contact with Jackson. Logically, 
however, it is improbable that such evidence could exist since it is unlikely that Coates 
and Nelson would have made public statements prior to their secret meeting with 
Jackson. As such, it is necessary to look for other clues to the recognition of a common 
identity or a basis for it.  
Turning to retrospective accounts by Bill Coates of his decision to approach 
Jackson, we see that he and others may have recognized the basis for a common identity 
early on – a love for the land and country. In an interview in 1999, Coates was asked 
whether his values towards nature had changed through his experiences with the Quincy 
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Library Group. To the contrary, Coates and others discovered that they shared those 
values with environmentalists when the group began meeting.  
The thing that we always had in common that we did not know that we did was a 
love for the land and the country.  Once we realized that a person doesn’t live in 
the mountains unless they love it, because they can make a hell of a lot more 
money someplace else.  To put up with this weather and the lack of income and 
the poor working conditions you have to have a love of nature. So I don’t know 
anyone, and I have lots and lots of friends in this county, I don’t have a single one 
who wants to leave this place worse than he found it.  So as we got into these 
groups we all had actually the same underlying goal. To have a better forest. 
(personal communication 5-17-99) 
 
While Coates claims that environmentalists and loggers discovered a basis for a common 
identity once they started meeting, it is more likely that they knew this before hand since 
this was a key message coming from the local environmental community. Taking Coates’ 
comments at face value, however, it appears that there was at least the basis for a 
common identity almost from the start. Moreover, the community itself, as indicated in 
Coates’ statement above, and many others like it, also suggests that a common identity 
was recognized by the logging community. From this information, we can reasonably 
infer that Brewer’s second condition is also met.  
The third condition, positive interdependence, is apparent from loggers’ interest in 
the Friends of Plumas Wilderness plan and from the above statement and others like it, in 
which loggers begin to adopt the environmental community’s framing of the overall goal. 
Interestingly, public statements by the logging community prior to the meeting between 
Coates, Nelson and Jackson suggest that loggers were beginning to accept the 
environmental community’s inclusive framing of the problem, although not 
environmentalists themselves. From a social identity perspective, loggers would have to 
recognize a common identity with environmentalists, or the basis for a common identity, 
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in order to navigate this shift, even though they did not acknowledge it. The acceptance 
of the environmental community’s framing appears to follow a gradual process that 
began with the stark “jobs versus owls” duality that was perpetuated throughout the 
1980s by the logging community and is expressed in the flowing statement from 1989: 
“This rally is about the spotted owl and my rights – people’s rights to work. If we don’t 
stop the spotted owl deal, you’re not even going to have a job!” [66] 
As the conflict evolved, however, it was eventually reframed by the logging 
community in ways that more fully captured the social and economic dimensions of the 
problem but continued to marginalize and ignore the environmental dimensions. For 
example, a January 1992 critique of the Lassen Forest plan advocated only one side of the 
problem: “Community stability should be a Forest Service objective. The plans you are 
showing us ruin that.” [124]  This common sentiment was eventually reframed by the 
logging community in ways that began to recognize the tensions created by the overall 
problem. The following frame, taken from a newspaper report from August 1992, 
suggests that the either/or jobs-versus-owls duality had been reframed by some in the 
logging community as a both/and possibility along with the adoption the environmental 
community’s overall goal – community stability and forest health:  
Baremore also said she was not sure she agreed with the Forest Service’s 
emphasis on… clearcutting areas of timber and then replanting seedlings. 
Baremore, who said she was concerned about “community economic stability and 
forest health,” said a great concern of hers was that in the plan, “There aren't a lot 
of whys.” [138]  
 
Finally, as the Library Group began meeting, the goal was again reframed and this 
time captured the complex nature of the challenge the group faced. The following frame, 
noteworthy in its similarity to the previous frame and environmentalists’ initial framing, 
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was taken from the group’s purpose statement and appeared in the Feather River Bulletin 
shortly after the watershed town meeting at the Quincy Theater in the summer of 1993: 
The group’s focus is, “to develop a plan that would promote the objectives of 
forest health, ecological integrity, adequate timber supply, and local economic 
stability.” [155] 
 
This gradual and subtle reframing, which occurred in 1992, suggests that the logging 
community may have been negotiating an identity shift that was somehow inclusive of 
the environmental community. The common identity that emerged, which was framed by 
both loggers and environmentalists, was the community itself, even though group 
members’ affiliations with the Quincy Library Group were more salient to others. This 
gradual reframing by the logging community suggests that loggers may have expanded 
the boundaries of the larger community to include local environmentalists, which they 
had previously excluded. From this perspective, Coates and Nelson were not stepping 
across stark ideological boundaries but were instead extending a long deserved welcome 
to their new neighbors – the environmentalists. As neighbors, cooperation was expected. 
External Directional Forces 
We have now discussed the conditions necessary for cooperation to transcend 
intractable conflict. In this section we will explore the external directional forces that 
likely “herded” the focal unit and conditions into mutual proximity. I return to Mohr’s 
(1982) framework to discuss those forces and their impact on disputants’ common fate. 
We are reminded that the external directional force required for malaria to occur is the 
hunting of prey by Anopheles mosquitoes.  Similarly, in the forest management conflict, 
the external directional force – that which is producing the fate – is a changing context as 
described in Chapter VII above. As QLG biologist Linda Blum reminds us: 
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It was an interesting sequence of events… it wasn’t just this great, courageous, 
out-of-the-blue step that somebody from Sierra Pacific Industries approached the 
environmentalists.  There were a number of factors rolling up to that (personal 
communication 3-3-99).  
 
Similarly, QLG environmentalists George and Pat Terhune (1998) reflected on the 
dynamic and complex dimensions surrounding the local timber wars that played an 
important role in helping them recognize a common fate, not only with the logging 
community but also with the Forest Service.  
Within this atmosphere, some people in each camp began to recognize, but not yet 
clearly articulate, that our forests, our communities and the Forest Service had an 
unbreakable relationship of mutual interdependence. We could not have stable 
and healthy communities if we did not assure long-term health of the surrounding 
forests, as demanded by environmentalists. We could not restore long-term health 
to our forests without the large-scale participation of an industrial infrastructure 
largely dependent on a profitable timber base. And neither goal could be achieved 
unless greatly improved forest management could be implemented by the Forest 
Service (p. 6). 
 
The Terhunes’ statement also acknowledges a common identity with the forest-dependent 
communities of the region as well as the recognition of mutual interdependence among 
environmentalists, loggers and the Forest Service.  
External directional forces – changing context – can be traced to three areas; 
changes in the community, changing forest conditions, and changes in the U.S. Forest 
Service.  A fourth contextual change, in the environmental movement, appears to be a 
response to contextual changes listed above as well as changes in the movement at the 
regional and national level. Within this framework, contextual changes should both 
produce and heighten the awareness of a common fate within the local logging and 
environmental communities and make salient a common identity and positive 
interdependence within the focal unit. These contextual dimensions are extracted from 




The community changed in two fundamental ways that heightened the awareness 
of common fate between loggers and environmentalists. First, the region’s commodity-
based population and culture was offset by an emerging amenity-based population that 
brought new values and ideas to the region, thus helping to foster and empower the local 
environmental community. Second, and most importantly, economic and social change 
throughout the region began to negatively impact the commodity-based culture, and 
forest-dependent communities, sharpening awareness of and concern for this component 
of the community’s social and economic fabric and diminishing its power base 
throughout the region. As Michael Jackson lamented, “My heart doesn’t bleed for Sierra 
Pacific Industries, but it bleeds for the folks getting $12 an hour who don’t have any 
alternatives for work.” [163] 
Amenity migration was a necessary component of the discovery of a common fate 
as it brought people to the region who were not dependent on the timber economy but 
who moved to the region for its recreational opportunities, rural lifestyle, and lower cost 
of living. As mentioned, amenity migrants included back-to-the-land types, entrepreneurs 
escaping congested cities, and retirees seeking a more relaxed lifestyle and lower cost of 
living. Amenity migrants began moving to the region in the late 1960s and continued 
throughout the study period. An Oklahoma native, Michael Jackson moved to Quincy in 
1977 from Redding, California (personal communication 8/98). Mike Yost, a Duke 
University forester and principal architect of the Friends of Plumas Wilderness’ 
conservationist alternative, moved to Quincy in 1975, shortly after Feather River College 
was established (personal communication, 3/4/99). Jackson and Yost, both in their 30s at 
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the time, were typical of the young urban professionals seeking to establish careers and 
raise their families in the growing and changing mountain communities characteristic of 
the Sierras at the time.  
Further, not only were the newcomers there to stay, they were also starting to 
integrate themselves and their families into the communities.  Yost, for example, taught 
forestry and natural resources at Feather River College and was actively involved in the 
budding environmental community (personal communication, 3/4/99). Jackson became 
the track coach at the local high school and ran for a Plumas County supervisor seat in 
1984 – he lost by just 12 votes (personal communication 8/98). George Terhune, a retired 
American Airlines pilot, and his wife Pat moved to Quincy in 1986.  Pat soon joined 
Plumas People for Peace, Quincy’s emerging anti-nuclear weapons movement, and 
volunteered at the local natural-foods coop (personal communication, 5/20/99).  
The budding environmental community had very little influence over forest 
management, however, until 1984 when it was successful in designating the Bucks Lake 
Wilderness Area. Buoyed by community support for a wilderness area, the environmental 
community began focusing on Forest Service timber sales and the NFMA forest planning 
process. As Jackson stated in 1989, however, environmentalists did not “desire a victory 
at the expense of our neighbors in the timber industry” [71].  This suggests that 
environmentalists may have recognized interdependencies with the logging community at 
a relatively early stage. This recognition, in part, led to the formulation of the Friends of 
Plumas Wilderness conservationist alternative, an attempt to reform Forest Service 
management practices while maintaining community economic stability.  
 
 227
Even with their Bucks Lake victory, however, environmentalists made little 
headway in their attempts to reform Forest Service management practices. As a result, 
they continued to file formal appeals of agency timber sales. They also continued 
working with their regional counterparts in the environmental movement to ripen forest 
reform issues related to clearcutting, old-growth, endangered species, and riparian habitat 
protection. The result of their actions was, in part, the curtailing of logging operations.  
Timber sales began to decline, unemployment rose, mill closures threatened, and 
revenues to counties for roads and schools began to drop. While they continued 
promoting their alternative forest plan, environmentalists received virtually no support 
from the logging community.  
Unfortunately, the logging community did not recognize or acknowledge a 
common fate with environmentalists and instead viewed them as largely 
responsible for the fate descending upon them. Clearly, loggers did not believe that 
environmentalists had their interests in mind and viewed them instead as a threat, even 
though environmentalists offered a plan that increased timber harvest levels by more than 
50 million board feet above previous harvests and proposed meeting those targets through 
selective logging, which loggers greatly preferred over clearcutting.  Moreover, the 
Forest Service had touted the Friends’ conservationist alternative as the plan best able to 
achieve long-term community stability by providing a steady supply of timber.  
According to Plumas County Supervisor Bill Coates (personal communication 5/17/99), 
the local logging community rejected the Friends’ alternative because it did not trust 
environmentalists. Coates described loggers’ perceptions of the local environmental 
community at the time as “a bunch of people that had shown a certain disdain for the 
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need to work and the need to raise kids.” Coates also described loggers’ perceptions of 
environmentalists’ approach to the problem: 
The attitude was that we could replace all the businesses around here with 
boutique shops.  So it was not a time when environmental organization ideas were 
well accepted in rural communities, because they represented the big city attitude 
towards the woods, which was lock them up and keep people out.  So local 
citizens reacting to that attitude were very negative about anything some of these 
people suggested.  So even if they thought the idea looked alright they were 
suspicious of it because of who was driving the boat (pers. comm. 5-17-99). 
 
In this passage, Coates is suggesting that the logging community likely 
recognized the merits of the Friends’ plan at a time when environmentalists were viewed 
in a highly derogatory light by the rest of the community. Hence, loggers were suspicious 
of the plan, and rejected it, in part because it was authored by the environmental 
community. The passage lends credence to the argument that identity distinctions played 
a significant role in the conflict as it was being played out and that disparate identities 
prevented the logging community from recognizing the merits of the Friends’ plan and 
taking it more seriously at an early stage. The incongruence between the plan’s obvious 
benefits to the logging community and loggers’ abhorrence of the plan suggests that 
underlying cognitive processes were overriding rational behavior.  
It is also the case that the logging community advocated for even higher harvest 
levels in the NFMA planning process and held out hope that the Forest Service would, on 
appeal, select its proposed alternative. However, the logging community’s preferred 
alternative, while harvesting significantly more timber volume, would likely produce a 
boom and bust economic cycle through massive clearcutting. Its proposal, a throwback to 
the previous era of timber domination, was not only detrimental to long-term community 
stability, it also employed a logging technique – clearcutting – that local loggers found 
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offensive.  Further, it contained few of the environmental protection provisions that the 
Forest Service was required to consider. While logging community leaders may have 
longed for the “good ole days,” it is unlikely that they felt much confidence that their 
proposal would be seriously considered or that it would survive the appeal process.  
Meanwhile, environmentalists were persistent in their efforts to establish a 
working relationship with the logging community, while at the same time continuing to 
press for forest reforms.  Jackson alluded to such a relationship, and the interdependence 
between loggers and environmentalists, in a 1989 Feather River Bulletin commentary in 
which environmentalists appealed to the local logging community to work together 
towards the implementation of the conservationist alternative. Jackson stated in part: 
We also know that the logging community has answers to some of our common 
problems which we may not have considered.  We know that for a complete 
solution to our common goals we need the wisdom of the people who have worked 
in the woods for the four generations we have been logging in Plumas County. [71] 
 
As we know, however, the local logging community did not share the same 
perspective and, instead, chose to characterize environmentalists as a vocal minority that 
was not only dangerously out of touch with logging interests but was a threat to their 
culture and way of life. Loggers launched the Yellow Ribbon Labor Day Campaign and 
took to the highways with their message of solidarity with working people and their 
disdain for their “preservationist adversaries” who threatened it. Little changed, however, 
and timber harvests began to decline, at first gradually and then precipitously, starting in 
1990. On the Plumas National Forest, timber sales dropped from an annual average of 
185.5 million board feet from 1988 through 1990 and to an average of only 20 million 
board feet in the period from 1994 through 1996. Layoffs at lumber mills started 
immediately and then increased during the summer of 1992 [135, 136, 138]. And while 
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salvage sales from drought-stricken and burned-over forests prevented some mills from 
closing, the trend was clearly towards more layoffs and eventual closures. True to form, 
loggers further escalated the conflict by publicly blaming both environmentalists and the 
Forest Service for their plight. Closure of the P&M Cedar Products mill and log yard in 
August 1992 brought this response from Larry Hood, company president:  
These unfortunate reductions in our operations are the direct result of the 
continued and unjustified pressure from preservationists, and the abject failure of 
the U.S. Forest Service to meet its obligations under the Multiple Use Sustained 
Yield Act of 1960. [135] 
 
Applying a social identity framework, it appears that a changing community 
context produced very different realities for environmentalists and loggers. For 
environmentalists, changing community context led to the integration amenity migrants 
and to the recognition of a common fate, common identity, and interdependence with 
loggers. Local environmentalists, it appears, adopted dual identity frames as members of 
the local environmental community and as members of the larger community, of which 
loggers were a significant and legitimate part. Applying a social identity framework, dual 
identities resulted from the changing context and enabled local environmentalists to 
recognize positive interdependencies with the logging community. The Friends’ 
conservationist alternative, it follows, grew from this recognition.  
For loggers, however, the establishment and integration of the environmental 
community was seen as a threat to the logging community itself, causing intergroup 
tensions to escalate. While a common fate may have existed between loggers and 
environmentalists as residents of the forest-dependent region, it was not acknowledged by 
loggers.  Instead, loggers perceived negative interdependencies with environmentalists 
whom, they feared, sought to take productive forestland out of the timber base. Loggers 
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resisted a common identity that required the recognition of environmentalists as 
legitimate members of the larger community and, instead, adopted a community identity 
exclusive of local environmentalists. Applying a social identity framework, a changing 
community context produced a threat to the community and prevented local loggers from 
recognizing a common identity and positive interdependencies with the environmental 
community. The rejection of the Friends’ conservationist alternative resulted in part from 
this threat. This suggests that identity-based barriers may have to be bridged at a higher 
level of inclusion before the Friends’ plan could be acknowledged and accepted.  
Changes in the Environmental Movement 
Changes in the environmental movement are considered separately from 
community change since changes in the movement produced external forces that had an 
additional affect on local environmentalists. As such, local environmentalists were 
influenced by the same external forces acting upon their regional counterparts but were 
also influenced by external forces acting upon forest-dependent communities in which 
they lived.  From a social identity perspective, these contextual changes created dilemmas 
for local environmentalists that required them to negotiate what it meant to be 
environmental activists as residents of forest-dependent communities. It also placed local 
environmentalists in the unique position of having to find novel approaches to 
environmental activism. As Brewer (1991) noted, “When the definition of self changes, 
the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also changes accordingly” (p. 
476).  In this section, I discuss changes that were occurring at both the regional and local 
level and local environmentalists’ response to those changes.  
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To begin, the environmental movement changed in three fundamental ways that, 
from a social identity perspective, helped local environmentalists negotiate the meaning 
of “community-based” environmental activism.  Redefining activist identities, in turn, 
enabled local environmentalists to recognize a common fate with the logging community 
and to seek integrated solutions to forest management problems. First, it appears that 
amenity migration and integration, and a decline in the commodity-based culture and 
economy, led local environmentalists to the recognition of a common fate with loggers, 
to see themselves as fellow community members, and to develop a concern for the 
wellbeing of those communities. This, in turn, led them to seek integrative approaches to 
forest management that recognized positive interdependencies. Second, changes affecting 
the environmental movement presented novel approaches that could be used to integrate 
environmental and logging interests.  And third, increased attention to the plight of the 
Sierras elevated environmentalists’ status in the debate and altered the balance of power. 
These changes are analyzed below from the perspective of how they contributed to 
environmentalists’ identities as community-based activists and to the recognition of a 
common fate with the logging community. 
Amenity migration, as we know, produced a local and empowered environmental 
community whose members eventually integrated themselves into the larger community. 
Environmentalists wanted their communities to survive, as Michael Jackson stated, 
because they wanted to live there too. As such, amenity migration and integration, in part, 
led environmentalists to pursue approaches that integrated environmental and logging 
interests. Jackson alluded to this pursuit as he recalled the relationship local 
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environmentalists were seeking in their development of the Friends of Plumas Wilderness 
conservationist alternative:  
…we anticipated the kind of relationship we liked to have with our neighbors in a 
situation in which everybody was trying to take care of the environment.  And in 
which any timber production was a by-product of that.  It was an honest attempt 
by honest people in the environmental movement to foresee a future – a changed 
timber industry but one still a part of management of the national forest. (personal 
communication 8/98) 
 
In addition, from their vantage point as community-based activists, local 
environmentalists were concluding that adversarial and confrontational approaches were 
no longer workable in the gradually worsening ecological and socio-economic context. 
Halting the sale of timber from national forests, or “shutting down” the timber industry, 
they surmised, would not improve forest conditions and would have deleterious affects 
on community wellbeing. Linda Blum described this realization in the unusual summer of 
1992, a few months before logging community leaders approached Michael Jackson:   
And, during that summer is when we first started realizing you can’t just say, 
“Don’t log it.”  You’ve got to treat the problem that leads to these big, 
catastrophic wildfires.  Meanwhile the local political drumbeat was this thing of 
environmentalists as a whole are anti people – they want the forest to burn up, you 
know, the end of the world kind of stuff.  Also in the summer of ’92 is when the 
Forest Service published the… California Spotted Owl [CASPO] technical 
assessment that was intended, and we helped make it, to establish a new 
management direction for the forests. (personal communication 3/3/99) 
 
As the passage contunied, Blum also hinted at the different ways that environmentalists 
perceived the new management direction recommended by the CASPO report, falling out 
along local and regional/national identity distinctions: 
Some people perceived [CASPO] to be a total lock-up of the timber supply.  
Others of us saw that there was considerable room to do other stuff – that there 
was logging to be done and that it did not mean that the mills in Loyalton and 





Moreover, there was also a growing concern primarily among community-based 
activists that confrontational strategies were producing grim results.  Blum recalled her 
own realization in the early 1990s that while forest activists had succeeded with 
administrative appeals, in the courts, and in political action campaigns, they needed less 
confrontational tools for responding to the growing hostilities. As pressure mounted, 
Blum recalled, tensions between loggers and environmental activists escalated:  
The political polarizations were escalating – jobs v. owls, fish v. people, Judi Bari 
got car-bombed, forest arsons were up – and some of us really were alarmed, and 
felt we should try to defuse the hostilities and dysfunctionalities before more 
people and places got seriously hurt. (personal communication 5/20/05) 
 
Local environmentalists’ reaction to these concerns, I argue, stems in part from their 
vantage point as community members subject to the same external forces as their fellow 
loggers. This is perhaps best observed by comparing perceptions between local 
environmentalists and their regional and national counterparts in discussions over the 
most effective strategies for advancing forest reform efforts. In the passage below, Linda 
Blum, who actively networked with her regional counterparts on forest reform issues, 
lamented about the differences between her perspective as a community-based activist 
and her perceptions of the perspectives of her regional counterparts:  
What I thought I knew better than they at that point were the practical limitations 
to a confrontation-only strategy, based upon the realities of appeals and the timber 
sale lawsuits at that time; what things were and were not achievable in settlement 
negotiations; and the level of social and ecological unrest in mill towns and forest 
communities from Susanville to Terra Bella (personal communication 5/21/05). 
 
Unfortunately, different perspectives, which fell out primarily along local and 
regional/national lines, began to produce tensions within the environmental movement 
itself. Environmental activists on each side were increasingly frustrated with proposed 
strategies from their counterparts that did not match their perceptions.  This difference 
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created a growing rift between activists as they attempted to network with each other over 
proposed forest reform efforts. This rift eventually caused the networks to splinter and, in 
some cases, to oppose each other. As biologist Linda Blum lamented regarding her 
attempts to network with a coalition of activists:  
I was very frustrated by the Sierra Club and NRDC and sort of the San Francisco 
– the urban faction – basically in their insistence upon their choice of organizing 
and lobbying techniques. If you’re going to make a change in whether that timber 
sale operator tells the sale administrator he knows it’s wrong to cut 30-inch trees 
and he’s not going to do it, you’ve got to change his mind and his heart.  You 
aren’t going to do it by putting an Action Alert on a door hanger in Modesto 
(personal communication 3-3-99).  
 
From their perspective as community-based activists, local environmentalists 
were no longer satisfied with top-down “just say no” stances espoused by regional and 
national environmentalists and sought new approaches. Drawing from the third wave of 
the environmental movement, market-based solutions provided a compelling model for 
local environmentalists, who were concerned not only with the economic wellbeing of 
their communities but with overall forest management. More importantly, they were 
aware that the forests needed attention and that the logging community could prosper if it 
could be enlisted to help improve forest health. Localized citizen action and modified 
market-based approaches merged around the concept of ecological forestry, which 
evolved at the grassroots level in response to the NFMA (Hays 2007). Using ecological 
forestry principles, and the neighboring Collins Almanor Forest as a model, the Friends 
of Plumas Wilderness sought to demonstrate that timber production and ecological health 
were not mutually exclusive. Friends’ forester Mike Yost described the group’s thought 
process in developing their forest plan:   
“...we came up with what we thought was a pretty comprehensive plan for 
management of the forest in an environmentally sound way.  And, we didn’t at all 
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try to limit timber production.  We talked a lot about thinning and we talked about 
doing timber in a different way.  And we weren’t really focusing on timber as the 
ultimate resource.  We were protecting all the back country, protecting all the 
roadless areas, protecting the watersheds and trying to keep enough of the timber 
program so we would keep the mills open.” (personal communication, 3/4/99) 
 
Finally, increased attention to the plight of the Sierra Nevada resulting from the 
1991 Sacramento Bee series “Majesty and Tragedy: the Sierra in Peril” elevated 
environmentalists’ status at a critical time in the debate and altered the balance of power. 
Vindicated by the series, environmentalists gained influence over the direction of forest 
management and were faced with a choice as to how to employ their increased power. 
Community-based activists, for the most part, used this influence to advocate for 
increased dialogue with the local logging community to defuse hostilities and to find 
integrative solutions, including the Friends of Plumas Wilderness’ plan.  Reflecting on 
local environmentalists’ response to the logging community’s interest in resurrecting the 
Friends’ plan, Terry Terharr, a Sierra Club activist who was involved at the time, spoke 
of environmentalists’ increased influence over forest management and community-based 
activists’ choice to cooperate:  
That was a time when the environmentalists thought the sky was the limit.  But to 
their credit, they said: “They’re offering us what we said we wanted, and that's 
what we want.”  They might have said, “We are going to ask for more,” but they 
didn't. (Marston 1997, p. 12) 
 
 Regional and national activists, however, advocated for what they felt was stricter 
enforcement of laws and regulations. According to Jackson, environmentalists chose not 
to endorse the QLG plan because, “They think they can get a better deal now that the 
timber industry is on its knees.  They are mad at us because we are going to let it up to do 
the right thing” [258].  Jackson was, in part, correct.  John Buckley (1998), director of the 
Central Sierra Environmental Resource Center, defended environmentalists’ decision to 
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reject the QLG proposal on the grounds that the balance of power had shifted in their 
favor.  
When the QLG agreement was created by all the local warring factions, it was a 
time of clearcutting, intensive road-building into roadless areas, and minimal 
protection for streams and rivers. At the time, the compromise agreed to by local 
environmentalists was probably a reasonable deal. But years later, by the time the 
QLG legislation was developed, the national forests were under much different 
direction. Today in the Sierra Nevada, roadless areas are temporarily off limits, 
trees over thirty inches in diameter are mostly protected, and timber sale levels are 
much lower than a few years ago (p. 46).  
 
However, Buckley (1998) admitted that at the time the QLG agreement was 
forged, it was “probably a reasonable deal” (p. 46).  Why then did local and regional 
environmentalists respond differently? One explanation, from a social identity 
perspective, is that the changing context surrounding the local timber wars produced a 
common fate that local environmentalists shared with their communities that regional and 
national environmentalists did not recognize. This fate increased the saliency of a 
common identity at the community level and appears to have produced a distinct identity 
as community-based environmentalist activists (as opposed to grass-roots activists). This 
distinction caused a rift along identity-based lines between local and regional/national 
environmentalists, or between community-based and grassroots activists, and caused the 
camps to view forest reform goals and strategies differently.  
Changing Forest Conditions 
Local loggers and environmentalists, we know, shared a common fate as residents 
of a forest-dependent region at the northern tip of the Sierras. Their communities were 
literally surrounded by large expanses of national forests that were managed by the U.S. 
Forest Service. Their lives and livelihoods, in many ways, were inextricably tied to the 
fate and condition of the surrounding forests.  A change in those conditions, therefore, 
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might affect loggers and environmentalists in similar ways, thus heightening their 
awareness of a common fate and leading to cooperative behavior. On the other hand, 
however, changing forest conditions may affect them differently, or be perceived 
differently in their causes and effects. Heightened perceptions of common fate may, in 
fact, lead residents to competitive behavior such as hording.  
The condition of the northern Sierra forests changed in two fundamental ways. 
First, the combination of a century of fire suppression and a half-century of intensive 
forest management left behind a forest that contained shrinking economic opportunities; 
growing risk of loss of life, property, and livelihood from catastrophic wildfire; and 
declining ecological health.  Second, an intensive six-year drought that struck the 
northern Sierras between 1986 and 1992 greatly magnified the conditions described 
above and posed an immediate threat to communities surrounded by drought-stricken 
national forests, as well as to the species that depended on the forest. As the drought 
worsened, forest fires burned at alarming intensities.  
Forest fire suppression and intensive forest management following World War II 
left behind a biologically depleted forest deficient of large canopy trees, choked with 
small understory trees, and prone to insect infestation and wildfire.  As a result, the Forest 
Service was forced to institute policies that were designed to halt or reverse these trends. 
The combination of forest conditions and resulting Forest Service policies had the effect 
of severely curtailing the timber industry and causing an abrupt downturn in the timber 
economy in the northern Sierras, thus exposing communities in the region to layoffs, mill 
closures, and lost tax revenues. Unfortunately, the logging and environmental 
communities perceived the causes of the problems quite differently. Much of the blame 
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for the economic downturn was attributed to environmentalists, who were largely 
responsible for raising awareness of declining forest health conditions and challenging 
Forest Service policies. 
One of the principal tensions between loggers and environmentalists affecting the 
factions’ perceptions of forest conditions was the logging community’s “sustained yield” 
forest management perspective. A common perception within the logging community at 
the time, for example, was that the Plumas National Forest produced more than 300 
million board feet of timber per year.  According to Bill Coates, since the forest 
consistently produced that volume of timber, harvesting less was an inefficient use of the 
resource. This argument led the logging community, and the Forest Service itself, to 
focus almost exclusively on timber volume and was put forth by loggers as one basis for 
rejecting the Friends of Plumas Wilderness plan to harvest only 245 million board feet.  
We just decided that if we were growing so much we ought to be able to take a 
little less than that out in the form of wood fiber.  Made pretty good sense to us.  
Well in those days the recognized number for what we were growing depended on 
who you talked to.  The Forest Service would come out with an estimate in the 
300 million board foot category.  We were only suggesting a 262 million board 
foot cut.  So we thought that as long as we were far under what we were growing 
that there was no reason to go down any further (personal comm. 5-17-99).  
 
Another significant tension between loggers and environmentalists affecting 
perceptions of forest conditions and subsequent management strategies was the logging 
community’s perspective on “multiple use” resource management. Multiple use, to the 
logging community, meant shared use of the entire land base. Environmentalists’ efforts 
to protect remaining old-growth forest, spotted owl habitat, and roadless and riparian 
areas by removing them from the land base were therefore particularly threatening to the 
logging community because the so-called “set-asides” reduced land available for timber 
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production.  Loggers’ arguments against set-asides were grounded in their interpretation 
of the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960. Coates elaborated on the loggers’ 
interpretation of the law as well as their fears. To logging advocates,  
…true multiple use meant that there was room in the forest to enjoy a wide 
variety of activities from wheelchair handicapped people to the most avid 
backpacker to the most needful logger, and that they ought to be able to co-exist.  
And the basic rule was that you didn’t interfere with one of those other uses.  The 
“set-aside movement” came along and threatened that whole idea because they 
wanted a chunk of land just for themselves.  So after a while we realized that the 
set-aside groups were endangering the general forest by grabbing off chunks of it 
(personal communication 5-17-99). 
 
While forest management practices were principally responsible for changing 
forest conditions, the severe drought of 1986-92 greatly exacerbated those conditions by 
placing additional stress on the forests. The drought, and the devastating wildfires that 
accompanied it, significantly heightened the threat to the forests and to forest-dependent 
communities.  Threat of catastrophic wildfire provided another powerful external force 
for residents of rural communities surrounded by susceptible forestland. For the most 
part, however, such fires were consistently managed by firefighting agencies. Of the 
4,570 fires reported on California national forests in 1992, only three produced 
devastating fires. [150]  It appears that forested communities had become complacent in 
the face of increasing risks. While they were aware that a common fate existed, the 
relative saliency of that which was producing the fate was apparently not yet great 
enough, or sufficiently close to home. 
The tipping point appears to be the intense fires that occurred during the summer 
and fall of 1992, at the height of the drought. Suddenly, the external force had become 
quite salient. Michael Jackson noted that the Friends’ conservationist alternative was 
designed in part to reduce the fuel loads that had accumulated from over a century of fire 
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suppression and intensive logging. But the plan did not specify a strategy for dealing with 
fires that threatened the communities themselves. Why? At the time the group did not 
fully appreciate the threat that modern fires posed. In the summer of 1998, however, 
Jackson was keenly aware of the threat. Sitting in his downtown office in Quincy, 
California, Jackson posed the following question:  
Would you like to walk out and take a look at the back side of this town and tell 
me what the fire coming down hill through that undergrowth is going to look like 
when it arrives?  Because my neighbors down here in Loyalton saw it three times 
in one two-day period.  It took them $9 million to drive that fire out of town.  And 
all the help from everybody in the world.  That is a very expensive way to deal 
with this problem (personal communication 8/98) 
 
Regional and national environmentalists later criticized the Quincy Library Group 
for playing on citizens’ fear of catastrophic wildfire, and believed the fire issue was 
overblown. Judging from media reports on the drought, and media coverage of several 
severe fires, it appears that their fears were valid.  When Bill Coates was asked if he 
knew why a concern for catastrophic wildfire was not part of the Friends’ 1986 
conservationist alternative, but was being used as a primary argument for implementing 
the QLG plan, Coates pointed to the nearby Cottonwood fire of the fall of 1992:    
When the [conservationist] alternative had been done, we did not have the 
Cottonwood fire in our area at that point.  So I think the thinking has changed a 
little bit since the alternative, based on that fire and others that have happened 
around us.  I think peoples’ thinking tends to be a work-in-progress based on what 
happens in your environment. (personal communication 5-25-99) 
 
As we have observed, forest conditions changed dramatically in the northern 
Sierras throughout the period of the timber wars. These changes affected 
environmentalists and loggers in similar ways and in ways that were quite different. For 
example, the threat of catastrophic wildfire and the overall health of the forests affected 
environmentalists and loggers similarly, exposing a common threat and common interests 
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to protect the forest and their communities. Neither relished the thought of a catastrophic 
wildfire sweeping through the town or devastating the surrounding forests. On the other 
hand, the protection of old growth forests, endangered species, and roadless and riparian 
areas affected them differently, exposing a threat to the logging community and 
conflicting interests with regard to harvest levels and set-asides.  
From a social identity perspective, their exposure to the increasing threat of 
drought and catastrophic wildfire may have created a greater awareness of their shared 
fate as residents of forest-dependent communities and heightened the saliency of a 
common identity and positive interdependencies associated with cooperation.  At the 
same time, their exposure to ecological degradation associated with old growth, 
endangered species, and roadless and riparian area protection may have created a greater 
awareness of their shared fate as competing factions within forest-dependent 
communities and heightened the saliency of subgroup identities and negative 
interdependencies associated with competition and conflict.  
Borrowing from Yaffee (1998), it can be argued that changes in forest conditions 
created both centripetal and centrifugal forces that acted on disputants in ways that 
heightened either a salient superordinate identity or salient subgroup identities. In this 
regard, cooperation would be expected to transcend conflict when centripetal forces – the 
threat of drought, disease, and catastrophic wildfire – outweighed centrifugal forces – old 
growth, endangered species, and roadless and riparian set-asides. Prior to 1992, it appears 
that centrifugal forces heightened the saliency of subgroup identities between loggers and 
environmentalists and the perception of negative interdependencies, despite the presence 
of the Friends of Plumas Wilderness conservationist alternative.  As the drought 
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deepened and forest fires intensified in the unusual summer and fall of 1992, centripetal 
forces around the increased threat of devastating wildfire may have increased the saliency 
of a superordinate identity that enabled residents of forest-dependent communities to 
align themselves against the threat.  
Forest Service Change 
 The U.S. Forest Service plays a dominant role in the northern Sierra communities 
surrounded by national forests. Forest Service policies, set by Congress and by 
administrative priorities, can literally make or break communities, institutions, and 
livelihoods. In addition, court actions and administrative appeals brought against the 
Forest Service can have similar effects. However for some, “Forest Service change” is an 
oxymoron since the agency is notoriously slow to adapt to changing conditions. This 
section is primarily a story of the agency’s response to the changing context in which it 
operated. The Forest Service responded to change in two fundamental ways that affected 
local loggers and environmentalists’ sense of a common fate as constituent groups subject 
to the agency’s policies and actions.  First was the Forest Service’s inability to adequately 
adapt to the growing crisis. Second, the agency’s response, when it finally acted, was 
simply to abandon its long-standing forest management paradigm, with no apparent 
alternative. This created a sense within both the logging and environmental communities 
that the Forest Service could not address the crisis. While it had articulated New 
Perspectives, New Forestry, and ecosystem management, what it delivered was a halt to 
almost all logging.  
The agency’s inability to adapt to a changing environment is a familiar theme. 
Wondolleck (1988) argued that the Forest Service’s inability to adapt was due, in part, to 
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its difficulty managing the “preservation paradigm” that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Rather than adapting to the new laws and policies, the Forest Service adapted the laws 
and policies to its existing paradigm. As Wondolleck argues, the approach continually 
failed, yet the agency persisted in its all-too-familiar process. Similarly, Salka (2004) 
argues that the agency’s inability to adapt to the northern spotted owl crisis was due to it 
being “captured by its own core technologies” (p. 221). Salka defines core technologies 
as “arrangements necessary for carrying out the tasks or programs the agency is assigned 
to do.” An agency’s core technology is largely “a function of the technological 
knowledge and skills of the agency’s dominant profession” (p. 222). To maintain and 
protect their core technologies, organizations will attempt to “buffer them against 
uncertainties” in the surrounding environment by demonstrating a willingness to adapt to 
changes as they arise. Short of adapting, however, an organization may provide the 
appearance of change while carefully guarding its core technology. The core technology 
may then become a barrier. Lacking a means for addressing the problem, the agency is 
thrown into a crisis. 
Often, agency procedures will become routinized so that each new issue will be 
dealt with in routine ways.  This tendency creates the potential for problems if the 
new issue cannot be effectively addressed with routine procedures (p. 223).  
 
In the northern spotted owl controversy, the focus of Salka’s research, the Forest 
Service relied on its core technology, scientific planning and management, to assess and 
respond to the growing crisis. Moreover, the agency’s core technology was heavily 
influenced by one set of constituents – the commodity-based culture – with which agency 
decision-makers were strongly aligned (Culhane 1981; Salka 2004; Twight and Lynden 
1989).  Failing to recognize the magnitude of the problem, the Forest Service simply 
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included the SOHA networks as another variable in the planning process. The agency’s 
inability to address the issue enabled environmentalists to expand the scope of the 
conflict through the courts, causing the Forest Service to lose control of the issue, thus 
becoming a victim of its core technology.  
Yaffee (1994) argues that the Forest Service’s organizational norms and values, a 
legacy of its Progressive Era past, prevented the agency from adapting to the northern 
spotted owl crisis. Yaffee contends that over time “an elaborate set of norms developed 
that defined organizational styles and prescribed appropriate behavior.” Behavioral norms 
were reinforced through narrowly focused academic disciplines, image control that 
attracted recruits that “fit the mold,” on-the-job training and socialization, and deliberate 
and subtle rewards and sanctions.  As they became embedded in the agency, the norms 
created a technical workforce that was strikingly homogeneous. Former Forest Service 
Chief Jack Ward Thomas (1998) would concur with this assessment:  
The traditional Forest Service workforce was made up of males – predominately 
foresters and engineers – most from accredited forestry schools who went through 
a very similar socialization process in education and early experience. They didn’t 
tend to question much (p. 18).  
 
On the ground, agency norms and values translated directly into timber harvest targets, 
which provided the basis for the agency’s reward system. While resource managers were 
well aware of the timber bias, most did not question it.  A Forest Service resource 
manager revealed the agency’s bias to Sacramento Bee reporter Tom Knudson in 1991: 
We have a whole generation of managers who were raised on getting the cut out. 
They get graded on it. When our forest supervisor gets his yearly review, it's a 
big-ticket item, “Did you meet the timber targets?” I have wildlife targets, too, 
and fish targets. And nobody ever once reviews, when I get graded, whether I 





 In response to the emerging northern spotted owl crisis, Yaffee (1994) observed 
that the Forest Service’s initial reaction was to “avoid dealing with it at all.”   
The owl was a non-issue for the agency. It was neither threatening nor 
demanding, because all of the experience of the leadership suggested that the owl 
could be dealt with in a minimal fashion with no resulting organizational or 
political fall-out (p. 270). 
 
As the issue became more controversial, and could no longer be ignored, the agency 
simply followed its standard operating procedures. Yaffee contends that the agency’s 
failure to deal with the spotted owl issue “was not that it was not doing anything, but 
rather that it was responding in time-honored ways that were inappropriate to the owl 
case or the times” (p. 270). Yaffee concluded:  
The time had come for a different kind of response to the evolving owl issue, and 
agency officials were unable to carry it out. Even those who tried were bound 
excessively by the character of the agency as it had evolved and been perfected 
over time (p. 275). 
 
This pattern was repeated on Sierra Nevada national forests, first by fitting the 
problem into the agency’s existing paradigm and then by abandoning the paradigm and 
suspending logging altogether. While the agency was trying to avoid a repeat of the 
northern spotted owl crisis, it had only succeeded, for the time being, in temporarily 
preventing an ESA listing of the owl. It had not addressed the larger issue of balancing 
commodity and non-commodity needs.  Ruth (1996 p. 160) framed the dilemma the 
agency faced as it contemplated the next step:  
Scientific and technical knowledge are essential components of decision making, 
but this expertise has not solved the riddle of how to meet either the demands of 
NFMA’s several conflicting forest management goals or the conflicting demands 
of the public. 
  
Stuck in its Progressive Era paradigm, the agency held the fate of the community and 
region in its hands, maintained control over that fate though scientific management, and 
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yet provided no path for addressing the crisis. What emerged from the agency’s action to 
suspend logging was a common recognition among local loggers and environmentalists 
that the Forest Service could not solve the problem for either of them.  
 The recognition that the Forest Service held the fate of both groups in its hands 
and, further, that its policies could not satisfy either of them, or the larger community, 
came sooner to the local environmental community. This recognition is captured in the 
Friends of Plumas Wilderness plan, which attempted to integrate environmental and 
logging interests, and in statements that local environmentalists made in an attempt to 
convince the logging community that the Forest Service was not its ultimate salvation. 
The following statement by Michael Jackson, for example, is indicative of how local 
environmentalists chose to convey this message to the logging community: 
The Plumas County environmental community has been preparing for the forest 
planning process for over ten years. We know what is wrong with present Forest 
Service activities and we know how to fix it. We know how to do that while 
preserving all of the local timber industry jobs and potentially increasing them. 
We also know that the logging community has answers to some of our common 
problems which we may not have considered. [71] 
 
The logging community may too have recognized a common fate with 
environmentalists at the hands of the Forest Service since they were aware that the 
agency had ultimate authority over forest management decisions affecting both groups’ 
interests.  Applying a social identity lens, Forest Service actions to suspend logging were 
perceived as a direct threat to the logging community, both from the perspective of the 
agency’s perceived actions against the logging community and from the appearance of 
favoring the environmental community. The logging community expressed this threat by 
attacking the Forest Service for caving in to radical environmentalists, whom they chose 
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to diminish and discredit, as the following passage from Frank Stewart of Collins Pine 
Co. suggested in August 1991:  
Until John G. Public stands up and says what he wants, the Forest Service 
responds to a vocal minority – that less than 1 percent of the public that wants to 
lock everything up for owls and wandering minstrels.  If it continues, something's 
going to have to go.  Everybody's going to be competing for the available Forest 
Service timber.  Somebody's going to have to drop out. [119] 
 
Eventually, however, it became obvious to most that neither group was satisfied 
with the agency’s direction, or lack thereof, and neither was being favored.  This 
realization may have reduced the perceived threat to the logging community and enabled 
its members to acknowledge mutual dissatisfaction with Forest Service actions. On rare 
occasions, the logging community’s criticism of the Forest Service even included such an 
acknowledgment, as in logging consultant Phil Nemir’s critique of the Lassen Forest 
planning process in August 1992. “They tried to play God,” complained Nemir. “Now 
nobody's happy because nobody fully understands what the trade-offs are.” [141]   
From a social identity perspective, the logging community likely recognized its 
shared fate with environmentalists in the hands of the Forest Service. However, it is 
likely that they still perceived negative interdependencies with environmentalists over 
critical forest management issues. They therefore continued to hold out hope that the 
Forest Service and intensive forest management would be their salvation. An indication 
of this is Bill Coates’ challenge to Forest Supervisor Leonard Atencio in response to a 
40-percent drop in timber harvest projections in the draft Lassen Forest Plan. The Feather 
River Bulletin covered a January 1992 meeting between the Forest Service and county 
supervisors at which Coates’ criticized the agency for caving in to environmentalists and 
admonished the agency, almost as a last resort, to fight on behalf of the communities:  
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We sense that the Forest Service is losing its will to fight. We are counting on you 
guys to start making a stand for these communities.  You can't fight a forest fire or 
anything else without them.  They are counting on you and we are counting on 
you, and we expect you to fight. [124] 
 
Atencio’s response was not hopeful. The Bulletin cited a shift in national values that 
“forced a change from the Forest Service’s traditional emphasis on timber harvests” 
[124]. Atenio told county supervisors that the agency now had other priorities, including 
stricter compliance with NFMA:  
I hope your perception is not that the Forest Service is not putting up a good fight.  
Internally [the agency] is in a lot of chaos.  As a country we are not sure we want 
to continue with our way of life or start protecting our environment. For the 
Forest Service it isn’t a choice.  Based on the laws we are required to follow, we 
are not given a choice of protecting animal species or communities.  It's real clear 
our job is to manage national forests. [124] 
 
Atencio’s assessment of the dilemma facing the Forest Service was accurate. The 
CASPO report was released later that year and called for drastic measures to protect the 
California spotted owl and to reduce the hazards of dangerous fuel build-up in Sierra 
Nevada national forests. The Forest Service, it appeared, could no longer be counted on 
to save the logging community from the fate that was upon it.  
Summary 
 
In the previous sections we have examined the changing context surrounding the 
timber wars from four perspectives – changes in the community, in the environmental 
movement, in forest conditions, and in the U.S. Forest Service. Moreover, we have 
examined those changes through a social identity lens in which identity is context-
dependent and in which a changing context is a necessary component for social identity 
change. In addition, from a social identity perspective, a changing context may produce 
and make salient a common fate among disputants in an intractable conflict, thus creating 
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conditions necessary for the emergence of a common identity, the recognition of positive 
interdependence, and movement towards collective action. Using Mohr’s (1982) 
framework, contextual changes provide the external forces that “herd” the disputants and 
the conditions necessary for cooperation to emerge into mutual proximity (p. 45).  
In the local timber wars, it can be argued that contextual changes produced three 
elements that heightened the saliency of a common fate among disputants in the local 
timber wars and created conditions necessary for a common identity to emerge. These 
elements are extracted from the contextual categories described above and define the 
crisis they were facing: a) a shared sense of loss, b) a shared sense of urgency, and c) 
institutional failure. These elements, I argue, are the fundamental contextual dimensions 
of local disputants’ common fate and coalesce around a common sense of and concern for 
the fate of their forest-dependent communities and surrounding forests. These elements or 
dimensions of common fate were produced and made salient by a) economic loss and 
projections of further suffering, b) the immediate threat that modern wildfires posed in 
conditions of severe drought, and c) Forest Service paralysis in addressing these and 
other problems.  
In addition, we can take from the analysis of necessary conditions that disputants 
recognized a common identity as residents of the forest-dependent community or at least 
recognized the basis for a common identity. Finally, disputants also shared the knowledge 
of a common set of tools, techniques, skills, and models for mutual fate control.  This 
arose from their common knowledge of each other and from local models of forest 
management and ecological restoration, such as the Collins Almanor Forest and the 
Feather River Coordinated Resource Management Group.  External direction forces, it 
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can be argued, had moved the disputants and conditions necessary for cooperation to 
emerge into mutual proximity. There is still one missing component of Mohr’s recipe – 
the probability that the mosquito will bite the victim.  
Necessary Probabilistic Processes  
"I could feel, smell and almost taste the fire," said Clinton Wooster, a Reno 
attorney who walked outside for 30 minutes Wednesday evening and came back 
coughing. "The mountains were not visible because of the haze and smoke." [149] 
 
Clinton Wooster lives in Reno, Nevada, 75 miles south-southeast of Quincy, 
California, the location of the infamous meeting at which Coates and Nelson approached 
Jackson to inquire whether environmentalists were serious about the conservationist 
alternative. Wooster walked outside on the evening of September 30, 1992. The 
Cleveland Fire started the day before near a campground on the Eldorado National Forest 
west of Lake Tahoe. The fire burned 22,485 acres over a two week period. Two 
firefighters died in a plane crash fighting the fire. Coates and Nelson very likely knew of 
these events as they walked up Main Street to Jackson’s law office.  
Bill Coates, Tom Nelson, Michael Jackson, and people like them, I argue, provide 
the necessary probabilistic process that causes cooperation to emerge from intractable 
conflict, when it does emerge. But Coates, Nelson, and Jackson have to do something that 
is equivalent to the bite inflicted by the Anopheles mosquito. They also have to carry a 
certain status that makes them effective communicators.  In the case of the Anopheles 
mosquito, that status is a female mosquito. They cannot, for example, be male Anopheles 
or other mosquito species. In other words, in order to transmit the disease they have to be 
a certain thing – a female Anopheles – and they have to do a certain thing – bite a person.  
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By the same token, in order for cooperation to transcend intractability, Coates, 
Nelson, and Jackson have to be a certain thing and they have to do a certain thing. 
Applying a social identity framework, the probability of cooperation emerging, therefore, 
will depend upon the ability of adopted leaders to effectively frame the conflict in ways 
that make salient disputants’ common fate, common identity, and positive 
interdependencies. Given similar external directional forces in forest-dependent 
communities throughout the Northwest, this probabilistic dimension of the dispute 
appears to be the critical element that appears to distinguish those forest-dependent 
communities that adopted collaborative approaches during the timber wars from those 
that did not. This interpretation requires us to revisit the concept of framing explored in 
chapter III and to develop a better understanding of the role that leaders play in the 
framing process. This suggests the following questions in the context of the present 
research: who is framing and what is being framed?  
Who is Framing? 
In studies of organizational leadership, Haslam and Platow (2001, p. 218) argue 
that social identity salience, “can be seen to provide the psychological footing for a range 
of key organizational phenomena including information exchange, consensus seeking, 
cooperation, trust, empowerment, group productivity, and collective action.” A leader’s 
success, therefore, “hinges upon an ability to turn ‘me’ and ‘you’ into ‘us’ and to define a 
social project that gives that sense of ‘us-ness’ meaning and purpose.” In this regard, it is 
the role of the leader to define and maintain organizational identity salience. Haslam and 
others contend that leaders provide the critical role of “entrepreneurs of identity” (Haslam 
2004; Reicher et al. 2001).  
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In studies of leadership in social movements, Reicher et al. (2001) suggest that, 
“If crowd members are seeking to determine how they should behave as category 
members, then the issue comes down to the process of how categories are defined and 
how proposals come to be construed as either consonant or dissonant with such 
definitions.” Equally, they argue, “the issue of leadership comes down to the question of 
how individuals come to be seen as defining these matters of category identity” (p. 184). 
Reicher and his colleagues conclude that, “those who wish to mobilise people to different 
ends will seek to provide different categories through which people should see their 
world, themselves and their actions in the world” (p. 186). The “transformative potential 
of leaders,” therefore, “lies in their ability to define shared social identities. It is through 
redefining identity that they are able to shape the perceptions, values and goals of group 
members” (Reicher et al. 2005, p. 560).   
In the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif et al. 1961), the research team controlled 
the experiment that led to the discovery of a superordinate goal. However, the research 
team did not, according to the research protocol, prime their subjects in any way. 
According to the protocol, staff members at the camp (the research team) were instructed 
to avoid directing the subjects.  
No staff member is to be a leader to the boys during any stage of the study in any 
of the various activities… You may have to give advice when asked and institute 
controls when necessary to maintain order, but please refrain from giving 
direction and initiating action in relation to problem situations (p. 57).  
 
In the conclusion of the study, Sherif (1961) reiterated the importance of letting the 
factions discover the superordinate goal:  
In this experiment, the setting and circumstances for the introduction of 
superordinate goals were elaborately prepared by the experimenters. But beyond 
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setting the scene, the methods followed, the discussion necessary for the solution, 
the plans to be made and executed were left to the groups themselves (p. 210). 
  
In the experimental situation involving the breakdown of the supply truck, the 
boys recognized their common fate and then discovered the tug-of-war rope that could be 
used to pull and jump-start the truck.  The initial exchange among the boys during the 
discovery of the superordinate goal (below) is taken from the researchers’ account of the 
event. To set the stage, Mills emerged and remained the Rattlers’ (R) leader throughout 
the experiment while for the Eagles’ a new leader emerged at each stage. The description 
below suggests that the superordinate goal was initially framed by Mills. Unfortunately, it 
is unclear from the passage what Eagles’ responded to Mills. 
Several Rattlers suggested, “Let’s push it,” but they abandoned the idea because 
the truck was parked facing up-hill. The tug-of-war rope was in plain sight to both 
groups. Mills (R) said, “Let’s get ‘our’ tug-of-war rope and have a tug-of-war 
against the truck” (p. 171).  
 
In the Robbers Cave experiment we see that a leader from one faction initiated the 
framing process, which was accepted by an individual (or individuals) from the other 
faction.  Similarly, from the QLG case study we see that adopted leaders from the local 
environmental community initiated the framing process in hopes that it would be 
reciprocated by leaders from the logging community. Local environmental leaders 
consistently framed the conflict in ways that invited cooperation with the local logging 
community. Their efforts, however, initially had little impact on the local logging 
community.  Leaders on one side of the dispute may have correctly framed the dispute, 
but they could not transform the conflict without the acceptance of their framing by 
adopted leaders on the other side. Both the Robbers Cave experiment and the QLG case 
suggest that adopted leaders or appropriate spokespeople on both sides of the dispute are 
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necessary components of the framing process. This also appears to be true from media 
accounts and case studies of well known collaborative groups whose leaders crossed 
ideological (identity) boundaries to talk (Bernard and Young 1997; Brick et al. 2001; 
Cestaro 1999; Colburn 2002; Kiester 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).  
Media accounts, moreover, often call attention to the courageous acts by factional 
leaders as they symbolically cross ideological boundaries to talk with adversaries. This is 
a common theme in the QLG story, which is captured in a Chico News & Review 
editorial titled Truce in the Forest Wars describing the new relationship forged by 
Jackson and Coates as they sat next to each other on the stage of the Quincy Town Hall 
Theater in July 1993.      
Michael Jackson and Bill Coates, inveterate enemies, are sitting side-by-side on 
the bare wood stage of Quincy's Town Hall Theatre. Watching them in open-
mouthed amazement is an audience of loggers, downtown shop owners and long-
hairs from the food co-op around the corner. No one who knows the combative 
attorney and a politician who hates to lose would be shocked if they suddenly 
exchanged fisticuffs. Instead, however, Jackson and Coates surrender their 15-
year owls-versus-jobs fight to stand together and embrace a proposal to save their 
community and the national forests surrounding it. [179] 
 
These acts appear to be important in the context of “who is framing” in that they 
acknowledge the individuals who took considerable risk in stepping across ideological 
and identity-based boundaries as they initiated the framing process. What makes the 
effort all the more noteworthy, it appears, is that the individuals are leaders of their 
respective groups and not random group members.  
What is Framed? 
Paralleling Mohr’s (1982) analogy regarding the contraction of malaria, Perdue et 
al. (1990) observed that “in-group- and out-group-associated words may function as 
linguistic vectors that establish an evaluative predisposition toward targets previously 
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uninfected…” (p. 482). In the same way that epidemiologists refer to vectors that carry 
and distribute disease-producing micro-organisms (insects, animals, and food), Perdue 
and colleagues investigated how in-group and out-group “descriptors” (collective 
pronouns) such as we, us and ours or they, them and theirs, affected the way in which 
information associated with the descriptor was evaluated. Their findings showed that 
priming subjects with in-group descriptors elicited significantly more pleasant 
evaluations from research subjects than when primed with out-group descriptors. 
Foddy and Hogg (1999) argue that an important implication for social dilemmas 
is how people with access to the resource categorize themselves; as members of a 
superordinate group, as two or more subgroups, or as an aggregate of distinct individuals. 
Since research findings strongly suggest that a superordinate identity is more likely to 
result in collective restraint, it follows that the superordinate group is the preferred 
categorization. The authors conclude that, “If the crux of the conflict in resource 
dilemmas resides with the level at which identification occurs, then the resolution will 
rely on finding methods for instilling compatible levels of social identity” (p. 313). To 
that end, social movement theorists Snow and McAdam (2000) contend that “framing 
processes… constitute perhaps the most important mechanism facilitating identity 
construction…, largely because identity constructions are an inherent feature of framing 
activities” (p. 53).  At a concrete level, they argue, “the construction of identities via 
framing occurs in the course of identity talk among adherents and activists” wherein 
“identities are announced or renounced, avowed of disavowed, and embraced or rejected” 
(p. 54). The medium, they conclude, “is typically framing discourse” (p. 54).  
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As entrepreneurs of identity, Reicher and colleagues (2001) contend that leaders 
must accomplish three fundamental and interrelated tasks in order to successfully 
mobilize people to appropriate action. First, they must “define the boundaries of the 
relevant identity such that it includes all those whose support is sought.” Second, they 
must “define those for whom support is sought (the individual, the organisation) such that 
they are undoubtedly part of the group.” And third, they must “define the content of the 
relevant identity and the nature of one’s proposals such that the two are consonant” (p. 
186). In other words, leaders will be more likely to succeed to the extent that they can 
successfully “frame” for their followers, a) the salient identity and boundary of inclusion 
(and exclusion), b) the distinct characteristics and values of in-group members, including 
the leader, and c) the congruency between the group’s (superordinate) identity and the 
leader’s proposed (superordinate) goals. “Above all,” Reicher concludes, “it is necessary 
to work on these various constructive dimensions… such that they form a coherent and 
seamless whole” (p. 186). While Reicher and colleagues (2001) do not discuss the role of 
common fate in their analysis, social movement theorists recognize the importance of a 
common fate or common threat as a possible condition for mobilization (Noakes 2000).  
Finally, we must consider Brewer’s (2000) necessary conditions for the 
emergence of intergroup cooperation – common fate, common identity, and positive 
interdependence. Unfortunately, Brewer does not suggest how the necessary conditions 
become salient. She does, however, argue forcefully for their saliency. Returning to the 
Robbers Cave experiment, which Brewer used to draw attention to the conditions (p. 
119), we find examples of not only the conditions necessary for cooperation to emerge 
but the mechanism – framing – that heightened their salience. The following description 
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is a continuation of Sherif’s (1961) passage in which the Rattlers’ leader, Mills, framed 
the superordinate goal for the two factions:  
Someone said, “Yeah, we can’t push it.” Swift (R) said, “20 of us can.” Several 
boys agreed loudly with this, Mills adding, “20 of us can pull it for sure.” The 
idea of having a tug-of-war against the truck was repeated by several boys in both 
groups. Mills (R) ran over to get the rope and started to tie it to the front bumper 
of the truck. An Eagle (E) said it would be too long, and suggested pulling it half-
way through the bumper, thus making two pulling ropes. Clark (E) fed it through 
the bumper while Mills (R) stretched it out. Harrison (R) suggested that the 
Eagles pull one rope and the Rattlers the other. Barton (R) said, “It doesn’t make 
any difference” (p. 171).  
 
The passage confirms the framing of a superordinate goal as the basis for Sherif’s 
conclusion, however the boys are, at the same time, framing a superordinate identity in 
their choice of collective pronouns, or linguistic vectors, to motivate action: “Let’s push 
it,” “Let’s get our tug-of-war rope,”  “…we can’t push it,” and “20 of us can pull it for 
sure.”  Consistent with Brewer (2000), then, it appears that the boys’ awareness of a 
common fate – the breakdown of the supply truck – led to the framing of a salient 
superordinate identity and superordinate goal (“a tug-of-war against the truck”). The 
research team created the situation but played no further role in priming the boys. The 
boys themselves created the frames that allowed them to transform the conflict. Finally, 
one factional leader initiated the framing process, which was gradually accepted by the 
other faction.  
While the other researchers cited in this section have not struggled with the 
constructs in the same way Brewer has, they appear to have arrived at similar 
conclusions. Each reference the importance of a superordinate identity and identity 
boundaries in the framing process (Foddy and Hogg 1999; Snow and McAdam 2000; 
Reicher et al. 2001). In addition, Reicher et al. (2001) discuss the link between the 
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“content of the relevant identity and the nature of one’s proposals” (p. 186) and argue for 
congruency between the two. These appear to be equivalent to Brewer’s superordinate 
identity and superordinate goal. Finally, Haslam and Platow (2001), citied above, also 
make the connection between a common identity and a common goal in their reference to 
“a social project that gives that sense of ‘us-ness’ meaning and purpose” (p. 218).  
Applying a social identity lens, it appears that the necessary probabilistic 
processes in transforming an intractable conflict such as the one found in the Quincy 
Library Group case appear to involve adopted leaders from both (or all) sides of the 
conflict, symbolically crossing identity-based boundaries, and framing a salient common 
fate, common identity, and positive interdependence and/or superordinate goal such that 
disputants in the conflict are mobilized to cooperate. While the probability of this process 
occurring is relatively low, it is not unheard of. In fact, the social identity lens applied 
here helps to explain what we generally know about how similar intractable conflicts 
were transformed in the early 1990s (Bernard and Young 1997; Brick et al. 2001; Cestaro 
1999; Coughlin et al. 1999; Colburn 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Yaffee et al. 
1996).  Moreover, it does not diminish the relevancy of other explanations of cooperative 
behavior in similar contexts, as will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter.  
 In this chapter I have applied a social identity lens to the transformation of a 
community-based environmental conflict. I have also used an explanatory framework that 
recognizes situations in which causal explanations do not hold. In such situations, 
conditions may exist for an outcome to occur and yet there is a probability that it may not 
occur. Following this framework, I have explored the necessary conditions for the 
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outcome to occur, the external directional forces necessary to align the conditions with 
the participants, and the probabilistic processes necessary to produce the outcome.  
In summary, the necessary conditions for cooperation to transcend conflict are 
extracted from Brewer’s (2000) theoretical framework and are a common fate, common 
identity, and positive interdependence as residents of forest-dependent communities 
subject to the same external forces and decision rules. The external directional forces 
required to herd the conditions and disputants into favorable alignment were extracted 
from disputants’ descriptions of the changing context surrounding the local timber wars, 
as well as further study of the changing context. Finally, the necessary probabilistic 
processes that produced the outcome were extracted from observations and general 
knowledge of the differences between situations where cooperation has emerged and 
similar situations where it has not. The difference, it appears, is the role that leaders play 
in framing and reframing the conflict in ways that make salient the necessary conditions 











Putnam (1994) encourages negotiation scholars to challenge traditional models of 
negotiation theory, in particular three assumptions that are embedded in such models; the 
focus on instrumental goals, the primacy of the individual, and rationality as the source of 
knowledge and choice. Putnam argues that while traditional models have given us “a rich 
field of study with excellent descriptive and explanatory power,” they “seem to blind us 
to important aspects of this complex process” (p. 337). Traditional approaches, she 
argues, for the most part, “fail to see, explain, or understand what is hidden or ‘invisible’ 
from many negotiation theories” (p. 337).  Putnam contends that the field of negotiation 
remains dominated by “a controlling paradigm or root metaphor – transactional 
exchange” (p. 338).  To move away from a narrow focus on traditional models informed 
by exchange theory, Putnam encourages scholars to develop an interdisciplinary field in 
which “multiple paradigms flourish and inform one another” (p. 337): 
The interdisciplinary area of negotiation analysis needs to expand its range of 
explanatory heuristics and introduce a variety of conceptual lenses rather than 
continue to grind one lens to optimal sharpness.  
 
 This research attempts to expand the range of explanatory heuristics in the 
negotiation and conflict management field by applying a social identity perspective to the 
transformation of an intractable environmental conflict at the local level. A social identity 
perspective was initially chosen during preliminary research due to the way that 
disputants’ collective identities appeared to change during the course of the conflict. An 
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initial exploratory research question of “What changes when difficult environmental 
conflicts are transformed?” guided the preliminary research and was reframed to capture 
the identity-based focus of the study. The revised question, “How does a focus on social 
identity inform our understanding of the transformation of community-based 
environmental conflict?” was chosen to better describe the more narrowly focused 
direction of the research. The question was also framed so as to avoid setting up 
competing paradigms with traditional models of negotiation. The research is intended to 
provide an additional lens with which to understand intractable environmental conflict 
and its transformation. It does not attempt to replace the traditional model of negotiation 
however it does attempt to challenge the primacy of that model over other models.  
As we have learned from applying a social identity perspective, disputants in the 
local timber wars adopted new collective identities as the conflict was transformed. These 
identities shifted from divergent affiliations with the environmental and logging 
communities to a collective and inclusive affiliation with the larger community and with 
the Quincy Library Group. Further, it appears that the logging community expanded its 
definition of the larger community to include local environmentalists. These findings are 
captured in the identity and characterization frames in chapters V and VI. It also appears 
from additional research that the context surrounding the conflict changed dramatically 
prior to and during the period in which the conflict occurred. Chapter VII details this 
changing context along four dimensions – changes in the community, in the 
environmental movement, in forest conditions, and in the U.S. Forest Service. These 
dimensions, extracted from interviews with disputants, are often mentioned by disputants 
in their explanations for the behavioral changes that occurred during the timber wars.  
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These two very distinct features of the conflict – changing identities and changing 
context – are critical to our understanding of the transformation of the conflict from a 
social identity perspective.  As we know from social identity theory, social identities are 
context dependent and change with changing context. We also know that individuals 
have multiple social identities and that a particular identity becomes salient in a given 
context. From a social identity perspective, therefore, the changing social identities 
observed in chapters V and VI would have to have been “caused” by the changing 
context surrounding the disputants. Since the four contextual dimensions described in 
chapter VII had the greatest impact on disputants throughout the conflict, it is likely that 
these contextual elements were principally responsible for the change in identity salience 
observed in chapters V and VI. Further, the contextual changes appear to have caused 
divergent identities with environmentalists and loggers to converge and “align” around a 
common identity with the larger community and with the Quincy Library Group.  
We also know from social identity theory that a common identity provides a 
strong basis for cooperation. From a social identity perspective, a common identity may 
emerge from the recognition of a common fate that is produced by the changing context. 
A common fate – being subject to the same external forces and/or decision rules – then 
makes salient a common identity among disputants. Their common identity then allows 
disputants to recognize positive interdependencies and common goals. We see this in 
environmentalists’ inclusive identity and characterization frames and in their focus on 
positive interdependencies with the logging community. With the logging community, 
however, we see almost the opposite pattern – exclusive identity and characterization 
frames and a focus on negative interdependencies with environmentalists.  
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Eventually, a common fate as residents of a forest-dependent community 
entrusted to a federal agency that could not manage the growing crisis likely increased 
the saliency of loggers’ common identity with environmentalists and allowed them to 
recognize positive interdependencies and a common goal. Fortunately, a common goal 
existed in the form of the Friends of Plumas Wilderness plan, which became the basis for 
the Quincy Library Group community stability proposal. From a social identity 
perspective, the continually changing context likely produced a common fate that caused 
salient social identities to align. While leaders of the logging community obviously made 
strategic choices that can be explained through transactional and exchange theory models, 
those models do not account for identity shifts and the role that changing identity played 
in the ability of disputants to transcend the previously intractable conflict. 
We also know from social identity theory that leaders play a particularly 
important role in the transformation of an intractable conflict in that they have the ability 
to frame a common fate, common identity, and positive interdependencies such that 
disputants recognize and translate those conditions into cooperative interaction. Leaders, 
however, also have the ability to perpetuate identity distinctions and intergroup conflict 
by increasing the salience of identity boundaries, the divergent characteristics and values 
of out-group members, and negative interdependencies that exist between or among the 
groups.  From a social identity perspective, this choice is likely based on the ability of 
factional leaders to recognize a common identity with their adversaries, or the basis for a 
common identity. This again is produced by a common fate. In the local timber wars, it 
appears that environmental leaders recognized the basis for a common identity with 
loggers and framed a common fate, common identity, and positive interdependence with 
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the logging community at an early stage of the conflict. This is evident from identity and 
characterization frames expressed by environmental leaders.  
Logging community leaders, however, did not recognize the basis for a common 
identity with environmentalists and perceived the environmental community as largely 
responsible for their fate. Logging community leaders framed the conflict in ways that 
perpetuated identity distinctions and negative interdependencies. As the context 
continued to change, however, and their common fate became more obvious, logging 
community leaders appear to have discovered the basis for a common identity and began 
to reframe the conflict in ways that gradually reflected environmentalists’ perspectives, 
thus accepting environmentalists into the larger forest-dependent community. In 
accepting environmentalists, it can also be argued that the logging community may have 
redefined the larger community – it was now no longer a “timber-dependent” community 
but was more appropriately a “forest-dependent” community.  
Finally, the research methodology and the research itself points to an 
unrecognized phenomena of leadership that is characteristic in the transformation of 
intergroup conflict. It appears from this research that group leaders from both or all 
factions of the conflict must recognize and frame a common fate, common identity, and 
positive interdependence with their adversaries in order to transform the conflict. For this 
to occur, a common fate and the basis for a common identity must be salient to both or all 
factional leaders. If it is not, the conflict will remain intractable. This suggests that the 
probability that leaders in intergroup conflict will mutually discover a common fate, 
common identity and positive interdependence, and mobilizing cooperative action to 
transform the conflict, is relatively rare.  
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Contribution to the Research  
 The present research draws primarily on social identity theory to explain the 
transformation of a deep-seated environmental conflict that is typical of the conflicts 
facing environmentalists, extractive industries, and government agencies throughout the 
U.S. Social identity theory was developed and advanced primarily through 
experimentation with student populations and research subjects in organizational 
contexts. In addition, most studies are of a quantitative nature. Social identity theory has 
also been tested in many real-world settings and has shown to be a consistently valid 
theoretical framework. In spite of the predominance of experimental research, social 
identity theory has shown such consistent and predictable results that social identity 
theorists suggest that cognitive processes involved in self-categorization and comparison 
are adaptive in human populations.  
 In the realm of social identity research, this study appears to offer a unique 
contribution. While field studies exploring social identity change exist, I was unable to 
locate a study of the complexity contained here. I was also unable to find any research 
that used frame analysis to track social identity change with a changing context; that 
explored the complexity of a changing context; that identified the role that leaders play in 
conflict transformation; and that used process theory in conjunction with social identity 
theory to explain probabilistic processes involved in behavioral change. The principal 
contributions to social identity theory, however, are the role that the surrounding context 
plays in identity change and the role that adopted leaders play in the transformation of 
identity-based conflict. These contributions are discussed below.  
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 First, social identity research posits that social identity is context dependent and 
changes when the context surrounding the individual changes. Turner et al. (1994) 
suggest that the individual “gains identity from being placed in context” (p. 458). Most 
research exploring contextual changes and subsequent changes in social identity have 
explored the movement of individuals from one context to another and the affect of those 
changes on collective identity. This research, on the other hand, looked at how identities 
change when research subjects stay in the same place and the context shifts around and 
under them. It also explores the way in which intergroup conflict is experienced by the 
groups as the surrounding context changes and as subgroup identities shift to a 
superordinate identity while maintaining subgroup affiliations.  
Findings of the present research support social identity theory in that identities are 
tied to context and change correspondingly. However, this research suggests that 
changing context surrounding existing identities may not be immediately recognized by 
participants and may emerge through an evolving process as participants grapple with 
contextual changes and their meaning. While new identity frames appear abruptly with 
the emergence of the Quincy Library Group, it appears that environmentalists adopted a 
common identity frame early in the conflict while the logging community resisted the 
changing context until a sense of urgency enveloped them.  
 Second, social identity research offers little in the way of leadership in the context 
of intergroup conflict, except to demonstrate that as prototypical group members leaders 
play a role in reinforcing identity distinctions with other groups. In common pool 
resource dilemma research, leaders are often appointed by group members to oversee 
access to the resource. In social movement research, leaders frame collective identities 
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and mobilize sympathizers against oppressors. I found no research, however, describing 
the role that leaders play in resolving identity-based conflict, particularly where leaders 
may have defied principals of prototypicality and framed superordinate identities that 
bridged identity boundaries. I also found no direct research that discussed the way in 
which a changing context or a common fate is conveyed to group members. In that light, 
the present research makes a significant contribution to the role that leaders play in 
perpetuating identity distinctions and in framing common fate, common identity, and 
common goals, and creating a common space for opposing leaders to enter.  
 The research may make an even greater contribution to the field of negotiation 
theory in that it advances our understanding of identity-based conflicts and provides 
another lens through which to view intractable conflicts. With regard to furthering our 
understanding of identity-based conflict, this research has delved more deeply into social 
identity theory as an explanatory framework, and into the conflict itself, than comparable 
identity-based research in the negotiation arena. Most negotiation research dealing with 
identity-based conflict, I have found, has either mixed identity and social identity 
frameworks in its analyses or has skimmed the surface of the theory, thus overlooking the 
richness of the framework. Moreover, many social psychologists that study negotiation 
behavior, I have found, tend to focus on interpersonal dynamics and pay little attention to 
either group behavior, intergroup conflict, or the role of context. I found as I delved into 
the research that I was initially drawn to the more familiar negotiation literature 
pertaining to identity-based conflict, but soon found it lacking as a solid framework. As I 
waded more deeply into social identity theory, however, I discovered greater theoretical 
consistency and a solid framework, but found myself in a very deep pool. Feeling slightly 
 
 269
overwhelmed by the challenge, I was tempted to return to the negotiation literature. 
Fortunately, I stayed afloat and can now add to the depth of knowledge of identity-based 
conflict in the negotiation field.  
 Finally, as Putnam (1994) observed, the dominant theoretical framework for 
understanding and explaining negotiation behavior is exchange theory. Following this 
framework, actors are driven by instrumental goals, act as individual utility maximizers, 
and make decisions that are guided by purely rational thought. While it is helpful to view 
the present research through this lens, such a view would miss the hidden and invisible 
dimensions of individual and group behavior that inform our understanding of the 
conflict and its transformation in value-added ways. From this perspective, the present 
research, which stays true to a social identity framework throughout the study, adds 
immensely to the interdisciplinary nature of negotiation theory and research. Discounting 
the research because it does not track with the dominant paradigm would be a mistake.  
Limitations of the Research 
The principal data used to identify and document identity and characterization 
frames was extracted from media and documentary accounts of the way in which 
disputants in the local timber wars used third-person plural pronouns and other 
affiliations when talking about forest management issues. These accounts were derived 
from public settings in which disputants spoke briefly about forest management issues 
that were the topic of a particular meeting. Accounts were also derived from media 
interviews with disputants as well as letters to the editor, guest opinions, and other 
accounts.  In addition, many of the newspaper articles that covered forest management 
issues were written by a single reporter. While the advantage of these accounts is that 
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they are all real time data and are absent of reflective biases, they may be limited in two 
minor ways, discussed below.  
First, media accounts of the ongoing conflict may be biased by the views of the 
reporter or may be sensationalized to capture a certain drama produced by the conflict. 
While sensationalized media accounts of conflict are more prevalent today, they were 
likely occurring in the 1980s and early 1990s, even in rural communities. In addition, 
participants may have “played to the media” or to the audience by exaggerating their 
views or opinions in a highly charged public context. While both are possible, I did not 
detect an observable difference between media accounts and disputants’ own accounts of 
the situation. Moreover, media or disputant dramatization of the conflict may have drawn 
out identity and characterization distinctions that are relevant to the conflict and its 
resolution but which would have remained unspoken in the absence of more intense 
conflict. Finally, dramatization may, in fact, make the conflict more difficult to resolve, 
suggesting that its resolution is all the more astonishing.   
Second, while identity and characterization frames are extracted from public 
statements made by disputants in media and written accounts of the dispute, social 
identity theory is in large part a cognitive process that occurs internally and emerges 
through social interaction. Self categorization may therefore occur outside of any public 
accounting of identity and characterization framing. This makes it difficult to know in 
real time whether a common identity was recognized by the logging community prior to 
the formation of the Quincy Library Group. As mentioned, it is improbable that such 
evidence would exist since it is unlikely that Coates and Nelson would have made public 
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statements prior to their secret meeting with Jackson. Nevertheless, public accounts of the 
conflict provide limited real-time opportunities to track some important information.  
Application in the Public Policy Arena 
Ending the timber wars through local consensus was a significant goal of the 
Clinton Administration during the 1990s and continues to be a policy directive of the 
current administration, as indicated by federal initiatives and policies designed to foster 
“cooperative conservation” (Van de Wetering 2006). It is expected that consensus-based 
solutions to natural resource and environmental problems will be a significant goal of 
future administrations as environmental issues continue to challenge life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness. As such, the present research should be of interest to public policy 
makers, administrators, and managers. The research is also intended to add to the 
knowledge base and skill set of public policy conflict managers and the cadre of 
academics and professionals who train them, as well as participants in consensus-based 
decision-making processes. In this section I will discuss the relevancy of a social identity 
framework to understanding and managing community-based environmental conflicts 
from the perspectives of three sets of actors – public policy makers, conflict managers, 
and potential participants.  
Relevance for Public Policy Makers 
 A social identity framework helps us see that laws and policies such as the 
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act and the National Forest Management Act function 
in ways that inadvertently reinforce identity distinctions and perpetuate competition and 
conflict among user groups. While well-intended, laws and policies that divide natural 
resources into specific uses or values based on the stated or perceived interests of 
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narrowly defined “stakeholders” perpetuate competition and identity-based conflict. 
Because of the tendency among individuals to categorize themselves in terms of groups, 
to reserve benefits for in-group members, and to compare their group more favorably 
with regard to access and distribution of resources, it is critical that policy makers 
consciously design public policies in ways that both avoid perpetuating divisive identity 
distinctions and reinforce common identity distinctions.  
Unfortunately, there is a tendency among policy makers to develop policy 
initiatives in ways that reinforce identity boundaries. This, I argue, occurs for two 
reasons.  First, policy makers generally do not see public policy debates as identity-based 
conflicts and tend to think of them solely as interest-based conflicts driven by substantive 
differences among parties. While there are clearly substantive dimensions to identity-
based conflicts, the conflicts themselves occur between or among groups rather than 
between or among individuals. It is the “we” and “they” of public policy debates that 
make them identity-based conflicts. Second, because policy makers generally do not 
recognize identity-based conflicts, they tend to overlook the role that their own social 
identities play in policy debates. They therefore tend to categorize themselves in 
alignment with an interest group, reserve benefits for in-group members, and compare 
their in-group more favorably than other groups.  
 Public policies that are cognizant of social identity dynamics and identity-based 
conflict would contain subtle but important differences. Instead of framing the policy 
around distinct resource values and uses, policies would recognize such values and uses 
but focus on their integration within an inclusive identity frame, which would be 
reinforced by policy makers and public managers through governing structures, 
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professional positions, and reward systems. Instead of “getting the desires of each side 
into one field of vision” as Mary Parker Follett (1942. p. 39) stated in her definition of 
reframing, public policies would focus more strongly on “getting the faces of each side 
into one field of vision.” Pursuant to this research, such policies would include an 
inclusive framing of the common fate faced by the people the policy will affect, subgroup 
identities and a superordinate identity defined by the policy or its implementation, 
positive interdependencies among people and groups, and a common or visionary goal 
that will be achieved if the policy is successful. One significant goal of the policy itself, 
therefore, should be to instill and sustain a salient superordinate identity among all of the 
resource users, while allowing subordinate or interest-based identities to co-exist.  
Pursuant to NFMA, for example, the forest planning process is focused on 
individual national forests, which may provide the basis for a common identity. However, 
the most salient identities in the NFMA planning process, we have seen, are subgroup or 
interest-based identities focused on forest values and uses that perpetuate identity 
distinctions. An identity-based approach might focus more strongly on the resource, 
landscape, or ecosystem as a socializing construct in an effort to make salient a common 
resource-based identity, the integration of resource values within the boundary of that 
identity, and an overarching goal that captures a shared vision that could be achieved if 
the goal was realized.  Section 101 of NEPA offers the conceptual framework for such a 
goal in its recognition of productive harmony: 
“…it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with 
State and local governments, and other concerned public and private 
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures… to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and 
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 




Inclusive concepts such as productive harmony provide an integrated and 
visionary goal that a group of people can work towards. From a social identity 
perspective, they first need a context in which to pursue the goal, where the “we” is or 
can be defined. In an environmental arena, that context is generally a landscape, region, 
or ecosystem that provides a salient boundary inside of which people have the potential to 
see themselves as a single group with a common fate. Collaborative resource 
management groups such as the Applegate Partnership and Malpai Borderlands Group, 
for example, tend to redefine themselves in “landscape” terms rather than as disparate 
users groups (QLG is an exception) (Brick et al. 2001).  Group members still affiliate 
with their respective user group identities but have defined a common identity boundary 
inside of which they see themselves as a single group. And the group is defined by the 
landscape that they share. Unfortunately, integrated concepts such as productive harmony 
have been replaced by competing resource uses and values that perpetuate identity 
distinctions, competition, and conflict. Without a basis for a common resource-based 
identity, it appears, the most we can expect from environmental policies are compromises 
among competing uses and values, hardly a condition of productive harmony.  
In addition to public policies, government agencies that administer such policies 
show strong tendencies towards structures of governance that reinforce identity-based 
distinctions and perpetuate intergroup tensions. Social identities exist within and between 
organizations at levels where identity salience is most stable. Organizational, 
programmatic, and disciplinary identities engender trust and cooperation within the 
organization, program, or discipline, but create barriers that prevent managers and 
resource specialists from crossing identity-based boundaries to define integrated 
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problems, share information, and leverage resources in ways that lead to integrated 
problem solving and productive harmony. It is imperative that public managers and 
resource specialists are aware of identity-based barriers to cooperation and to collectively 
identify a basis for common identity that has the potential to define group boundaries at a 
greater level of inclusiveness. The concept of ecosystem management, for example, has 
the potential to provide a superordinate identity for organizations responsible for the 
management of the system. Framing a common identity at the appropriate landscape 
scale, I argue, may be critical to the success of a management initiative or project.  
Relevance for Conflict Management 
 Conflict managers are in a unique position to design and facilitate collaborative 
and negotiated processes that minimize identity-based distinctions and increase 
opportunities for integrative problem solving and cooperation. Often, however, conflict 
managers inadvertently perpetuate identity distinctions because they overlook the 
identity-based nature of most environmental and natural resource conflicts and decision-
making processes. Or they attempt to frame a common identity without fully 
understanding the saliency of the identity to disputants or the unique context surrounding 
it. In addition, while most conflict managers are aware of the concept of framing and 
reframing, they tend to apply the concept only to restatements of the problem or peoples’ 
interests without fully understanding the role that social identity plays in how people 
might perceive their interests. Moreover, conflict managers may downplay the salient 
identities around which conflict exists and miss opportunities to establish and sustain dual 
identities that capture both the intergroup tensions necessary to ensure that the basis of 
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conflict is addressed and the shared motivation to turn their differences into 
opportunities. 
 Environmental conflict managers are also in a unique position to help disputants 
define resource management boundaries inside of which people may see themselves as a 
common group. Boundaries and scale in ecosystem management, for example, are 
extremely important variables in determining the likelihood that a superordinate resource-
based identity will be established and will be stable. At what landscape scale and under 
what conditions, for example, will divergent natural resource users recognize a 
convergent superordinate identity? How do they define or arrange themselves on the 
landscape in ways that might suggest a common boundary within which there is potential 
to recognize a common fate and a common identity?  
In the QLG case, it appears that the forests defining the boundaries of the 
intergroup conflict – the timber wars – also came to define the boundaries of a salient 
superordinate identity for the warring factions. This occurred in part due to the context in 
which the conflict occurred – national forest management and the NFMA planning 
process. However, it also suggests that social identities can be shaped to some extent by 
the ways in which the context is defined by an agency such as the Forest Service that 
largely controls peoples’ fate. On the other hand, resource management agencies may be 
wise to define management boundaries based on the ways in which resource users define 
them. Such boundaries may already provide the basis for a common identity.  
As we have established, landscape or resource boundaries must be defined such 
that a salient superordinate identity is achievable. One significant dimension of this 
equation is the ability among resource users to trust and/or monitor other users. If the 
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identity boundary is too large, for example, thus increasing the anonymity of resource 
users or the difficulty of resource monitoring, identity salience is considerably more 
challenging. In addition, a common resource-based identity may be difficult to achieve 
and sustain in situations where strong intergroup distinctions create additional barriers to 
the formation of trust. Conversely, a superordinate identity may be easier to achieve and 
sustain where a basis for intergroup or interpersonal trust already exists or where all-party 
monitoring can be more easily established. Finally, since social identity is context 
dependent, the changing context surrounding the management of specific resources or 
specific uses may provide opportunities to frame common identities based on new 
interpretations of common fate and positive interdependencies among the parties.  
 In addition to issues of boundary and scale, identity-based dimensions of 
environmental and natural resource conflicts suggest new areas of inquiry for conflict 
assessment. The discussion above suggests that conflict assessment should be focused not 
only on the principal issues, underlying interests, and willingness among the parties to 
engage in negotiation or collaboration, but also on the identity-based dimensions of the 
conflict. Identity-based dimensions are revealed in the way parties use social identity and 
characterization frames in their descriptions of the conflict. From a social identity 
perspective, a conflict or situation assessment should also explore, a) the context 
surrounding the conflict and whether contextual dimensions are acting as centripetal or 
centrifugal forces to produce a common fate, b) whether participants perceive a common 
fate and interdependence with other participants, c) whether there is a basis for a common 
identity in the way participants talk about each other and/or share the landscape or 
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resource, and d) whether leaders among the factions perceive a common identity or with 
their adversaries.  
A willingness to engage in a negotiated process suggests that the parties may 
already perceive a common fate of some sort that provides the basis for a common 
identity. This may be as straightforward as, for example, a negotiating group’s common 
knowledge that if they don’t reach an agreement, a higher authority will decide for them. 
Their common identity as a group of people subject to the same fate may enable them to 
join forces in a process of mutual fate control. This suggests that even in a negotiated 
rulemaking context, for example, where participants have no social ties with each other, 
there still exists the opportunity for a common identity to emerge and to better the 
negotiated outcome.  
Finally, conflict managers need to be aware of how social identity influences the 
dynamics of the intergroup conflicts they are mediating. Ideally, we have learned, 
outcomes are improved when participants maintain a healthy tension between their 
subgroup identities and their superordinate identity, or between their identities as 
environmentalists and loggers and their identity as QLG members. All too often, 
negotiators in collaborative processes either fail to adopt the more inclusive group 
identity, therefore never recognizing the superordinate goal, or they fully adopt the 
superordinate identity and lose sight of their constituents’ underlying interests.  A social 
identity lens helps conflict managers make sense of their observations of participants who 
at one extreme seem unwilling to agree to anything the group proposes and at the other 
extreme seem willing to agree to almost anything the group proposes. As conflict 
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managers are aware, these differences go beyond the parties’ instrumental goals and 
suggest social and psychological dimensions of conflict and cooperation.  
Relevance for Participation 
 Participants in environmental and natural resource conflicts may be making 
strategic choices to gain or maintain political advantage for their group and, therefore, 
may be quite comfortable perpetuating identity-based divisions. Where inherent power 
differences exist, altering the balance of power by mobilizing people to take action may 
require identity and characterization framing that distinguishes between the “haves” and 
the “have-nots.” This is essentially the role that social identity plays in social movements, 
including the environmental and natural resource justice movements. It is also the 
strategy used by local environmentalists in the present research. However, local 
environmentalists did something else that opened the door for cooperation and 
collaboration with the logging community. They, in a sense, built a bridge for the logging 
community to walk across while at the same time working through activist channels to 
block their alternate routes.  
 Why might this be the wiser strategy to pursue in environmental conflicts, not 
only for environmentalists but for other interest groups? From a common pool resource 
perspective, it is a wiser strategy because of the collective nature of common pool 
resource dilemmas. As environmental ethicist Johnson (2003) asserts, since common pool 
resource problems are derived from resource users acting independently, one’s moral 
obligation in the face of a commons dilemma is to “work for a collective agreement that 
could avert a potential tragedy of the commons” (p. 283). As noted above, working 
towards a collective agreement may require disenfranchised groups to first gain power by 
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influencing the context surrounding management of the resource. However, ethical 
obligations require each of the parties to take additional steps towards a collective 
agreement that enables them to work together to avert the tragedy.  
The nature of common pool resource dilemmas also requires participants to 
recognize the difficult challenges faced by resource users who derive their livelihoods 
from the resource itself. In such situations, Johnson notes (2003), “personal sacrifice to 
preserve the commons tends to be self-eliminating” (p. 272) since other users will fill the 
gap created by the individual exercising restraint. Thus the challenges created by the 
dilemma will be more acutely experienced by those whose livelihoods are affected by 
proposed changes. And when their identities are tied to those livelihoods, the prospect of 
change is increasingly threatening. A “fourth generation logger in Plumas County” [66], 
with salient ties to family, vocation, and place, will find personal sacrifice for the good of 
the commons much more challenging, especially with the very real prospect that showing 
restraint will be self-eliminating.  
 Assuming that participants in environmental and natural resource conflicts wish to 
move towards collective action in common pool situations, achieve a more productive 
harmony between man and nature, or simply resolve the conflicts they are facing, what 
might they learn by applying social identity theory to the QLG case? First, it appears that 
while local environmentalists in the QLG case were trying to gain political advantage for 
their group, they were also framing a common fate, common identity, positive 
interdependencies, and a common goal with the local logging community. Moreover, 
they were careful to legitimize the logging community’s role in the larger community and 
in the implementation of their plan, and sought their input in making the plan better. In 
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addition, environmentalists made an effort to integrate themselves into the larger 
community in ways that benefited the community as a whole. Finally, they offered a 
consistent and inclusive message throughout the conflict, even as they were being vilified 
by members of the logging and environmental communities.   
Fortunately for them, the context surrounding the conflict changed, thus 
heightening awareness within the logging community that their fate and the fate of the 
environmental community were tied together. Since social identity is context-dependent, 
it follows that a changing context is a necessary component of a changing identity. 
Therefore, the context surrounding the conflict needs to perceptually shift. If it does not, 
or it is not recognized, it is unlikely that a common fate will be acknowledged. However, 
a common fate may occur in many forms and is not limited to those identified in the QLG 
case.  It is therefore necessary to monitor the context surrounding the conflict for 
opportunities to frame or reframe contextual changes in ways that define the basis for a 
common identity, that frame a common identity when a basis exists, and that point 
towards interdependencies among the parties and to a common goal or vision.  
Moreover, it appears that a common fate and common identity may need to be 
framed by leaders from one group and accepted, in one form or another, by leaders from 
the other group.  This act may present a challenge for the groups and their respective 
leaders if their advances are perceived as a sign of weakness by either group. This 
perception makes it all the more difficult for leaders to cross identity-based boundaries 
and may, to a large extent, prevent them from doing so. Unless, that is, they can define a 
superordinate identity they and other leaders can step into that encompasses a larger 
collective. In the QLG case, the larger collective was the forest-dependent community 
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they shared. Stepping into a common space for the good of the community, as it was 
characterized by the media and most observers, was not perceived as a sign of weakness, 
even though Jackson famously commented later that the timber industry had come to 
environmentalists “on its knees.” This suggests that leaders play a unique and 
complicated role in the transformation of identity-based conflict in that they frame a 
salient common identity that is inclusive of the other group, maintain a common space for 
other leaders to step into without losing power or face, close off alternative courses of 
action, and accommodate other leaders and their constituents when they take the step.  
 A final note on the Quincy Library Group itself. I have purposely not taken sides 
in the QLG debate, and have been disappointed with other researchers who have 
compromised their integrity by deciding that QLG is either good or bad. I have also been 
disappointed by fellow researchers who have taken sides in the debate without thoroughly 
studying the points they are criticizing. Instead, they have interviewed the parties in the 
conflict and interpreted their statements as factual evidence when additional research 
would have exposed them as opinions designed to influence peoples’ perceptions. In that 
light, many researchers have become pawns of the disputants whose side they have taken. 
Having studied this group more extensively than other researchers, read what other 
researchers have written, and lived in the community for a year, I have to conclude that 
the group has been misrepresented and misunderstood. It is evident to me that the Quincy 
Library Group is not a pawn of the timber industry, is not undemocratic, is not trying to 
circumvent federal environmental laws, is not unscientific, is not a special interest group, 
and is not purposefully exclusive. It is an honest example of collaborative decision-
making, with all of its imperfections.  
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The group has also made mistakes along the way, principally alienating the Forest 
Service, allowing western Republicans to use the group to criticize environmentalists, 
and failing to use its popularity in Congress to keep the environmental community at the 
table. Of these, the greatest misstep, in my judgment, was the alienation of the Forest 
Service. I say this because the Friends of Plumas Wilderness plan, which was eventually 
recognized as a common goal between loggers and environmentalists, was also the 
common goal for the Forest Service, since it met the CASPO guidelines, provided 
community stability, and was consistent with New Forestry and ecosystem management 
principles. However, the agency did not recognize the plan as a common goal since, from 
a social identity perspective, it had no basis for a common identity with environmentalists 
or with QLG. More importantly, the Forest Service was not viewed and did not view 
itself as an interdependent member of the larger community. This failure perhaps speaks 
best to the role that social identity plays in either achieving cooperation or perpetuating 
conflict. The failure of QLG to implement its plan lies to a large extent in its inability to 
frame a common fate, common identity, and positive interdependencies with the Forest 
Service – to create and maintain a common space for agency leaders to step into without 
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Interviewees and Affiliations 
 
Leonard Atencio, US Forest Service 
Tom Bonnicksen, Texas A&M University 
Barbara Boyle, Sierra Club 
Linda Blum, QLG/Friends of Plumas Wilderness 
Luis Blumberg, The Wilderness Society 
Rose Comstock, QLG/Women in Timber 
Kent Connoughton, US Forest Service 
Jody Cook, US Forest Service 
Neil Dion, Friends of Plumas Wilderness 
Steve Evans, Friends of the River 
Maggie Fox, Sierra Club 
Duane Gibson, US House Natural Resources Committee 
Warren Gorbet, Maidu logger 
Rick Healy, US House Natural Resources Committee 
Steve Holmer, American Lands Alliance 
Michael Jackson, QLG/Friends of Plumas Wilderness 
Cathy Lacey, US Senator Dianne Feinstein 
Mike Leahy, National Audubon Society 
Jody Linker, US Senator Barbara Boxer 
Jane Braxton Little, journalist 
Jim Lyons, Under Secretary of Agriculture 
Michael McCloskey, Sierra Club 
Mike McGill, US Senator Dianne Feinstein 
Tom Nelson, QLG/Sierra Pacific Industries 
Erin Noel, Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign 
Felice Pace, Klamath Forest Alliance 
John Preschutti, Friends of Plumas Wilderness 
Kathy Reich, US Senator Dianne Feinstein 
Mark Rey, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
John Sheehan, QLG/Plumas Corporation  
Dallas Sholes, US Congressman Wally Herger 
Frank Stewart, QLG/Collins Pine Co. 
Kieran Suckling, Center for Biodiversity 
George and Pat Terhune, QLG 
Craig Thomas, Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign 
Jack Ward Thomas, US Forest Service 
Wayne Thornton, US Forest Service 
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3. 9-28-84, Ken Payton, NEW TIMBER, WATER RULES IN EFFECT FOR US FORESTS IN 
STATE, Sacramento Bee. 
 
4. 10-21-84, Jane Braxton Little, Small-town triumph for nature: After 30 years, Bucks Lake 
Wilderness is official, Sacramento Bee. 
 
5. 3-3-85, Jane Braxton Little, Timber firms learning to cope with slow times, Reno Gazette-
Journal. 
 
6. 6-26-85, Betty Nelson, Collins employees vote to extend contract. Timber Industry Trends. 
 
7. 8-20- 85, Jane Braxton Little, County's timber industry slow but steady, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
8. 11-3-85, Walt Wiley, COMPETITION CUTS AWAY AT STATE TIMBER TRADE 
Sacramento Bee. 
 
9. 1-23-86, Dennis Hanson, The Future of the Forests, Chico News & Review. 
 
10. 1-23-86, Jane Braxton Little, A plan to last 50 years: can sustain the Plumas forest?  Chico 
News & Review.  
 
11. 1-27-86, Jane Braxton Little, Stage set for ‘job survival’ battle on PNF plan, Feather River 
Bulletin.  
 
12. 2-12-86, Jane Braxton Little, Clearcutting: Assuring Future Forests? Portola Reporter. 
 
13. 3-27-86, Gary Voet, WHAT IS WILD? Sacramento Bee. 
 
14. 4-30-86, Jane Braxton Little, Quincy protesters want bigger wood harvests, Sacramento Bee. 
 
15. 5-7-86, Jane Braxton Little, Plumas rallies behind a maximum timber harvests, Feather River 
Bulletin.  
 
16. 5-7-86, Jane Braxton Little, Plumas evaluates comments on forest plan, Feather River 
Bulletin. 
 




18. 5-8-86, Jane Braxton Little, Controversy greets Plumas forest plan: deadline nears for public 
comment, Chico News & Review. 
 
19. 5-8-86, Danielle Toussaint, Budget axe falls on the forest: fewer services, higher fees at 
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22. 10-1-86, Jane Braxton Little, What threatens our supervisors? Indian Valley Record. 
 
23. 3-18-87, Walt Wiley, Retired Forester has Faith in Trees’ Future, Sacramento Bee. 
 
24. 4-8-87, Betsy Curry Week, Lumber forecast stable for 1987, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
25. 8-6-87, Jane Braxton Little, Timber slump felling town: Historic Greenville hopes it can 
mobilize to attract tourists, Sacramento Bee. 
 
26. 8-16-87, Jane Braxton Little, US Lumber Sales Policy Cuts out Small Companies, 
Residents Say, Sacramento Bee. 
 
27. 9-7-87, Jim Sanders, CREWS CONTAIN MORE THAN 1,000 OF STATE INFERNOS, 
Sacramento Bee. 
 
28. 2-14-88, PANELISTS DEBATE CLEAR CUTTING ON NATIONAL FORESTS, 
Sacramento Bee. 
 
29. January/February 1988, Jane Braxton Little, The Gadfly Botanist of Plumas County, Sierra 
Magazine. 
 
30. 1-27-88, Jane Braxton Little, Proposal would divide forest, Indian Valley Record.  
 
31. 1-27-88, Jane Braxton Little, Supes endorse forest split plan, Indian Valley Record.  
 
32. 2-2-88, Jane Braxton Little, Small sawmill seeks change in timber bidding, Sacramento 
Bee. 
 
33. 2-3-88, Jane Braxton Little, Small timber sales program wins high praise, Indian Valley 
Record. 
 
34. 3-2-88, Tom Wright, Lassen opposes Modoc Forest plan, Lassen County Times. 
 
35. 3-2-88, Tom Wright, At a glance: Timber receipts announced, Lassen County Times. 
 
36. 3-8-88, Tom Wright, Timber harvest to drop? Lassen County Times.  
 
37. 3-13-88, Jane Braxton Little, Industry charges errors in Lassen Forest plan, Feather River 
Bulletin.  
 




39. 8-27-88, Tom Wright, Crosses denounce Quincy logging, Feather River Bulletin.  
 
40. 8-31-88, Jane Braxton Little, Plumas releases Forest plan, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
41. 9-1-88, Ken Payton, Boost planned in Plumas timber sales, Sacramento Bee. 
 
42. 9-5-88, Sandra Gubel, New Forestry Standards Afoot, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
43. 9-7-88, Jane Braxton Little, Appeal already of Plumas plan, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
44. 9-13-88, Don Rogers, Nail-lined board found buried on logging road, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
45. 9-14-88, Jane Braxton Little, Not enough: industry against Forest plan, Feather River 
Bulletin.  
 
46. 9-15-88, Danielle Toussaint, Eyes Out For The Spotted Owl: On the Trail of the Forest’s 
Most Controversial Critter, Chico News & Review.  
 
47. 9-15-88, Jane Braxton Little, The 14-Pound Compromise, Few Satisfied With Huge New 
Forest Plan, Chico News & Review. 
 
48. 9-15-88, Jane Braxton Little, Forest Plan Calls For New Protections: Water, Wildlife, 
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49. 9-20-88, Tom Wright, Reward fund established, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
50. 9-28-88, Jane Braxton Little, Supervisors plan to appeal Plumas Forest plan, Feather River 
Bulletin. 
 
51. 10-5-88, Lynda Smith, Forest Service Rep Explains Management Plan, Feather River 
Bulletin. 
 
52. 10-12-88, Jane Braxton Little, Plumas Forest plan attacked from all sides, Sacramento Bee. 
 
53. 10-19-88, Jane Braxton Little, Nobody likes this Plumas forest plan, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
54. 10-11-89, Jane Braxton Little, Plumas Forest plan opposed by both sides, Sacramento 
Bee. 
 
55. 1-11-89, Jane Braxton Little, Plumas Forest plan hit by appeals, Feather River 
Bulletin. 
 
56. 1-12-89, Jane Braxton Little, Battle lines drawn over Plumas Forest plan, Chico News & 
Review.  
 
57. 1-31-89, Jane Feller, Board appeals Plumas plan, Lassen County Times. 
 





59. 2-15-89, Chris Bowman, DROUGHT TOLL: DEAD TREES TO OUTSELL LIVE ONES, 
Sacramento Bee. 
 
60.  4-23-89, Chris Bowman, BEST AND BIGGEST VANISH OLD-GROWTH TIMBER 
MAKES LAST STAND, Sacramento Bee.  
 
61. May/June ‘89, Jane Braxton Little, Collins Almanor:  A Selective Forest, American Forests. 
 
62. 5-24-89, Jane Braxton Little, $1 million loan would add jobs at sawmill, Indian Valley 
Record. 
 
63. 5-31-89, Jane Braxton Little, Mill undaunted by high-level rejection (see similar articles 
in 1988), Indian Valley Record. 
 
64. 7-22-89, Kevin Roderick Voracious Beetles Take Toll on Sierra Trees, Los Angeles Times. 
 
65. 8-22-89, Vandalism unsolved, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
66. 9-3-89, Jane Braxton Little, Loggers stack up complaints, Sacramento Bee. 
 
67. 9-5-89, Tom Wright, Yellow Ribbon Rally targets Bay Area, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
68. 9-6-89, Editorial Page, Letters to the Editor, Feather River Bulletin. 
 
69. 9-8-89, Jane Braxton Little, Vandals strike in Plumas: Engines damaged in 5 logging vehicles, 
Sacramento Bee. 
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82. 4-18-90, Jane Braxton Little, Protest divides Plumas: Some are seeing red over yellow 
ribbons, Sacramento Bee. 
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